My two-cents on MPCC 2018-030

In this post I will critique the Military Police Complaints Commission Final Report MPCC 2018-030.

This will be a somewhat long read, but it will be worth it.

I’m not going to critique each and every item in MPCC 2018-030. I’m just going to critique the items that I feel need to be critiqued or expanded upon.

Opening section of MPCC 2018-030

On June 23rd, 2011 the Military Police Complaints Commission made the following submission to the Independant Review Authority that was charged with reviewing the 1998 Amendmentd to the National Defence Act:

One of the issues noted by the Military Police Complaints Commission itself is that civilians, such as myself, do not have access to internal Canadian Forces grievances mechanisms. This means that when a civilian such as myself wishes to make a complaint against a member of the Canadian Forces military police, unlike members of the Canadian Armed Forces, we receive absolutely no assistance from the Canadian Forces nor do we receive assistance from the Military Police Complaints Commission.

Civilians are on their own.

A brief step back to 2011

Because the Military Police Complaints Commission raises the spectre of the previous MPCC review (MPCC 2011-045) I will briefly speak to it.

During my initial complaint in 2011 I had absolutely no access to any of the investigation paperwork.

All I knew is that on November 4th, 2011 Petty Office Steve Morris contacted me via telephone and told me that the CFNIS could find absolutely no evidence that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I accused him of.

P.S. was the same person that retired Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham told me about on November 27th, 2011 as having been investigated by the base military police for having inappropriate interactions with children on the base.

P.S., as I would later discover, had an extensive record for sexual crimes involving children. His attraction to children was in no doubt nurtured by the grooming P.S. received at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

At no time during the initial MPCC investigation (MPCC 2011-045) was any of the CFNIS paperwork shared with me. As such this was literal blind attempt to try to figure out what went so off the rails with the original 2011 CFNIS investigation.

And even if I had tried to obtain the investigation paperwork, the paperwork would have been very heavily redacted. And that’s if the paperwork even shows up within the established time frame for making a complaint. In August of 2018 I filed and ATI request for the paperwork from the 2015 to 2018 portion of CFNIS 2011-5754. It took 20 months for DND to respond to my request and provide the paperwork. The paperwork that I received was redacted to the point of being useless.

It wasn’t until I received the Certified Tribunal Records from the MPCC when I made my application for Judicial Review that I learnt exactly what had transpired during the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

Basically it was my father’s statement to the CFNIS that allowed the CFNIS to write my complaint off as meaningless. My father’s statement fit the narrative that the CFNIS needed. This narrative was that my brother and I never had a babysitter. And that I was obviously only doing this because I wanted easy money.

The only problem with my father’s statement is that even though I had no idea that the CFNIS had contacted my father in June of 2011, I had supplied the CFNIS with a copy of my foster care records from the Alberta Government. The CFNIS ignored the contents of these records. The MPCC wasn’t able to consider these records as they had not been before the CFNIS. And because both agencies ignored these records and didn’t consider these records in their respective reviews, these records were not allowed to be introduced in Federal Court during my application for Judicial Review. My foster care records and other documents such as my father’s statement acknowledging that there was in fact a babysitter in our house were struck as being “new evidence”.

What did these records have to say?
My father took no responsibility for his family.
My father blamed the problems that my brother and I were having on his mother.
My father had invited his mother into the house on base to raise my brother and after our mother had “abandoned us” at CFB Summerside.
My father was frequently absent due to military requirements.
That my father was so resistant to family counselling that I was to have been removed from the house and placed into foster care or residential care as a means to induce my father into the counselling that he so desperately required.

So why did my father spin such a fanciful and tall tale?
Well, he’s been dead since January 2017 so we’ll never find out.
But, my foster care records did observe that he often told people he perceived to be in positions of authority what he thought they wanted to hear. My foster care records also indicated that my father often changed his stories from one meeting to the next.

Basically, my father was a pathological liar who would say anything if he thought that it would make him look like the good guy.

How could a man like Richard ever publicly admit that he willingly put his children in a position to be sexually abused because he placed his military career above all else.

For my father to tell the CFNIS in 2011 that he had never heard about a babysitter when he spent every year from 1980 until 1987 when I moved out of the house, blaming me for allowing and encouraging the babysitter to touch my younger brother, was beyond belief.

And yes, when I examined my father for Federal Court in 2013, he admitted that he hadn’t been truthful with the CFNIS in 2011. He admitted that there had in fact been a babysitter in the house. But as usual he blamed his mother for hiring the babysitter. He also basically admitted that he kidnapped my brother and I in 1977 and that our mother hadn’t really abandoned the family.

So, why didn’t I raise these issues with the MPCC in 2012 when I was interviewed?

I had absolutely no idea of what was in the CFNIS investigation paperwork that the Provost Marshal had submitted to the Military Police Complaints Commission. This is by far the biggest flaw with the whole MPCC complaints process. A complainant such as myself is literally playing “pin the tail on the donkey” in a tilt-a-whirl with absolutely no assistance from anyone. No assistance from the MPCC. No assistance from the Provost Marshal. No assistance from the Canadian Forces ombudsman.

The evidence that I collected, it was all considered new evidence, even though most of it had been in the possession of the CFNIS during the original CFNIS investigation.

I can only wonder how the previous 2011 CFNIS investigation has poisoned the Alberta Crown to ever prosecuting P.S.. I can’t see the Alberta Crown coming out and admitting that they got hoodwinked by the CFNIS in 2011.

I know from the Certified Tribunal Records that I received as part of my application for Judicial Review in 2013 that the CFNIS fed the Alberta Crown a rather horrid plate of B.S..

During my interview with the CFNIS on March 31st, 2011 I told CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock that I had twice tried reporting P.S. to the military police. Once in 1984, and once in 1990. For what ever reason, the CFNIS in 2011 made the decision to not pass this information on to the Alberta Crown. This resulted in Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki making the follwoing observation which no doubt figured heavily in his decicision to not prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester.

My younger brother at the time would have been between four and six years of age when the babysitter, P.S. was abusing him. P.S. would have been between the ages of thirteen and fifteen when he was absuing my younger brother. That’s not “childhood curiosity and experimentation”. And is very obvious that Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki is placing very heavy emphasis on “the fact that no complaint was made to any party or a person in authority after P.S. moved away is very significant.”

P.S. was born in June of 1965. He would have been 14 in June of 1979. He would have been just weeks shy of his 15th birthday when he was found buggering me in his bedroom. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act P.S. would have been fully culpable for his crimes. Yes, it’s true that P.S. would have to be charged under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, but he’s already had a lifetime of prosecution for sexual offences involving children. It’s not like he’s going to do any jail time or face any serious consequences other than officially being found guilty.

I know that Chief Alberta Crown Prosecutor Orest Yeriniuk is extremely upset that I was allowed to see this document. I can only wonder if the Crown’s continued reluctance to prosecute P.S. is a function of retaliation.

I know from my complaint to the Alberta Criminal Injuries Review Board that the CFNIS heavily edited the documents that it submitted to the Alberta Crown in 2011. For example on Tuesday August 9th, 2011 P.S. called CFNIS investigator Mcpl Robert Jon Hancock and stated the following:

However, this is what was submitted to the Alberta Crown:

Notice something missing? As we shall see later on, P.S. did have extensive involvement with the military police for what had transpired on CFB Namao from August of 1978 until May of 1980. Why didn’t the CFNIS want the Alberta Crown to know this? It’s not like the Alberta Crown would have any access to military police records. Surely, if the CFNIS wanted to present a strong case, they would have submitted the military’s records relating to the activities of P.S. from August of 1978 until May of 1980.

And in a way, I can fully understand Orest Yeriniuk’s continued refusal to prosecute. Going against the original decision made by Werbicki in November of 2011 to not prosecute P.S. would be considered improper and a rebuke of Werbicki’s independence as a Crown Prosecutor. This is not something the Crown undertakes lightly.

Also, the Alberta Crown would essentially be admitting that it didn’t perform due diligence in this matter and had the wool pulled over their eyes by a police force with a very questionable record.

Pretty bad when the Minister of National Defence says this.

When I made my first complaint in March of 2011, the case was only 31 years old. Not 40.

I was a pre-pubescent child. My brother a was pre-pubescent child. P.S. was a young adult who had passed through puberty. Not the same category. None of the children that P.S. was abusing was sexually developed. P.S. was fully sexually matured.

Earl Ray Stevens – a 32 year old complaint.

In March of 2017 I made a complaint against Earl Ray Stevens. He was a commissionaire at the Denison Armouries when I was in cadets. He had also been a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces. He started sexually abusing me just after the summer of 1985. He took advantage of the fact that he knew my father was in the Canadian Forces and that the Commissionaires had special authority under the National Defence Act that placed them almost at the same level as military police. Basically the threats were that if I ever told anyone about what he was doing, that he’d tell my father. I’d be kicked out of cadets. But even worse than that, my father would find out that I had sex with men. This is not something that any male child living on a Canadian Forces Base at the time wanted anyone to know.

The CFNIS took the investigation as the abuses occured on Canadian Forces military property.

The case was initially investigated by the CFNIS in Borden, ON. CFNIS Borden then handed the case over to the Toronto Police Services. The Toronto Police Service laid six charges against Earl within weeks of taking the case on.

I had provided even less evidence to the CFNIS in the matter of Earl Ray Steven.

And the Ontario Crown was worried that as I was 14 when the abuse started that Earl’s defence lawyer would be able to argue that I had consented to willfully have sexual intercourse with a 42 year old man.

In 2018 I took part in the preliminary hearing. The hearing lasted two days. At the end of the hearing the justice overseeing the matter determined that there was more than sufficient evidence and the case was moved up to Superior Court for trial.

Unfortunately Earl died of bladder cancer before the trial.

But at least he was charged. And at least we were heading to trial.

Why the difference?

Liability.

Earl worked for the Canadian Corp of Commissionaires. The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence cannot be sued for the actions of an employee of a subcontractor.

P.S. was abused by an employee of the Department of National Defence. P.S. was a juvenile at the time of his offences. The Juvenile Delinquents Act said that the adult who contributed to the delinquency of a minor could be held responsible. This means that just as P.S. sued the Minister of National Defence in 2001, anyone abused by P.S. would be eligible to sue the minister as well…. so long as their was a direct link established by the victim of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae. Without charges against P.S., there can be no link.

Limited disclosure to outside agencies

I can only wonder who it was that determined which information it was that was released to the Alberta Victim of Crimes board. You have to remember that in a CFNIS investigation, the CFNIS investigators can’t do anything without the expressed permission or instruction of the Chain of Command.

RCAF Station Namao ceased to exist in 1968 with the unification of the Forces. It was CFB Namao when we lived there. CFB Namao and CFB Griesbach formed CFB Edmonton.

I was 7 when the abuse started in the fall of 1978 and 8 when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

My younger brother would have been 4 when the abuse started and 6 when the abuse ended.

P.S. would have been 13 when the abuse started and weeks shy of his 15th birthday when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

Again, having not seen any of the paperwork from the 2011 CFNIS investigation I was not able to flag any of the obvious flaws with the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

As I stated previously, it was only after I had received the certified tribunal records from the Military Police Complaints Commission that I was able to finally see just how horrific and putrid the 2011 CFNIS investigation actually was.

Any evidence that I submitted in my records to the Federal Court to show that the CFNIS had really bungled the investigation was struck from the hearings as “New Evidence”. New evidence included documents that I had exchanged with the CFNIS in 2011, but which were never submitted to the MPCC during the MPCC 2011-045/054. New evidence was copies of emails between myself and the investigators which were not passed on to the MPCC during the review.

It was after RCMP Akrum Ghadban reviewed the 2011 CFNIS investigation as well as the new information that I had as a result of my telephone calls with both P.S. and his father J.S. that the decision was made to re-open the investigation.

There were four items that Insp Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to concentrate on.
1) Locating the younger brother of P.S.
2) Talking to a potential witness who had possibly seen the beating I took from the older kids when I left P.S.’s house after he was discovered buggering me in his bedroom.
3) Talking to Fred Cunningham
4) Locating records of my 1984 and 1990 complaints. Unlike what the CFNIS had claimed, Insp Ghadban said that he noted that I did in fact mention this to the CFNIS in 2011. And yes, I do have a copy of my video statement to the CFNIS and yes, I do mention these two events.

Locating the younger brother of P.S. was tricky. At first the S. family was claiming that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast and never contacted the family. One family member even suggested that the younger brother was deceased. As it turned out, the younger brother at the time was living in Welland Ontario, just a short distance away from where P.S. and his father J.S. were living in Fort Erie, Ontario. It turns out that the younger brother was actually in frequent contact with the rest of the S. family.

Locating the witness was easy, but sadly the witness was only around 11 at the time and can’t remember anything. He does remember P.S. though.

Fred Cunningham was easy enough for the CFNIS to locate. Even more stunning was the location of the CFSIU paperwork which contrary to what Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre told me in January of 2011 indicated that Fred Cunningham was a very key player in the investigation of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae.

Fred Cunningham was such a key player that he was the primary witness for the prosecution during the court martial of Captain Father Angus McRae.

During the 2015 through 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation, Sgt. Tenaschuk would often tell me that he was trying to locate any copies of the records from when I attended the military police shack on CFB Namao in 1984 and 1990 to make my complaints against P.S. but that the record keeping system from then left a lot to be desired. Sgt. Tenaschuk wouldn’t be the first person to find issue with the military’s historical record system. This was brought up in the ’90s during the Somalia hearings.

McRae is officially labeled as a pedophile.

As it turns out, in 1980 they knew that alcohol was being given to the children “hanging around” at his living quarters (the rectory at the chapel).

Examination of Fred Cunningham during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

And yes, they knew what McRae was doing in the Rectory at the chapel:

Examination of Sgt. Ryan during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

It’s nice to finally see Captain McRae called out for what he was. It’s also nice to see that my recollection of P.S. taking me to the chapel is in the official records. I told the CFNIS about these five visits on May 3rd, 2011 when Mcpl Christian Cyr called me to ask me if I remembered anything about the base chaplain, Captain McRae, having been charged with molesting children. I sent Cyr some information that evening. I told Mcpl Cyr that I remembered 5 different visits to the rectory at the chapel. That these visits always ended with P.S. giving me a tumbler with a “sickly sweet grape juice”. I told Cyr that I didn’t remember anything after the grape juice, not even how I got home. I even sent Mcpl Cyr maps and descriptions of the rectory.

This however is not what was recorded in Mcpl Cyr’s occurrence report.

This was:

From MPCC 2011-045 Certified Tribunal Records.

During the 2011 portion of the CFNIS investigation the CFNIS scrubbed any and all mention of Captain McRae from the investigation.

As this information does not show up in the records the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal submitted to the MPCC in 2012, the MPCC was completely unaware of this. The MPCC did not share any information with me during the MPCC review of 2011-5754 as they’re not required to. As such I wasn’t able to raise any concerns about the creative editing and the narrative provided by this creative editing. Because I couldn’t raise these issues during the MPCC review I was unable to enter these into Federal Court as they were now considered “new evidence”.

The more I think about it now, the more I realize that the CFNIS in 2011 knew about the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. They knew about P.S.’s extensive criminal record for child molestation. And the CFNIS or the relevant chain of command must have concluded that I was just looking for a quick buck, that somehow I must have heard about the settlement between P.S. and the Minister and therefore I decided that I wanted some easy money.

Might explain why my father’s statement was so custom tailored to the wishes of the CFNIS even though his statement was easily proved wrong by the various social service records my family accumulated across Canada.

A brief trip to the Federal Court for Judicial Review.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

In the written examination of my father he admits that there was a babysitter in the house and he can’t offer an explanation as to why he willingly told the CFNIS in 2011 that there wasn’t.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

The lawyer representing the Attorney General of Canada went through the roof when I introduced the emails between myself and Master Corporal Christain Cyr as well as the written examinations of both my father and my brother.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

It’s funny, but the justice that reviewed my matter was basically okay with striking my “new evidence” because it didn’t appear in the CFNIS investigation even though my documents showed that it had been presented to and made known to the CFNIS.

Sure, I know, I know…… “but Bobbie why didn’t you challenge the absurdity of this in the Supreme Court of Canada”.

Supreme court ain’t cheap. And I don’t have $100k plus kicking around to go tilting at windmills.

Sometimes you gotta take the bad judgments and just walk away.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement
From T_317_13 Final Judgement

This is one of the massive flaws with the courts in this country. The courts do not assist in the location of information that the courts themselves have access to.

It wasn’t until after this hearing that I was able to contact the Edmonton lawyer who represented P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence. The lawyer in a way confirmed the identity of P.S.. Or more succinctly I should state that this lawyer was unwilling to go on record and state that the P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was NOT my babysitter P.S.

This lawyer also gave me a bit of advice. He said that I should think long and hard about going after DND. He said that given the chance, he’d never do this again. I think the point this lawyer was making is that DND and the Department of Justice have extremely deep pockets and can tie anyone up in court long enough that you’ll be happy to take any scrap of a settlement they’re willing to throw your way.

And I know there is some truth to this.

P.S. started his action in March of 2001. The Canadian Forces Director of Civil Liabilities and Claims made the offer to settle in November of 2008. That’s almost 7-1/2 years of court for a matter in which a member of the Canadian Armed Forces admitted to and plead guilty to molesting a military dependent on a military establishment. The liability couldn’t be more clear cut. Yet DND and the absurdly named “Department of Justice” spent 7-1/2 years trying to weasel out of compensating a victim.

In my July 2015 telephone call with P.S., he confirmed that P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was his civil action but that an NDA agreement prevents him from discussing the matter.

To date DND has stonewalled me for any information related to P.S. v Minister of National Defence.

It wasn’t until I got creative and submitted an Access to Information request to the Department of Justice for their records related to their defence of the Minister of National Defence in the matter of P.S. v. Minister of National Defence that I discovered that the Minister settled with P.S. in November of 2008.

But this is all information that is easily available to the courts. These are court records.

It really makes me sick to realize that the courts have all of this power, but willingly play stupid.

So far as liability goes. The Juvenile Delinquents Act is very clear in that the adult responsible for the delinquency is responsible for the consequences.

Yes, I could have appealed this to the Supreme Court, but with court costs and expenses estimated to be over $100,000.00 sometimes it better to just walk away.

P.S. v. Minister of National Defence confirmed.

Here the MPCC is stating something that the Federal Court of Canada was unwilling to state even though the Federal Court had easy access to these records:

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

Again, Mr. X is P.S.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

McRae died three months after the start of the investigation into my complaint against P.S. McRae died 17 days after Mcpl Cyr asked me if I remembered anything about McRae.

You need to bear in mind that when the investigation plan was put into action that Angus McRae was still alive. This posed a very serious dilemma for the CFNIS. Depending on the outcome of their investigation into P.S. they might be able to charge P.S., but due to the fact that Angus McRae was subject to the Code of Service Discipline in 1980 no matter what crimes P.S. implicated McRae in the 3-year time bar would prevent the CFNIS from even charging Angus McRae.

The email that started it all.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

The Edmonton Police Service didn’t refer me to anyone. The EPS contacted the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team. ASIRT in turn contacted the CFNIS. The CFNIS assumed jurisdiction.

My original message to the Edmonton Police Service:

Edmonton Police Service internal message:

Another internal Edmonton Police Service email:

ASIRT contacting the CFNIS:

Warrant Officer Blair Hart contacting Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger:

Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger stating CFNIS will take jurisdiction and even mentioning that in 1980 jurisdiction would have belinged to the RCMP.

So no, at no time did I contact the CFNIS on my own. If I had known in 2011 that this was going to investigated by the Canadian Forces I would have just walked away.

MPCC 2018-030

Remember, the CFNIS submitted such horrific evidence to the Alberta Crown that the Alberta Crown wondered if anything had happened at all outside of “childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

Also, the first communication I had from the CFNIS indicating that the investigation was over was on November 4th, 2011.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Petty Officer Morris’ words were that “the CFNIS could find no evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I had accused him of” and that the investigation was going to be closed.

MPCC 2018-030

Again, bear in mind that during the 2012 MPCC investigation I was not shown any of the documentation that was supplied to the MPCC by the CFNIS and I was therefore unable to question some of the questionable decisions by the CFNIS in 2011. As a result of this, any evidence that I entered into court was struck as being “new evidence” as I didn’t raise this evidence during the MPCC review. Neat how that works, eh?

MPCC 2018-030

I can only wonder if the Alberta Crown’s continued refusal to prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester is an act of retribution against me by the Alberta Crown for the fuss I’ve raised over Alberta Crown Prosecutor Jon Werbicki’s Crown opinion. I was never supposed to have seen that Crown opinion. They’re considered privileged documents.

Request for a Public Interest Hearing.

MPCC 2018-030

The funny thing about the MPCC declining to convene a public interest hearing is that it was the MPCC itself in 2011 that had stated in the “Military Police Complaints Commission Submissions to the Independent Review Authority” that having the Provost Marshal respond to the commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff “runs counter to Canadian law and practice regarding the independence of police investigations generally”.

Basically, what is being stated here is that when the police are investigating a criminal matter, the police answer to no one but the law itself. However, this is not possible in the Canadian Armed Forces as members of the CFNIS as well as the chain of command of the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal are members of the Canadian Forces and are bound by the National Defence Act as well as the Queen’s Regulations and Orders and must obey their superiors at all times.

This chain of command means that the investigator investigating my matter is subordinate to the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence is the very same entity that I would have to sue for civil damages.

This excerpt is from a Supreme Court of Canada matter which the Military Police Complaints Commisison raised within its submissions to the Independent Review Authority on June 23rd, 2011.

The Military Police Complaints Commission was taking issue with ammendments made to the National Defence Act which would allow for the Vice Chief of Defence Staff to direct the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal in any Professional Standards review and and military police investigation. The Surpeme Court of Canada has long recognized that it is improper for a police agency to receive instuction or guideance from any agency that may stand to be subject to civil actions depending on the outcome of the police agency.

The Military Police Complaints Commission itself pointed out that the Vice Chief of Defence Staff is not a Peace Officer unlike the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal must obey the lawful commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff must obey the lawful commands of the Chief of Defence Staff. And the Chief of Defence Staff must obey the wishes of the Minister of National Defence.

And as illustrated in the matter of P.S. v. Mininster of National Defence, it is the Minister with direct authority over the military police that I would have to initiate a civil action against and that the success of this civil action is solely dependent on the findings of the military police investigation that the minister may issue instructions for.

National Defence Act
Revised statutes of Canada 1985, Chapter N-5
Current as of 2019-08-01

Section 18.4 defines the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal.

Section 18.5 gives the Vice Chief of Defence Staff certain responsibilities over the Provost Marshal.

Section 83 and 85 state that EVERY member of the Canadian Forces will without hesitation obey the lawful commands of their superior. There are no exceptions for the military police or the CFNIS or the Provost Marshal, or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, or the Chief of Defence staff. Each and every one of them must obey the commands of their superior. The ultimate superior in this chain is the Minister of National Defence.

This type of obedience does not exist in any civilian police department to the best of my knowledge.

Interference Complaint

So, why didn’t I file an inference complaint?

Becuase only members of the military police conducting or supervising an investigation may make an interference complaint.

Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The last sentence of the excerpt above should be very concerning to anyone who understands what it means. Due to the Chain of Command Influence within the Canadian Armed Forces, if interference in an investigation occurs high enough up the Chain of Command, the military police investigator may be completely unaware of the interference. It’s sad that the MPCC wrote this observation in 2011 but pretends that interference couldn’t have possibly been an issue in my matter which stood to expose the Minister of National Defence to Civil Actions.

Pre-1998 Brick Wall.

MPCC 2018-030

The Canadian Forces Military Police and the MPCC often hide behind this “brick wall” that was errected in December of 1999 with the creation of the Military Police Complaints Commission. The CFNIS and the MPCC both claim that they cannot take anything from the 1980 CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae into account as this happened prior to 1999.

Refusal to hand over documents to the MPCC for review.

MPCC 2018-030

Unlike in 2012, this time around the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal declined to provide the Military Police Complaints Commission a copy of the Crown Brief or the response from the Crown. The decision to not supply the MPCC with these documents more than likely stems from how embarrassing it was for both the Alberta Crown and the CFNIS for me to have obtained the prior Crown Brief and the decision by the Crown.

However, as I have the tribunal records from the Alberta Victims of Crime, I can state for a fact that the CFNIS basically just regurgitated the original 2011 investigation Crown Brief.

MPCC 2018-030

The MPCC did ask me to sign a consent form allowing them to retrieve the a copy of the Crown Brief from the Alberta Victims of Crime seeing as how the Provost Marshal was declining to hand over a copy. As I’ve seen the Crown Brief I know that the CFNIS added sweet bugger all to the original 2011 Crown Brief and basically just resubmitted the original 2011 mess. And then they act surprised when the Crown refuses to prosecute.

Mention of RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban

MPCC 2018-030
MPCC 2018-030
MPCC 2018-030

Okay, so the CPIC check is interesting. But it misses out on some of the details that are in the newspaper article below.

Deep River, Ontario is just north of Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. CFB Petawawa is where P.S.’s family had been transfered to in June of 1980.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Deep+River,+ON/@46.0342639,-77.4257889,11z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x4cd6def70c3cdefd:0x1ca01a3335c67a5f!8m2!3d46.0976628!4d-77.4933397

The 1984 charge from Manitoba is missing. This one involved an 8 year old boy in Manitoba.

There were TWO charges in 1985. One for molesting a 9 year old boy on Canadian Forces Base Namao after his family had been transferred back there in 1985. And one for molesting a 13 year old newspaper boy in Edmonton after the Canadian Forces ordered him out of the military housing and off the base. His father, J.S., rented him an apartment in the west end of Edmonton.

So, that’s a total of four charges involving children prior to 1985. And they’re only listing the crimes he was convicted of. What’s not listed, but what is available in his CPIC file, is the numerous charges that were stayed or dismissed.

So, I hope you understand why I get annoyed when I think back to the phone call I received on November 4th, 2011 from Petty Office Steve Morris stating that the CFNIS couldn’t find anything to indicate that P.S. was capable of the crimes that I had accused him of.

Warrant Officer Fred R. Cunningham

MPCC 2018-030

This is correct, the CFSIU which after the separation of the intelligence section, went on to become the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service. The CFSIU primarily concerned itself with “serious and sensitive” offences committed by service members, much the same as the modern day CFNIS. The base military police then, much as they do today, looked after the smaller menial occurrences.

CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434
CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434

At the time of the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae in 1980, Fred Cunningham was Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham of the CFSIU. Fred was a Military Police officer with the base military police but was then transfered over to the CFSIU and became the Acting Section Commander.

When I spoke with Fred on November 27th, 2011, he wouldn’t elaborate what function he did with the military police. He said that he was very familiar with the P.S. and Captain McRae affair.

He said that the base MPs had received numerous complaints about P.S. and that this led to the investigation of P.S. by the base military police. According to Fred, when P.S. was questioned in his father’s house P.S. named Captain Father Angus McRae. Fred stated that the CFSIU had the charges related to three boys ready to go to court martial, but that the brass cut the charges down to only those charges involving P.S.

Fred stated that one of the other boys who had his charges against McRae dismissed by the brass thought that P.S. had stabbed him in the back. Fred Cunningham said that this other boy was named either Fred or Frank and that he was a prolific pyromaniac on the base and had set numerous fires.

As a side note, I was able to determine who this other kids was. His initials are F.A.. His family’s PMQ was involved with fires that F.A. was found to have set. According to one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports F.A. like to play the “hero” by “discovering” the fire after it had been set. F.A. had a tendency to try to blame his sisters for setting the fires. F.A. had also been to a psychiatric hospital to help him deal with his urges.

And, one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports indicate that F.A. and P.S. were good friends going so far as playing with fire together.

Just on a side note, on September 11th, 1978 the Canadian Forces Military Police on CFB Namao knew that P.S. was 13.

CF Fire Marshal report 7667-2-E16
ATIP A-2016-00793
MQ #26 – 12 St is where P.S. lived, MQ #21 – 12 Street is where F.A. lived.

I have the Edmonton Telephone Directories from 1978, 1979, and 1980 which confirm the family names of the persons living in these Married Quarters.

When I asked Fred Cunningham is he was insinuating that this Fred boy had anything to to with the fire at the P.S. residence on June 23rd, 1980 which resulted in the death of a civilian contractor, Fred Cunningham responded ” I am not going to speak to that”.

Fred also said that the brass wouldn’t allow the base military police to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.

Fred pleaded with me to understand that the military police tried everything to get Captain McRae transferred into the civilian system but that the brass wouldn’t allow for that to happen.

Fred Cunningham was of the opinion that P.S. should never have been allowed to babysit children and that P.S. was having “mental problems” at the time and that he was a very “unsavory character”.

In 2011, after having talked to Fred Cunningham about this, I sent a letter to the Provost Marshal at the time hoping that this would show the Provost Marshal that something bad happened on CFB Namao in 1978 through 1980 and that he should have the CFNIS take a deeper look. In early January of 2012, I received a telephone call from Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre telling me to not put much faith in what Cunningham had told me, that Cunningham wasn’t involved in the original investigation and was probably telling me second or third hand information.

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The person “x” above is P.S.

P.S. was not the subject of a formal military police investigation because the military police at the time could not investigate P.S..

According to the National Defence Act at the time, the military police could only arrest military dependants who were outside of Canada accompanying their serving parent on Canadian Forces business. That’s actually still the case today.

The military police at the time would have had to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.. And according to Fred Cunningham the base military police and the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit were being prevented by the chain of command from calling in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S..

If the Canadian Forces had called in RCMP to deal with P.S., the Canadian Forces would have lost the ability to throw a gag-order over the Juvenile Delinquent Court. Yes, the Juvenile Court could easily prevent the naming of P.S., but they wouldn’t be able to prevent the naming of Captain Father Angus McRae and the delinquencies that Captain McRae was being charged with enabling a minor to commit.

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No one believed that P.S. was 12 years old at the time. P.S. was born in June of 1965. Captain McRae arrived at CFB Namao in August of 1978 from Canadian Forces Station Holberg on Vancouver Island. P.S. didn’t start abusing children until after Captain McRae started grooming P.S.. So this would have been in the fall of 1978. P.S. would have been about 13-1/2. P.S. would have turned 14 in June of 1979.

As indicated above, Canadian Forces records indicate that they knew in September of 1978 that P.S. was 13 years old.

In fact, the Canadian Forces NEEDED P.S. to be over the age of 14. According to a Court Martial Appeal Court matter titled Regina v. Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan from 1986 the Canadian Forces only retained the right to conduct a court martial for the crimes of Gross Indecency, and Indecent Assault so long as there was the possibility of consent. No consent meant the case had to be tried in a civilian court. No child under the age of consent can consent to have sexual relations with an adult. The age of consent in Canada at the time was 14.

C.M.A.C. 246 March 4, 1986
Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan v. Her Majesty the Queen (Regina)

As can been seen by the above excerpt, the military had the right to conduct a court martial against Captain McRae in the matter of Gross Indecency so long as there was the possibility that P.S. consented.

I wonder if any of this information from Fred Cunningham was passed on to the Alberta Crown.

If it wasn’t I wonder why?

Fred Cunningham was originally contacted by the CFNIS in early 2016.

For some reason he was very reluctant to sit down for a recorded interview with the CFNIS.

I wonder if Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre had truly put the fear of god into Fred Cunningham back in December 2011 when I told the Provost Marshal what Fred had told me. After all for some reason Sansterre seemed to really want me to forget and not pay much attention to what Cunningham had told me. I’m still convinced that Sansterre or one of his underlings at the Canadian Forces Military Police group threatened Cunningham with violating the Official Secrets Act / the Security of Information Act for having discussed the matter of Captain McRae’s court martial with me in violation of the in-camera order that was applied to the court martial in July of 1980 by the Western Commander of the Canadian Forces for the sole goal of “protecting the morals” of Canadians.

Protecting the Public Morals of Canadians.
ATI A-2019-00017 McRae Court Martial Transcript
RSC 1970, Chapter N-4, National Defence Act

Court Martial hearings are supposed to be open to the public, just as court proceedings are.

Basically the Canadian Forces didn’t want the Canadian public to discover that not only had an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relations on a military base. The Canadian Armed Forces didn’t want the Canadian public learning that an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relationships with children ranging in age from 15 to as young as possibly 4. As long as the Canadian Forces could hide this court martial, the Canadian Forces could portray it as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces having homosexual relations with a person who consented to the sexual activity.

ATI A-2018-00780
ATI A-2018-00780
MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

For someone who the CFNIS in 2011 couldn’t find any evidence against, P.S. sure keeps being mentioned as someone who liked to touch younger children.

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A lot of things back then seemed to have been dealt with “unofficially” back then if you know what I mean.

The funny thing about this is the MPCC and the CFNIS seem to have both neglected to mention my recording of the telephone call I had with retired Sgt. J.S., the father of P.S.. J.S. directly implicates his son.

Sgt. Tenaschuk called me in September of 2016 to inform me that the CFNIS was about ready to wrap up the investigation. Sgt. Tenaschuk asked me if there was anything else he thought that the CFNIS could do to satisfy me that they had tried everything this time. I suggested that the CFNIS run a Crime Stoppers appeal. Tenaschuk said that he would have to consult with his superiors to see if they would agree to this.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Note that the investigator can’t simply request a Crime Stoppers appeal. The investigator has to appeal to their chain of command. I also find it interesting that for a 40 year old case that lacks evidence that one Crime Stoppers appeal that ran for about two days in the media was garnering tips.

This appeal ran for two days. Better than nothing.

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7 tips for a two day appeal? Not too shabby.

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Victim D was James Paluck. James is the one who told me that the sickly sweet grape juice was actually Manischewitz wine. James also told me about P.S.’s convictions in 1985 and both James and P.S.’s younger brother had been riding the bus to M.E. LaZert high school in Edmonton when the other school kids started teasing P.S.’s younger brother about his older brother being a child molester. Unfortunately James passed away. However, before James passed away he did give me the name of one other victim to go looking for.

Victim C is the youngest of three boys. He currently lives on the East Coast. When I spoke to him he was fearful of coming forward as he didn’t want to jeopardize his career. The middle brother was having issues that the younger brother believed was directly attributable to the abuse on CFB Namao at the hands of McRae and P.S.. The eldest brother committed suicide years ago. The younger brother blames the way the military handled the abuse investigation back in the 1980s as being a contributing factor.

On a side note, I recently learnt of another former military dependent from Canadian Forces Base Namao that had been abused by Captain McRae who would later go on to commit suicide. This dependent’s brother recently contacted me.

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I can only wonder what these “painful memories” were. The CFNIS seemed to have scrubbed them from the investigation paperwork.

It should be noted that the interview with Victim C occurred on January 12, 2017.

It was in early February 2017 that Sgt Tenaschuk contacted me and told me about finding the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit case file for the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae. One of the things that Tenaschuk said has stuck with me. He said that it was very odd that this file still existed. He said that usually the military disposes of paperwork after a certain period. And seeing as how Captain McRae was convicted and subsequently booted out of the military in the early 1980s, this file shouldn’t exist anymore, but here it was.

This got me wondering. Maybe this file only continued to exist because it had been accessed frequently between 1980 and the current day because other victims of Captain McRae and P.S. kept coming forward over the years.

Maybe this is what drove P.S. to attempt suicide in 2000. He knew that he was never going to be free of what happened on CFB Namao.

Sgt. Tenaschuk read to me excerpts from the file. Unlike what J.S. had told me in July of 2015, it wasn’t J.S. that obtained the name of Captain McRae from his son P.S.. It was two base military police officers whom had interrogated P.S. in the kitchen of his family PMQ. Sgt. Tenaschuk said that just about everything else that Fred Cunningham had told me in 2011 was backed up by this paperwork. I asked Sgt. Tenaschuk for the name of this paperwork. He replied that it’s “CFSIU DS 120-10-80”. I filed an ATIP for CFSIU DS- 120-10-80 as soon as I got off the phone with Sgt. Tenaschuk.

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I forget how I was first put in contact with victim A, but if I remember correctly he contacted me via Facebook after having seen one of my postings in one of the Base Brat groups on Facebook. He’s a good guy. I’ve only met him twice face to face. His employment allows his to come out to the West Coast periodically. He has been willing in the past to go on camera so long as he is allowed to sit behind a screen. Being a sexually abused male carries such a bad stigma, especially in the line of work that he’s in that he doesn’t want anyone knowing who he actually is. And this I can totally understand.

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Again Mstr [X] refers to P.S..

Bear in mind that no one involved with my investigation had tried to locate this paperwork. It was only when the CFNIS commenced an investigation into the complaint made by Victim A that the CFNIS Western Region tracked down the paperwork.

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Remember, Corporal White was investigating the complaint of “Victim A”. No one from my investigation had tried obtaining the court martial records. P.S. was the main prosecution witness against Captain McRae.

In July of 2015 when I spoke with J.S. he told me how when his family was living on CFB Petawawa, the Canadian Forces wanted his son P.S. to fly back to Edmonton by himself to testify against Captain McRae. J.S. said that after much back-and-forth the Canadian Forces agreed to allow J.S. to fly to Edmonton with his son. However, J.S. was barred from entering the court martial. This would have been illegal at the time. Children have a right to have a parent or guardian present during any manner of court proceeding. The fact that the court martial panel didn’t want J.S. to hear his son’s testimony shows how far the Canadian Forces were willing to go to keep the actions of Captain McRae under wraps.

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And here it is ladies and gentlemen, the moment we’ve all been waiting for:

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There it is in black and white Ladies and Gentlemen, the words that the CFNIS and the Canadian Forces chain of command have been very fucking reluctant to say or even acknowledge. P.S. was sexually abusing younger children on the base and the military police in 1980 WERE aware of the abuse.

Having been investigated by the base military police in 1980 for sexually abusing younger children should have proved that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I accused him of. At least the should have allowed me to face P.S. in a court of law out of the hands of the military.

The Alberta Victims of Crime – 2018 Crown Brief.

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It should be understood that the 2011 ‘remarks’ are from the Crown Brief that was submitted to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki.

The reason that I had applied for benefits from the Victims of Crime Financial benefits program is that the victim services officer with the Canadian Forces suggested that I approach the Alberta Victims of Crime program for financial assistance to get counselling services.

As I’ve explained elsewhere as I’m not a member of the Canadian Forces I don’t qualify for counselling services from the Canadian Forces.

Alberta and British Columbia have both declined to assist me with counselling. British Columbia stating that the crimes didn’t occur in British Columbia, so it’s not their responsibility to pay.

Alberta first said that as I’m not a resident of Alberta, they’re not going to pay for counselling in another province. Then Alberta further declined stating that the crimes happened on a military reserve, therefore the Canadian Forces should pay.

Basically everyone just passes the buck.

And from what I’ve heard from other former base brats, this is common. Base brats quite often fall through social safety nets as the provinces look for any excuse to not deal with us.

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Section 156 of the 1980 Criminal Code was Indecent Assault on Male. This was an indictable offence. The sentence was for up to ten years and to be whipped. As a juvenile, P.S. would have received at most a stint in reform school, if that.

Also, what I find odd about this is Petty Office Steve Morris called me on November 4th, 2011 and told me that the CFNIS couldn’t find any evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I had accused him of.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I think Mr. Ghadban is being a little over generous here. After all, the CFNIS ‘forgot’ to mention to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki that I had tried twice previously to report P.S. to the military police. The CFNIS outright ignored the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. The CFNIS in 2011 could have just as easily obtained the court martial transcripts for Captain McRae as Corporal White did in the 2018 CFNIS investigation into the complaint against P.S. by the other victim.

In 2011 there would have been nothing preventing the CFNIS from changing the scope of the investigation while McRae was alive and changed the status of P.S. from accused to witness and then proceeded after McRae. But again, connecting my sexual abuse to the actions of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae has always been the last thing the Canadian Forces chain of command have wanted.

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Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I urge you to search for a Macleans Magazine article from the early 2000s called “The CFB Gagetown Rape Controversy”. I won’t get too much into that other that it was a story about a flawed military police investigation related to the rape of a developmentally challenged woman by four male soldiers at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in New Brunswick. One of the things that was noted is that the military police would often submit laughable cases to the local Crown Prosecutors knowing full well that the Crown would recommend against charges. This way the military could tell the victim that it was the Crown’s fault that charges were being pursued.

This rape and the subsequent investigation occurred prior to the Somalia Inquiry. The Somalia Inquiry found that the Canadian Forces justice system was prone to abuse and manipulation from the Chain of Command, commanding officers could easily interfere with investigations, people with no legal training and no legal back ground could summarily dismiss criminal code charges.

This is why with the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, the requirement for commanding officers to conduct summary investigations AFTER the military police laid charges was removed. This is also why the 3-year time bar that applied to ALL indictable offences in the Criminal Code of Canada was removed from the National Defence Act.

Still, it looks as if some things never change.

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As long as Orest Yeriniuk views me as a “trouble maker” instead of a victim, there will be no funding for counselling.

Submission of Case to Crown Prosecutor and conclusion

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If I had to hazard a guess, the Alberta Crown is still smarting over the release of the Crown Brief and the subsequent Crown Opinion to me by the Military Police Complaints Commission in 2013. I would have like to have been a fly on the wall when the Alberta Crown, and possibly even the Alberta Solicitor General reamed the CFNIS and possibly the MPCC a new one.

Decisions by the Crown are supposed to not be questioned. That’s one of the major flaws with the justice system in this country. The Crowns operate like their own private little fiefdoms that will dispense justice as they see fit. The Crowns believe that they are above reproach and should never have to justify their decisions to anyone, not even lowly peasants such as myself.

Questionable Crown decisions are how Karla Holmolka is allowed to walk the streets even though as it turned out, she was at least as involved with the murders as Paul Bernardo was.

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This must be a new “standard practice” as the Crown Prosecutor’s opinion was released to the MPCC the last time. I wonder what’s different this time around? This secrecy doesn’t really do anyone too well. In fact, even the MPCC has complained about this in the past.

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The case was 31 year old in 2011 when this started.

I was 7 to 8 when the abuse was occuring

P.S. was between 13-1/2 and 15 when the abuse was occuring.

P.S. had already been investigated by the base military police and had received counselling for his involvement with young children on the base.

It was the involvement of P.S. with the younger children that eventually led to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

P.S. has a substantial criminal record for child sexual abuse.

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The Alberta Crown in 2011 had determined, based on the original 2011 CFNIS investigation, that it was very significant that I never told anyone of the abuse. Looks like the CFNIS forgot to tell the Alberta Crown about my attempts to report P.S. to the military police in 1984 and in 1990. Also, the case presented to the Alberta Crown made it sound as if I could barely remember the assaults. I clearly remembered the two times that P.S. tried to have anal intercourse with me and the third time he succeeded. I clearly remember the times that P.S. forced me to perform oral sex on him. I clearly remember the threats that P.S. made to me that he would kill me if I ever told the military police about what he had done to me. I also remember quite clearly the threats P.S. made that his father would have my father thrown out of the military if I ever told anyone. However, I don’t think the CFNIS was too interested in passing all of this information on to the Alberta Crown. Otherwise I don’t think the Alberta Crown would have remarked that this was nothing more than “Childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

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The MPCC said itself that Chain of Command interference would be almost impossible to detect.

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is image-44.png
Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The MPCC cannot investigate an interference complaint from me. And as the MPCC state above in its own report, any interference from the chain of command may be undetectable. After all, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of any investigation and any Military Police investigation.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Basically, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, who is not a peace officer, and generally is not required to have any manner of legal training and who is not sworn to uphold the Criminal Code of Canada can supervise the Provost Marshal in criminal code investigations and in professional standard reviews.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Here’s the really scary part. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff can issue instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of a particular investigation. Basically the National Defence Act is stating that it’s okay for someone with no peace officer qualifications to direct a law enforcement agency.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Sound great in theory.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

So, if the Vice Chief of Defence Staff issued instructions to the Provost Marshal to not forward certain information to the Alberta Crown, what do you think the odds are on that I would ever be able to see those instructions?

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McRae’s court martial was anything but public knowledge. The Canadian Forces threw a “veil of secrecy” around it. The public never knew the true extent of what Captain McRae had done.

Edmonton Journal, July 31, 1980
Edmonton Journal July 30 1980
Globe and Mail August 1st, 1980

The tone presented in these news articles makes it very clear that the Canadian Forces wasn’t been too transparent with the Captain McRae affair.

If the Canadian public knew that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae had molested well over 25 children ranging in ages from 5 to 15 on a secure defence establishment, the Canadian public would have demanded that heads roll. To be very clear, the court martial wasn’t moved in-camera to protect the identity of P.S..

The court martial was moved in-camera to protect the public image of the Canadian Armed Forces.

25 children, on a secure defence establishment, sexually abused by an officer of the Canadian Armed Forces? This would have been a fucking scandal. There is no way that Minister of National Defence Gilles Lamontagne or Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau would have survived this.

Here is the order requesting that McRae’s court martial be moved in-camera in the “interests of public morals”:

From Court Martial transcripts CM62 July 18, 1980 ATIP A-2019-00017

It wasn’t the identity of P.S. that the Canadian Armed Forces were protecting. It was their own necks and their own careers.

25 children.

1 secure military base

1 military officer.

This was not going to be public at all.

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The Federal Government is compelled to settle this lawsuit. DND is legally liable and responsible for its employees. DND and the Canadian Government aren’t settling out of the kindness of their heart. They’re settling because of legal actions. Legal actions that military dependants or other civilians cannot take against the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence.

The class action lawsuit was specifically open to only members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence. Persons such as myself, who had been given “conversion therapy” through the military social workers are ineligible to join these class action lawsuits as we were never members of the Canadian Forces or civilian employees of the Department of National Defence.

It took almost 40 years for the Canadian Armed Forces to own up to its responsibilities for the cadets who had been killed and injured by a grenade blast in 1974 when a real live grenade was introduced into a classroom full of 12 to 18 year old children. From 1974 until 2011 the Canadian Forces refused to accept liability and to cover the expenses for the dead and injured cadets because cadets are not the legal responsibility of DND or the Canadian Forces.

It took the Minister of National Defence requesting that the Canadian Forces ombudsman review the matter before the Canadian Forces finally responded to the pleas of the former cadets for assistance.

The cadets were not able to receive compensation or assistance at the time of the grenade explosion because they were not members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/en/ombudsman-reports-stats-investigations-valcartier/valcartier-report.page#compensation

As per the above section of the Canadian Forces Ombudsman report on the CFB Valcartier cadet grenade incident the Canadian Armed Forces are only legally liable for its members of the Reserves and Regular Forces as well as its civilian employees and contractors. Cadets, military dependents (spouses and children), and civilians not employed by DND who are on military bases are their at their own risk.

The problem with DND and sexually abused military dependents is that no one knows just how many children were sexually abused on the various bases by members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

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Actually, the three year time bar flaw was never remedied. It was only removed. Meaning that after December 1998, the 3-year time bar could not be used to prevent the laying of charges under the criminal code against a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

However, what wasn’t fixed was the fact that any crime that occurred prior to 1998 cannot be charged for. What this means is that in my matter, if P.S. had been charged and had in turn implicated Angus McRae. Angus McRae could never be charged due to the 3-year time bar that existed prior to 1998.

I don’t think the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence want this one little flaw known.

I think this flaw is what allows the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence to claim that child sexual abuse on the bases in Canada was non-existent in the old days.

Dan M. was the Base Commander of Canadian Forces Base Namao, and he was also the commanding officer of Captain Father Angus McRae. Col Dan M. would have been the one who conducted the summary investigation against Captain McRae after the military police laid charges. It would have been Col Dan M. that would have determined which charges proceeded and which charges were dismissed. Col Dan M. would have also had the authority to prohibit the CFSIU and the base military police from calling in the RCMP to deal with P.S.

So, it is very clear that the 3-year time bar, even though it was removed by the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, still affects criminal investigations to this date.

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This is laughable.

The Minister of National Defence settled with P.S.. Of this there is no doubt.

P.S., in his telephone conversation with CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock in August of 2011 has said that the “military has already handled things that he was involved in as a youth”.

When I spoke with P.S. in July of 2015 he claimed that he is bound to silence by an NDA.

The Minister of National Defence by way of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions on any military police investigation.

The CFNIS conducted an investigation that could have potentially subjected the Minister of national Defence to further civil action.

The CFNIS also submitted to the Alberta Crown a very poorly executed investigation.

The Canadian Forces chain of command knew that by submitting an inferior investigation to the Crown that the Crown would be very highly unlikely to recommend charges.

The Canadian Forces chain of command are also well aware that without a criminal conviction, the chances on any victim of P.S. being successful in a civil action against the Minister would be severely diminished.

And as P.S. was a juvenile at the time, initiating a civil action against a minor would be impossible. However, the Juvenile Delinquents Act held that the adult who had contributed to the delinquency could be held responsible.

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Captain McRae was investigated in 1973 for committing “acts of homosexuality” at the Royal Military College at Canadian Forces Base Kingston in Ontario. “Acts of homosexuality” is also what Captain McRae was charged with committing on Canadian Forces Base Namao. Captain Father Angus McRae was involved with a teenage boy on Canadian Forces Station Holberg just prior to his transfer to Canadian Forces Base Namao.

Brigadier General Roger Bazin was arrested in 2010 for having sexually abused a boy on Canadian Forces Base Borden when he was a catholic chaplain at the military chapel on the base.

The Bazin matter occurred just prior to me bringing my complaint against P.S.

Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan molested numerous children in the 1970s before he joined the Canadian Armed Forces. Once in the Canadian Forces he was court martialed for molesting numerous boys on Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in 1984.

The Canadian Armed Forces removed the rectories from the catholic chapels in the late ’80s.

In 2006, the Canadian Armed Forces changed the way that baptismal records are issued specifically stating that this was due to the amount of civil actions being brought against Catholic Archdiocese in Canada.

Email from June 2011 when I tried to obtain my baptismal records from the Canadian Forces.
Operation “cover our asses” has commenced as of November 22nd, 2006.

Due to the way that children were moved from base to base to follow their serving parent’s military career, and due to the way that Canadian Forces service members including military chaplains were also moved from base to base, it is conceivable that there are thousands of children who were touched once or twice on the various bases, but who never said anything.

It’s also conceivable that these children never said anything until years later, possibly outside of the 3-year time bar, that made pressing charges impossible.

This is a problem that the Canadian Armed Forces are more than willing to let fade into history.

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As the MPCC itself has said, the investigators within the CFNIS and the military police may not even be aware of “chain of command” influence.

Why did the CFNIS chain of command determine that the Crown shouldn’t be informed of the entirety of the telephone conversation between P.S. and Robert Jon Hancock.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination that my father was not to be re-interviewed even though my foster care records and his answer to my written examination exposed his statement to the CFNIS as lie upon lie easily disproved by my foster care records.

Richard didn’t die until January of 2017. The CFNIS had over a year and a half to get the silly fucker to “clarify” his original statement to the CFNIS. And even though the CFNIS knew of the errors in Richard’s statement, they did nothing what so ever to make sure that the Alberta Crown understood the issues with Richard’s statement.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that shortly after the events on CFB Namao that I was made a ward of the province due to the instability in my household.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that P.S. had been interviewed by the base military police in 1980 and had also been sent for treatment for committing sexual assaults against young children on the base?

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As I’ve seen the documents submitted to the Alberta Victims of Crime, I know that it was basically the 2011 Crown Brief with a bit of the 2018 investigation thrown in.

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It’s generally good police practice to not tip off the family of the suspect that you’re looking for another family member to give a statement against another family member.

The family of P.S. told the CFNIS investigators in the 2015 to 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast, that the younger brother never spoke to the family, that the younger brother hated and despised P.S., and that the younger brother was probably deceased.

After tracking the younger brother down via CPIC, it turns out that the younger brother and P.S. lived about 25 km apart.

P.S. lived at home with his father, J.S. in Fort Erie.

Southern Ontario

J.S. told me in the telephone call that I had with him that he had just had one of his legs amputated and that he needed P.S. at home to look after him.

How much do you wanna bet that when Sgt. Tenaschuk called up J.S. looking for his youngest son that J.S. asked him not to say anything against P.S.?

When I spoke with J.S. in 2015, he blamed himself for what had happened to both P.S. and his younger brother. Apparently they had both been abused by Captain McRae.

Another former base brat, whom I met via the base brat groups, knew D.S, the older sister of P.S.. D.S. said that her father J.S. blamed himself. P.S. was apparently a shy boy and didn’t have many friends, so J.S. forced P.S. to go over to the chapel to be McRae’s altar boy and to assist McRae with duties around the chapel.

D.S. herself is interesting in the sense that she also covers for her brother, P.S..

It’s almost as if that entire family doesn’t hold P.S. responsible for all of the children that he assaulted and molested over he years because they all blame Captain McRae.

And I think they further justify this victimhood by saying that the Canadian Armed Forces never would have settled with P.S. if P.S. wasn’t a victim.

It’s just too bad that the rest of us can’t be victims.

I still can’t believe that my father thought that at 7 years of age that I could force 14 year old P.S. to molest my younger brother. I guess it must be true, after all I wasn’t a victim of anyone, right?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is under no obligation to supply the MPCC with documentation, and as the MPCC does not have the legal authority to subpoena any document from the Provost Marshal, I’m just going to have to say that I would never simply take the verbal word of anyone attached to the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

Having seen the games DND played during the Mark Norman affair I just can’t trust DND at their word.

In February of 2016 the Minister of National Defence called my intentions into question by suggesting that I had impure motives.

He wanted to know “what my game was” and “what angle was I trying to play”

In August of 2011 the CFNIS tried to get my brother to state that I was a societal malcontent with an axe to grind against the military.

This has never been about justice.

This has always been about the Canadian Armed Forces ensuring that the dirty secrets of the past stay in the past.

I never wanted a single nickel from the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

All I wanted was for my father to own up to the truth and for him to stop blaming me for having “fucked with his military career” and for having forced P.S. to molest my younger brother.

That was it.

Richard wasn’t the type of man to ever apologize unless he knew that he couldn’t weasel his way out of this with lies and bullshit.

Yeah, I do realize that any apology I would have received from him probably would have been worthless bullshit that he spewed just to try to make himself look good.

But the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service took that possibility away from me.

Keeping the military’s secrets was more paramount than my apology.

The lawyer in P.S.’ claim against the Crown summed it up the best:

As P.S. was a juvenile at the time, these are the entities that anyone abused by P.S. would have to make a claim against:

Court of Queens Bench procedure card Q0103 08346
P.S. v. Minister of National Defence et. al.

The Canadian Armed Forces would be represented by the Department of Justice. The DoJ has unlimited tax payer dollars and an unlimited amount of lawyers. Basically the DoJ can turn night into day if it so wishes. That’s how much power it has.

Final Report of MPCC Review 2018-030

I haven’t update my blog recently as I’ve been sitting on this report for the last month.

In many ways this report is an unexpected Christmas present.

Unlike in 2013, this time around the Military Police Complaints Commission is of the opinion that I was the victim of sexual abuse at the hands of P.S.. The MPCC is also of the opinion that the Canadian Forces Military Police were aware of the abuse that P.S. was inflicting upon other children in the years of 1978 until 1980. And the MPCC is also of the opinion that P.S. was abusing the younger children as a direct result of the abuse he suffered at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus.

The MPCC make it very clear that they cannot review the 1980 Base Military Police and Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit investigations as these are “pre-mandate” issues and are beyond the repsonsibility of the MPCC.

On October 30th, 2020 the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal accepted the finding of the Military Police Complaints Commission and the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal accepted the recomendations of the Military Police Complaints Commission.

I had 30 days after the report was issued to file a review for Judicial Review, but I was more than satisfied with what the report had to say, so I wanted to ensure that the clock ran out on the ability to file an appeal over the contents. I did this as I assumed that as long as my window was open, the Provost Marshal’s window to reconsider their acceptance of the recomendations was also open. I am pretty sure that now that I have allowed my window for filing a Judicial Review to lapse that this report is now “set in stone” and the Provost Marshal cannot change their acceptance of the recomendations and the report.

You must remember that the scope of the MPCC during a review is very narrow.

During a review the MPCC cannot subpoena documents or witnesses. Nor can the MPCC administer oaths. Participation in a MPCC review is strictly voluntary. The MPCC also cannot look at Canadian Forces command influence on an investigation. By this I mean that the instuctions issued to the Provost Marshal by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff are beyond the mandate of the MPCC to review.

In fact, the MPCC make metion that the 2018 submission to the Crown as well as the response from the Crown were withheld citing client-solicitor privilage. This means that the MPCC has no idea what the CFNIS submitted to the Crown.

Also bear in mind that the Vice Chief of Defence Staff may direct the Provost Marshal and the CFNIS during any criminal investigation or any professional standards review and those directions need not be made public, which also means that the MPCC may not be aware of these directions either.

And please, be sure to remember that just as the Provost Marshal is subordinate to the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, the VCDS is subordinate to the Chief of Defence Staff. The CDS is in turn subordinate to the Mininster of National Defence.

And Minister Sajjan has already made it very clear to me that he considers me to be a scammer trying to fleece the Canadian Forces for easy money as evidenced when he wanted to know “what my angle was” and “what game was I playing”.

All I wanted was for my father to apologize for the living hell he put me through in the days, weeks, months, and years after CFB Namao. He knew exactly what happened. And now thanks to the MPCC and the court martial transcripts, it’s apparent that a lot of people on that base knew what happened.

My old man died in January of 2017. So, unless the Canadian Armed Forces have a magical way in which to dig up my father’s corpse, reanimate it, and have it apologize to me, I guess a public apology from Mr. Sajjan himself will have to suffice.

The link below is a copy of the MPCC Final Report.

If you read the report you will notice that the MPCC is casting blame without pointing fingers. By this I mean that the MPCC is stating publicly what the CFNIS, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Department of National Defence have been actively trying to avoid. Captain Father Angus McRae was an active pedophile, Captain Father Angus McRae molested NUMEROUS children on the Canadian Forces Base Namao from August 1978 until May of 1980, the abuse that Captain Father Angus McRae inflicted upon P.S. (Mr. X) is directly responsible for the abuse that P.S. was in turn metting out to the younger children on the base.

The MPCC review could not substantiate my complaint against Sgt. Tenaschuk. And that’s fine, becuase I really didn’t have any complaints against Sgt. Tenaschuk.

The problem with the current structure of the MPCC is that I can’t file a complaint against an investigation. The rules of the complaint process state that I must file a complaint against an investigator.

I am also limited as to how far up the chain of command I can go. For example I can’t file an MPCC complaint against the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, even though these entities are granted the authority by the National Defence Act to issue instructions in relation to any CFNIS/Military Police investigation or any Canadian Forces Professional Standards review.

No matter how much I truly believe that senior members of the Canadian Armed Forces interferred with this investigation, only members of the military police or CFNIS may file “interference complaints”.

During the 2nd 5 year review of the Amendments to the National Defence Act which was conducted back in 2011, the MPCC noted that if interference occurs high enough up the chain of command that the investigators and their immediate superiors may not be aware of any interference.

Who do I think intereferred with this investigation? It was either the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Defence Staff, or the Minister of National Defence. Those three have the legal ability to involve themselves in an investigation.

And back in 2016, Minister Sajjan made it very clear to me that he thought I was trying to scam the military.

Minister Sajjan’s outright refusal to meet with me as the Minister of National Defence shows his disdain for this subject.

What the MPCC did find in this most current review though is that there was more than sufficient evidence to indicate that I was sexually abused by P.S. The MPCC also indicated that this abuse no doubt would have stemmed from the actions of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

On page 26 of the report, the MPCC not only refer to Canadian Armed Forces Officer Captain Father Angus McRae as an adult pedophile. The MPCC also state “Moreover, by all accounts, the accused’s victimization is what led to this young person committing these offences”

The MPCC found that the information that was submitted to the Alberta Victims of Crime didn’t properly convey the findings of criminal activity that were indicated by the CFNIS investigation, hence why the MPCC has recommended that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal submit “additional disclosures” from the GO 2011-5754 investigation to the Alberta Victims of Crime in order to substantiate the findings of the investigation.

The MPCC noted that even though BOTH investigation indicated that crimes of a sexual nature had occured, that language contained within the concluding remarks of the CFNIS contradicted the findings of the investigations.

The MPCC noted that although various people within the CFNIS chain of command were of the opinion that I was the victim of sexual assault, the documents supplied to the Alberta Victims of Crime board by the Access to Information and Privacy Manager for the Canadian Forces Military Police Group only comprised 10 pages when the 2015 to 2018 portion CFNIS of the investigation had well over 700 pages. The MPCC notes that the information provided to the Alberta Victims of Crime Board by the CFMP ATIP office casts doubt that a crime occured. Hence why the MPCC has requested that the Provost Marshal itself issue a clarification to the Alberta Victims of Crime Board.

The MPCC notes that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal did not disclose the Crown Brief or the response from the Alberta Crown to the MPCC unlike back in 2012.

The MPCC further notes that as I stated in my complaint, the CFNIS basically regurgitated the original 2011 Crown Brief and submitted that to the Alberta Victims of Crime board.

I think the Canadian Forces made a calculated determination this time around to not allow me to see the Crown Brief or the response from the Cown by ensuring that the MPCC did not receive these documents. Remember, durng a review the MPCC is powerless to compel the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal to hand documents over.

I went through the roof when I saw Alberta Crown Prosecutor Jon Werbicki’s response to CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock’s submission to the Alberta Crown in 2011. In 2011 the CFNIS had apparently “forgotten” to tell the Alberta Crown that I had twice tried to report P.S. to the military police. Once in 1984, and once in 1990. In 1984 I was interviewed at the military police shack for what seemed like the afternoon. In 1990 I was interviewed at the military police shack for just over an hour. Both times resulted in the base military police telling me that they couldn’t get involved because P.S. was a civilian.

Jon Werbicki’s response was thus:

Becuase of this one statement, RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadbhan had requested that the CFNIS try to locate any of the paperwork from the military police back then. This is recorded in my 2015 interview at the RCMP detachment at UBC. Sgt. Tenaschuk informed me a few times during the course of the investigation that he was trying hard to find these records, but that the military police record keeping system back then was a shambles. And that’s true. The Somalia Inquiry in the ’90s found that the military police record keeping system left a lot to be desired.

In March of 2015 RCMP Major Case Advisor Inspector Akrum Ghadban was of the opinion after his review of the original 2011 investigation that both my brother and I were victims of sexual assaults at the hands of P.S.

As the Canadian Forces declined to provide the MPCC with a copy of the Crown Briefing or the response from the Crown, the MPCC has no idea of what the CFNIS submitted to the Crown. However, I do.

I have a copy of the tribunal records released to me as a result of my appeal of the decision of the Alberta Victims of Crime to deny my benefits.

The CFNIS basically resubmitted the 2011 Crown Briefing with a few bits and pieces of the 2015 to 2018 CFNIS investigation.


I invite you to read the report for yourself.

The report is only 31 pages long.

I will disect the MPCC report in a further post.

What is also of interest in the MPCC findings is that they shed some light on the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae or more specifically what led up to the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

The following information was not from my investigation. This information apparently never made it into my investigation as the Provost Marshal had determined that my investigation was to be kept separate from any other victims of P.S. or Captain McRae that came forward. The following information was contained in the investigation conducted into the complaint of another former military dependant that came forward in 2017 and spoke to the CFNIS about his abuse at the hands of P.S.. This other CFNIS investigation was GO 2017-10640. I know who this other victim is. I will not name this victim as he has some reservations about his having been sexually abused as a child becoming public knowledge. And this I understand.

As part of investigation GO 2017-10640 CFNIS investigator Cpl. White entered the following information into the Security and Military Police Information System SAMPIS:

the McRae MPUIR (SWE 120-1-80) was a result of two separate incidents in which Mstr [x] (P.S.) tried to assert himself on younger children in the Lancaster Park area. The first incident as described by Mstr [x]’s father(Sgt. J.S.), as his son (Mstr [X](P.S.)) enticed several young boys to lower their pants and when they did, he spit on his penis and climbed on the young boys. The second incident is that he allegedly touched another young boys[sic] genital and buttocks and asked him if he liked it. There is no record of any investigation into either of these incidents

Basically, the Court Martial transcripts for Captain Father Angus McRae indicate that although the Base Military Police knew of what P.S. was doing, there wasn’t a military police investigation. And there couldn’t have been either. The investigation of P.S. for the sexual abuse of children living on the base would have been the jurisdiction of the RCMP in Morinville, Alberta. Even the CFNIS in 2011 knew this.

The million dollar question is, who was it that prevented the base military police or even the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit from calling in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to deal with P.S. in 1980. After all, they knew what P.S. was doing.

This is why I wanted Sgt. Tenaschul to talk to retired Colonel Daniel Edward Munro. Dan E. Munro was the base commander of CFB Edmonton during the Captain McRae fiasco. Captain McRae was Col Munro’s direct subordinate. The base military police on CFB Edmonton were also directly subordinate to Col Dan Munro. It’s just too bad that Sgt. Tenaschuk’s legal adviser in 2018 said that Col Munro couldn’t bet interviewed due to the 3-year time bar that existed in the pre-1998 National Defence Act.


The MPCC has refered to P.S. as Mr. [X] or Master [X]. I have taken the liberty of adding his initials where required for clarity. P.S. was my babysitter on CFB Namao. Sgt. J.S. was the father of P.S..

Excerpts from the court martial transcripts in which P.S. was called as a witness for the prosecution indicate that P.S. assaulted the boys in the Horseshoe forest which was behind the rec centre.

I don’t think that I was in the group of boys.

My assaults mainly occured in my family PMQ when P.S. was babysitting for my grandmother. There were assaults on other parts of the base like in the change rooms at the base arena, the change rooms at the base pool, the woods on the west side of the base, the three times in his family’s PMQ, and whatever happened in the rectory of the chapel after P.S. gave me the tumblers of wine.

An MPUIR is a Military Police Unusual Incident Report. MPUIR SWE 120-1-80 would have been conducted by the base military police, hence ‘MP’UIR. MPUIR SWE 120-1-80 would lead to the base military police calling in the Canadian Forces Special Investigation Unit. The CFSIU initiated CFSIU DS120-10-80 to investigate Captain McRae due to the allegations that P.S. made against Captain McRae when P.S. was interviewed by the base military police.

MPUIR SWE 120-1-80 would have been conducted in 1980 as indicated by the “80”. As P.S. was born in June of 1965, he would have been 14 at the time of this investigation. The military police didn’t call in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to deal with P.S. as they should have. The million dollar question is why?

P.S., being 14 years old at the time would have been fully culpable under the Juvenile Delinquents Act. And sex with anyone under the age of 12 was strictly illegal.

It’s very apparent from the language in the excerpt from MPUIR SWE 120-1-80 that Sgt. J.S. was very well aware of what his son P.S. was doing on the base with young children.

This is further backed up by a recorded telephone call I had with retired Sgt. J.S. in July of 2015. Sgt. J.S. knew what his son had been doing. As it turns out the military police in 1980 knew what P.S. was doing. The entire chain of command knew what P.S. was doing, and that’s not an exaggeration.

The one part of the excerpt that caught my eye was “the second incident is that he allegedly touched another young boys[sic] genital and buttocks and asked him if he liked it”. I have absolutely no proof that I was this boy. I know that P.S. was involved with a lot of young children on that base. However, the day P.S. was caught buggering me in his bedroom wasn’t the first time he had buggered me. He had tried on at least three occasions prior. I say tried as he was often in a hurry to get his penis inside of me, so this often resulted in a lot of pain. But the one thing that I do remember is that whenever he’d try to get his penis in he’d always tell me to relax and that I’d really like it once it was in.

As I told the CFNIS on March 31, 2011 when I was interviewed for my statement. I know that P.S. had sexually abused my brother as P.S. would abuse the two of us together. Sometimes he would abuse us individually, but it was usually together. It was not enjoyable for the either of us. I also told the CFNIS that I knew of four other kids, three boys and one girl. These kids were between my age and my brother’s age, so between 4 and 8. If I remember correctly, the girl was the sister of one of the boys. All I remember about the girl is would always be crying. What P.S. was doing to he, she did not like at all.

Anyways, enough for now.

As I mentioned, I will start disecting the MPCC report and I will go through it paragraph by paragraph in my next post.