My two-cents on MPCC 2018-030

In this post I will critique the Military Police Complaints Commission Final Report MPCC 2018-030.

This will be a somewhat long read, but it will be worth it.

I’m not going to critique each and every item in MPCC 2018-030. I’m just going to critique the items that I feel need to be critiqued or expanded upon.

Opening section of MPCC 2018-030

On June 23rd, 2011 the Military Police Complaints Commission made the following submission to the Independant Review Authority that was charged with reviewing the 1998 Amendmentd to the National Defence Act:

One of the issues noted by the Military Police Complaints Commission itself is that civilians, such as myself, do not have access to internal Canadian Forces grievances mechanisms. This means that when a civilian such as myself wishes to make a complaint against a member of the Canadian Forces military police, unlike members of the Canadian Armed Forces, we receive absolutely no assistance from the Canadian Forces nor do we receive assistance from the Military Police Complaints Commission.

Civilians are on their own.

A brief step back to 2011

Because the Military Police Complaints Commission raises the spectre of the previous MPCC review (MPCC 2011-045) I will briefly speak to it.

During my initial complaint in 2011 I had absolutely no access to any of the investigation paperwork.

All I knew is that on November 4th, 2011 Petty Office Steve Morris contacted me via telephone and told me that the CFNIS could find absolutely no evidence that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I accused him of.

P.S. was the same person that retired Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham told me about on November 27th, 2011 as having been investigated by the base military police for having inappropriate interactions with children on the base.

P.S., as I would later discover, had an extensive record for sexual crimes involving children. His attraction to children was in no doubt nurtured by the grooming P.S. received at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

At no time during the initial MPCC investigation (MPCC 2011-045) was any of the CFNIS paperwork shared with me. As such this was literal blind attempt to try to figure out what went so off the rails with the original 2011 CFNIS investigation.

And even if I had tried to obtain the investigation paperwork, the paperwork would have been very heavily redacted. And that’s if the paperwork even shows up within the established time frame for making a complaint. In August of 2018 I filed and ATI request for the paperwork from the 2015 to 2018 portion of CFNIS 2011-5754. It took 20 months for DND to respond to my request and provide the paperwork. The paperwork that I received was redacted to the point of being useless.

It wasn’t until I received the Certified Tribunal Records from the MPCC when I made my application for Judicial Review that I learnt exactly what had transpired during the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

Basically it was my father’s statement to the CFNIS that allowed the CFNIS to write my complaint off as meaningless. My father’s statement fit the narrative that the CFNIS needed. This narrative was that my brother and I never had a babysitter. And that I was obviously only doing this because I wanted easy money.

The only problem with my father’s statement is that even though I had no idea that the CFNIS had contacted my father in June of 2011, I had supplied the CFNIS with a copy of my foster care records from the Alberta Government. The CFNIS ignored the contents of these records. The MPCC wasn’t able to consider these records as they had not been before the CFNIS. And because both agencies ignored these records and didn’t consider these records in their respective reviews, these records were not allowed to be introduced in Federal Court during my application for Judicial Review. My foster care records and other documents such as my father’s statement acknowledging that there was in fact a babysitter in our house were struck as being “new evidence”.

What did these records have to say?
My father took no responsibility for his family.
My father blamed the problems that my brother and I were having on his mother.
My father had invited his mother into the house on base to raise my brother and after our mother had “abandoned us” at CFB Summerside.
My father was frequently absent due to military requirements.
That my father was so resistant to family counselling that I was to have been removed from the house and placed into foster care or residential care as a means to induce my father into the counselling that he so desperately required.

So why did my father spin such a fanciful and tall tale?
Well, he’s been dead since January 2017 so we’ll never find out.
But, my foster care records did observe that he often told people he perceived to be in positions of authority what he thought they wanted to hear. My foster care records also indicated that my father often changed his stories from one meeting to the next.

Basically, my father was a pathological liar who would say anything if he thought that it would make him look like the good guy.

How could a man like Richard ever publicly admit that he willingly put his children in a position to be sexually abused because he placed his military career above all else.

For my father to tell the CFNIS in 2011 that he had never heard about a babysitter when he spent every year from 1980 until 1987 when I moved out of the house, blaming me for allowing and encouraging the babysitter to touch my younger brother, was beyond belief.

And yes, when I examined my father for Federal Court in 2013, he admitted that he hadn’t been truthful with the CFNIS in 2011. He admitted that there had in fact been a babysitter in the house. But as usual he blamed his mother for hiring the babysitter. He also basically admitted that he kidnapped my brother and I in 1977 and that our mother hadn’t really abandoned the family.

So, why didn’t I raise these issues with the MPCC in 2012 when I was interviewed?

I had absolutely no idea of what was in the CFNIS investigation paperwork that the Provost Marshal had submitted to the Military Police Complaints Commission. This is by far the biggest flaw with the whole MPCC complaints process. A complainant such as myself is literally playing “pin the tail on the donkey” in a tilt-a-whirl with absolutely no assistance from anyone. No assistance from the MPCC. No assistance from the Provost Marshal. No assistance from the Canadian Forces ombudsman.

The evidence that I collected, it was all considered new evidence, even though most of it had been in the possession of the CFNIS during the original CFNIS investigation.

I can only wonder how the previous 2011 CFNIS investigation has poisoned the Alberta Crown to ever prosecuting P.S.. I can’t see the Alberta Crown coming out and admitting that they got hoodwinked by the CFNIS in 2011.

I know from the Certified Tribunal Records that I received as part of my application for Judicial Review in 2013 that the CFNIS fed the Alberta Crown a rather horrid plate of B.S..

During my interview with the CFNIS on March 31st, 2011 I told CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock that I had twice tried reporting P.S. to the military police. Once in 1984, and once in 1990. For what ever reason, the CFNIS in 2011 made the decision to not pass this information on to the Alberta Crown. This resulted in Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki making the follwoing observation which no doubt figured heavily in his decicision to not prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester.

My younger brother at the time would have been between four and six years of age when the babysitter, P.S. was abusing him. P.S. would have been between the ages of thirteen and fifteen when he was absuing my younger brother. That’s not “childhood curiosity and experimentation”. And is very obvious that Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki is placing very heavy emphasis on “the fact that no complaint was made to any party or a person in authority after P.S. moved away is very significant.”

P.S. was born in June of 1965. He would have been 14 in June of 1979. He would have been just weeks shy of his 15th birthday when he was found buggering me in his bedroom. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act P.S. would have been fully culpable for his crimes. Yes, it’s true that P.S. would have to be charged under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, but he’s already had a lifetime of prosecution for sexual offences involving children. It’s not like he’s going to do any jail time or face any serious consequences other than officially being found guilty.

I know that Chief Alberta Crown Prosecutor Orest Yeriniuk is extremely upset that I was allowed to see this document. I can only wonder if the Crown’s continued reluctance to prosecute P.S. is a function of retaliation.

I know from my complaint to the Alberta Criminal Injuries Review Board that the CFNIS heavily edited the documents that it submitted to the Alberta Crown in 2011. For example on Tuesday August 9th, 2011 P.S. called CFNIS investigator Mcpl Robert Jon Hancock and stated the following:

However, this is what was submitted to the Alberta Crown:

Notice something missing? As we shall see later on, P.S. did have extensive involvement with the military police for what had transpired on CFB Namao from August of 1978 until May of 1980. Why didn’t the CFNIS want the Alberta Crown to know this? It’s not like the Alberta Crown would have any access to military police records. Surely, if the CFNIS wanted to present a strong case, they would have submitted the military’s records relating to the activities of P.S. from August of 1978 until May of 1980.

And in a way, I can fully understand Orest Yeriniuk’s continued refusal to prosecute. Going against the original decision made by Werbicki in November of 2011 to not prosecute P.S. would be considered improper and a rebuke of Werbicki’s independence as a Crown Prosecutor. This is not something the Crown undertakes lightly.

Also, the Alberta Crown would essentially be admitting that it didn’t perform due diligence in this matter and had the wool pulled over their eyes by a police force with a very questionable record.

Pretty bad when the Minister of National Defence says this.

When I made my first complaint in March of 2011, the case was only 31 years old. Not 40.

I was a pre-pubescent child. My brother a was pre-pubescent child. P.S. was a young adult who had passed through puberty. Not the same category. None of the children that P.S. was abusing was sexually developed. P.S. was fully sexually matured.

Earl Ray Stevens – a 32 year old complaint.

In March of 2017 I made a complaint against Earl Ray Stevens. He was a commissionaire at the Denison Armouries when I was in cadets. He had also been a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces. He started sexually abusing me just after the summer of 1985. He took advantage of the fact that he knew my father was in the Canadian Forces and that the Commissionaires had special authority under the National Defence Act that placed them almost at the same level as military police. Basically the threats were that if I ever told anyone about what he was doing, that he’d tell my father. I’d be kicked out of cadets. But even worse than that, my father would find out that I had sex with men. This is not something that any male child living on a Canadian Forces Base at the time wanted anyone to know.

The CFNIS took the investigation as the abuses occured on Canadian Forces military property.

The case was initially investigated by the CFNIS in Borden, ON. CFNIS Borden then handed the case over to the Toronto Police Services. The Toronto Police Service laid six charges against Earl within weeks of taking the case on.

I had provided even less evidence to the CFNIS in the matter of Earl Ray Steven.

And the Ontario Crown was worried that as I was 14 when the abuse started that Earl’s defence lawyer would be able to argue that I had consented to willfully have sexual intercourse with a 42 year old man.

In 2018 I took part in the preliminary hearing. The hearing lasted two days. At the end of the hearing the justice overseeing the matter determined that there was more than sufficient evidence and the case was moved up to Superior Court for trial.

Unfortunately Earl died of bladder cancer before the trial.

But at least he was charged. And at least we were heading to trial.

Why the difference?

Liability.

Earl worked for the Canadian Corp of Commissionaires. The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence cannot be sued for the actions of an employee of a subcontractor.

P.S. was abused by an employee of the Department of National Defence. P.S. was a juvenile at the time of his offences. The Juvenile Delinquents Act said that the adult who contributed to the delinquency of a minor could be held responsible. This means that just as P.S. sued the Minister of National Defence in 2001, anyone abused by P.S. would be eligible to sue the minister as well…. so long as their was a direct link established by the victim of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae. Without charges against P.S., there can be no link.

Limited disclosure to outside agencies

I can only wonder who it was that determined which information it was that was released to the Alberta Victim of Crimes board. You have to remember that in a CFNIS investigation, the CFNIS investigators can’t do anything without the expressed permission or instruction of the Chain of Command.

RCAF Station Namao ceased to exist in 1968 with the unification of the Forces. It was CFB Namao when we lived there. CFB Namao and CFB Griesbach formed CFB Edmonton.

I was 7 when the abuse started in the fall of 1978 and 8 when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

My younger brother would have been 4 when the abuse started and 6 when the abuse ended.

P.S. would have been 13 when the abuse started and weeks shy of his 15th birthday when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

Again, having not seen any of the paperwork from the 2011 CFNIS investigation I was not able to flag any of the obvious flaws with the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

As I stated previously, it was only after I had received the certified tribunal records from the Military Police Complaints Commission that I was able to finally see just how horrific and putrid the 2011 CFNIS investigation actually was.

Any evidence that I submitted in my records to the Federal Court to show that the CFNIS had really bungled the investigation was struck from the hearings as “New Evidence”. New evidence included documents that I had exchanged with the CFNIS in 2011, but which were never submitted to the MPCC during the MPCC 2011-045/054. New evidence was copies of emails between myself and the investigators which were not passed on to the MPCC during the review.

It was after RCMP Akrum Ghadban reviewed the 2011 CFNIS investigation as well as the new information that I had as a result of my telephone calls with both P.S. and his father J.S. that the decision was made to re-open the investigation.

There were four items that Insp Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to concentrate on.
1) Locating the younger brother of P.S.
2) Talking to a potential witness who had possibly seen the beating I took from the older kids when I left P.S.’s house after he was discovered buggering me in his bedroom.
3) Talking to Fred Cunningham
4) Locating records of my 1984 and 1990 complaints. Unlike what the CFNIS had claimed, Insp Ghadban said that he noted that I did in fact mention this to the CFNIS in 2011. And yes, I do have a copy of my video statement to the CFNIS and yes, I do mention these two events.

Locating the younger brother of P.S. was tricky. At first the S. family was claiming that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast and never contacted the family. One family member even suggested that the younger brother was deceased. As it turned out, the younger brother at the time was living in Welland Ontario, just a short distance away from where P.S. and his father J.S. were living in Fort Erie, Ontario. It turns out that the younger brother was actually in frequent contact with the rest of the S. family.

Locating the witness was easy, but sadly the witness was only around 11 at the time and can’t remember anything. He does remember P.S. though.

Fred Cunningham was easy enough for the CFNIS to locate. Even more stunning was the location of the CFSIU paperwork which contrary to what Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre told me in January of 2011 indicated that Fred Cunningham was a very key player in the investigation of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae.

Fred Cunningham was such a key player that he was the primary witness for the prosecution during the court martial of Captain Father Angus McRae.

During the 2015 through 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation, Sgt. Tenaschuk would often tell me that he was trying to locate any copies of the records from when I attended the military police shack on CFB Namao in 1984 and 1990 to make my complaints against P.S. but that the record keeping system from then left a lot to be desired. Sgt. Tenaschuk wouldn’t be the first person to find issue with the military’s historical record system. This was brought up in the ’90s during the Somalia hearings.

McRae is officially labeled as a pedophile.

As it turns out, in 1980 they knew that alcohol was being given to the children “hanging around” at his living quarters (the rectory at the chapel).

Examination of Fred Cunningham during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

And yes, they knew what McRae was doing in the Rectory at the chapel:

Examination of Sgt. Ryan during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

It’s nice to finally see Captain McRae called out for what he was. It’s also nice to see that my recollection of P.S. taking me to the chapel is in the official records. I told the CFNIS about these five visits on May 3rd, 2011 when Mcpl Christian Cyr called me to ask me if I remembered anything about the base chaplain, Captain McRae, having been charged with molesting children. I sent Cyr some information that evening. I told Mcpl Cyr that I remembered 5 different visits to the rectory at the chapel. That these visits always ended with P.S. giving me a tumbler with a “sickly sweet grape juice”. I told Cyr that I didn’t remember anything after the grape juice, not even how I got home. I even sent Mcpl Cyr maps and descriptions of the rectory.

This however is not what was recorded in Mcpl Cyr’s occurrence report.

This was:

From MPCC 2011-045 Certified Tribunal Records.

During the 2011 portion of the CFNIS investigation the CFNIS scrubbed any and all mention of Captain McRae from the investigation.

As this information does not show up in the records the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal submitted to the MPCC in 2012, the MPCC was completely unaware of this. The MPCC did not share any information with me during the MPCC review of 2011-5754 as they’re not required to. As such I wasn’t able to raise any concerns about the creative editing and the narrative provided by this creative editing. Because I couldn’t raise these issues during the MPCC review I was unable to enter these into Federal Court as they were now considered “new evidence”.

The more I think about it now, the more I realize that the CFNIS in 2011 knew about the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. They knew about P.S.’s extensive criminal record for child molestation. And the CFNIS or the relevant chain of command must have concluded that I was just looking for a quick buck, that somehow I must have heard about the settlement between P.S. and the Minister and therefore I decided that I wanted some easy money.

Might explain why my father’s statement was so custom tailored to the wishes of the CFNIS even though his statement was easily proved wrong by the various social service records my family accumulated across Canada.

A brief trip to the Federal Court for Judicial Review.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

In the written examination of my father he admits that there was a babysitter in the house and he can’t offer an explanation as to why he willingly told the CFNIS in 2011 that there wasn’t.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

The lawyer representing the Attorney General of Canada went through the roof when I introduced the emails between myself and Master Corporal Christain Cyr as well as the written examinations of both my father and my brother.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

It’s funny, but the justice that reviewed my matter was basically okay with striking my “new evidence” because it didn’t appear in the CFNIS investigation even though my documents showed that it had been presented to and made known to the CFNIS.

Sure, I know, I know…… “but Bobbie why didn’t you challenge the absurdity of this in the Supreme Court of Canada”.

Supreme court ain’t cheap. And I don’t have $100k plus kicking around to go tilting at windmills.

Sometimes you gotta take the bad judgments and just walk away.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement
From T_317_13 Final Judgement

This is one of the massive flaws with the courts in this country. The courts do not assist in the location of information that the courts themselves have access to.

It wasn’t until after this hearing that I was able to contact the Edmonton lawyer who represented P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence. The lawyer in a way confirmed the identity of P.S.. Or more succinctly I should state that this lawyer was unwilling to go on record and state that the P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was NOT my babysitter P.S.

This lawyer also gave me a bit of advice. He said that I should think long and hard about going after DND. He said that given the chance, he’d never do this again. I think the point this lawyer was making is that DND and the Department of Justice have extremely deep pockets and can tie anyone up in court long enough that you’ll be happy to take any scrap of a settlement they’re willing to throw your way.

And I know there is some truth to this.

P.S. started his action in March of 2001. The Canadian Forces Director of Civil Liabilities and Claims made the offer to settle in November of 2008. That’s almost 7-1/2 years of court for a matter in which a member of the Canadian Armed Forces admitted to and plead guilty to molesting a military dependent on a military establishment. The liability couldn’t be more clear cut. Yet DND and the absurdly named “Department of Justice” spent 7-1/2 years trying to weasel out of compensating a victim.

In my July 2015 telephone call with P.S., he confirmed that P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was his civil action but that an NDA agreement prevents him from discussing the matter.

To date DND has stonewalled me for any information related to P.S. v Minister of National Defence.

It wasn’t until I got creative and submitted an Access to Information request to the Department of Justice for their records related to their defence of the Minister of National Defence in the matter of P.S. v. Minister of National Defence that I discovered that the Minister settled with P.S. in November of 2008.

But this is all information that is easily available to the courts. These are court records.

It really makes me sick to realize that the courts have all of this power, but willingly play stupid.

So far as liability goes. The Juvenile Delinquents Act is very clear in that the adult responsible for the delinquency is responsible for the consequences.

Yes, I could have appealed this to the Supreme Court, but with court costs and expenses estimated to be over $100,000.00 sometimes it better to just walk away.

P.S. v. Minister of National Defence confirmed.

Here the MPCC is stating something that the Federal Court of Canada was unwilling to state even though the Federal Court had easy access to these records:

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

Again, Mr. X is P.S.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

McRae died three months after the start of the investigation into my complaint against P.S. McRae died 17 days after Mcpl Cyr asked me if I remembered anything about McRae.

You need to bear in mind that when the investigation plan was put into action that Angus McRae was still alive. This posed a very serious dilemma for the CFNIS. Depending on the outcome of their investigation into P.S. they might be able to charge P.S., but due to the fact that Angus McRae was subject to the Code of Service Discipline in 1980 no matter what crimes P.S. implicated McRae in the 3-year time bar would prevent the CFNIS from even charging Angus McRae.

The email that started it all.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

The Edmonton Police Service didn’t refer me to anyone. The EPS contacted the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team. ASIRT in turn contacted the CFNIS. The CFNIS assumed jurisdiction.

My original message to the Edmonton Police Service:

Edmonton Police Service internal message:

Another internal Edmonton Police Service email:

ASIRT contacting the CFNIS:

Warrant Officer Blair Hart contacting Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger:

Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger stating CFNIS will take jurisdiction and even mentioning that in 1980 jurisdiction would have belinged to the RCMP.

So no, at no time did I contact the CFNIS on my own. If I had known in 2011 that this was going to investigated by the Canadian Forces I would have just walked away.

MPCC 2018-030

Remember, the CFNIS submitted such horrific evidence to the Alberta Crown that the Alberta Crown wondered if anything had happened at all outside of “childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

Also, the first communication I had from the CFNIS indicating that the investigation was over was on November 4th, 2011.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Petty Officer Morris’ words were that “the CFNIS could find no evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I had accused him of” and that the investigation was going to be closed.

MPCC 2018-030

Again, bear in mind that during the 2012 MPCC investigation I was not shown any of the documentation that was supplied to the MPCC by the CFNIS and I was therefore unable to question some of the questionable decisions by the CFNIS in 2011. As a result of this, any evidence that I entered into court was struck as being “new evidence” as I didn’t raise this evidence during the MPCC review. Neat how that works, eh?

MPCC 2018-030

I can only wonder if the Alberta Crown’s continued refusal to prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester is an act of retribution against me by the Alberta Crown for the fuss I’ve raised over Alberta Crown Prosecutor Jon Werbicki’s Crown opinion. I was never supposed to have seen that Crown opinion. They’re considered privileged documents.

Request for a Public Interest Hearing.

MPCC 2018-030

The funny thing about the MPCC declining to convene a public interest hearing is that it was the MPCC itself in 2011 that had stated in the “Military Police Complaints Commission Submissions to the Independent Review Authority” that having the Provost Marshal respond to the commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff “runs counter to Canadian law and practice regarding the independence of police investigations generally”.

Basically, what is being stated here is that when the police are investigating a criminal matter, the police answer to no one but the law itself. However, this is not possible in the Canadian Armed Forces as members of the CFNIS as well as the chain of command of the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal are members of the Canadian Forces and are bound by the National Defence Act as well as the Queen’s Regulations and Orders and must obey their superiors at all times.

This chain of command means that the investigator investigating my matter is subordinate to the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence is the very same entity that I would have to sue for civil damages.

This excerpt is from a Supreme Court of Canada matter which the Military Police Complaints Commisison raised within its submissions to the Independent Review Authority on June 23rd, 2011.

The Military Police Complaints Commission was taking issue with ammendments made to the National Defence Act which would allow for the Vice Chief of Defence Staff to direct the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal in any Professional Standards review and and military police investigation. The Surpeme Court of Canada has long recognized that it is improper for a police agency to receive instuction or guideance from any agency that may stand to be subject to civil actions depending on the outcome of the police agency.

The Military Police Complaints Commission itself pointed out that the Vice Chief of Defence Staff is not a Peace Officer unlike the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal must obey the lawful commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff must obey the lawful commands of the Chief of Defence Staff. And the Chief of Defence Staff must obey the wishes of the Minister of National Defence.

And as illustrated in the matter of P.S. v. Mininster of National Defence, it is the Minister with direct authority over the military police that I would have to initiate a civil action against and that the success of this civil action is solely dependent on the findings of the military police investigation that the minister may issue instructions for.

National Defence Act
Revised statutes of Canada 1985, Chapter N-5
Current as of 2019-08-01

Section 18.4 defines the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal.

Section 18.5 gives the Vice Chief of Defence Staff certain responsibilities over the Provost Marshal.

Section 83 and 85 state that EVERY member of the Canadian Forces will without hesitation obey the lawful commands of their superior. There are no exceptions for the military police or the CFNIS or the Provost Marshal, or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, or the Chief of Defence staff. Each and every one of them must obey the commands of their superior. The ultimate superior in this chain is the Minister of National Defence.

This type of obedience does not exist in any civilian police department to the best of my knowledge.

Interference Complaint

So, why didn’t I file an inference complaint?

Becuase only members of the military police conducting or supervising an investigation may make an interference complaint.

Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The last sentence of the excerpt above should be very concerning to anyone who understands what it means. Due to the Chain of Command Influence within the Canadian Armed Forces, if interference in an investigation occurs high enough up the Chain of Command, the military police investigator may be completely unaware of the interference. It’s sad that the MPCC wrote this observation in 2011 but pretends that interference couldn’t have possibly been an issue in my matter which stood to expose the Minister of National Defence to Civil Actions.

Pre-1998 Brick Wall.

MPCC 2018-030

The Canadian Forces Military Police and the MPCC often hide behind this “brick wall” that was errected in December of 1999 with the creation of the Military Police Complaints Commission. The CFNIS and the MPCC both claim that they cannot take anything from the 1980 CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae into account as this happened prior to 1999.

Refusal to hand over documents to the MPCC for review.

MPCC 2018-030

Unlike in 2012, this time around the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal declined to provide the Military Police Complaints Commission a copy of the Crown Brief or the response from the Crown. The decision to not supply the MPCC with these documents more than likely stems from how embarrassing it was for both the Alberta Crown and the CFNIS for me to have obtained the prior Crown Brief and the decision by the Crown.

However, as I have the tribunal records from the Alberta Victims of Crime, I can state for a fact that the CFNIS basically just regurgitated the original 2011 investigation Crown Brief.

MPCC 2018-030

The MPCC did ask me to sign a consent form allowing them to retrieve the a copy of the Crown Brief from the Alberta Victims of Crime seeing as how the Provost Marshal was declining to hand over a copy. As I’ve seen the Crown Brief I know that the CFNIS added sweet bugger all to the original 2011 Crown Brief and basically just resubmitted the original 2011 mess. And then they act surprised when the Crown refuses to prosecute.

Mention of RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban

MPCC 2018-030
MPCC 2018-030
MPCC 2018-030

Okay, so the CPIC check is interesting. But it misses out on some of the details that are in the newspaper article below.

Deep River, Ontario is just north of Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. CFB Petawawa is where P.S.’s family had been transfered to in June of 1980.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Deep+River,+ON/@46.0342639,-77.4257889,11z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x4cd6def70c3cdefd:0x1ca01a3335c67a5f!8m2!3d46.0976628!4d-77.4933397

The 1984 charge from Manitoba is missing. This one involved an 8 year old boy in Manitoba.

There were TWO charges in 1985. One for molesting a 9 year old boy on Canadian Forces Base Namao after his family had been transferred back there in 1985. And one for molesting a 13 year old newspaper boy in Edmonton after the Canadian Forces ordered him out of the military housing and off the base. His father, J.S., rented him an apartment in the west end of Edmonton.

So, that’s a total of four charges involving children prior to 1985. And they’re only listing the crimes he was convicted of. What’s not listed, but what is available in his CPIC file, is the numerous charges that were stayed or dismissed.

So, I hope you understand why I get annoyed when I think back to the phone call I received on November 4th, 2011 from Petty Office Steve Morris stating that the CFNIS couldn’t find anything to indicate that P.S. was capable of the crimes that I had accused him of.

Warrant Officer Fred R. Cunningham

MPCC 2018-030

This is correct, the CFSIU which after the separation of the intelligence section, went on to become the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service. The CFSIU primarily concerned itself with “serious and sensitive” offences committed by service members, much the same as the modern day CFNIS. The base military police then, much as they do today, looked after the smaller menial occurrences.

CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434
CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434

At the time of the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae in 1980, Fred Cunningham was Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham of the CFSIU. Fred was a Military Police officer with the base military police but was then transfered over to the CFSIU and became the Acting Section Commander.

When I spoke with Fred on November 27th, 2011, he wouldn’t elaborate what function he did with the military police. He said that he was very familiar with the P.S. and Captain McRae affair.

He said that the base MPs had received numerous complaints about P.S. and that this led to the investigation of P.S. by the base military police. According to Fred, when P.S. was questioned in his father’s house P.S. named Captain Father Angus McRae. Fred stated that the CFSIU had the charges related to three boys ready to go to court martial, but that the brass cut the charges down to only those charges involving P.S.

Fred stated that one of the other boys who had his charges against McRae dismissed by the brass thought that P.S. had stabbed him in the back. Fred Cunningham said that this other boy was named either Fred or Frank and that he was a prolific pyromaniac on the base and had set numerous fires.

As a side note, I was able to determine who this other kids was. His initials are F.A.. His family’s PMQ was involved with fires that F.A. was found to have set. According to one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports F.A. like to play the “hero” by “discovering” the fire after it had been set. F.A. had a tendency to try to blame his sisters for setting the fires. F.A. had also been to a psychiatric hospital to help him deal with his urges.

And, one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports indicate that F.A. and P.S. were good friends going so far as playing with fire together.

Just on a side note, on September 11th, 1978 the Canadian Forces Military Police on CFB Namao knew that P.S. was 13.

CF Fire Marshal report 7667-2-E16
ATIP A-2016-00793
MQ #26 – 12 St is where P.S. lived, MQ #21 – 12 Street is where F.A. lived.

I have the Edmonton Telephone Directories from 1978, 1979, and 1980 which confirm the family names of the persons living in these Married Quarters.

When I asked Fred Cunningham is he was insinuating that this Fred boy had anything to to with the fire at the P.S. residence on June 23rd, 1980 which resulted in the death of a civilian contractor, Fred Cunningham responded ” I am not going to speak to that”.

Fred also said that the brass wouldn’t allow the base military police to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.

Fred pleaded with me to understand that the military police tried everything to get Captain McRae transferred into the civilian system but that the brass wouldn’t allow for that to happen.

Fred Cunningham was of the opinion that P.S. should never have been allowed to babysit children and that P.S. was having “mental problems” at the time and that he was a very “unsavory character”.

In 2011, after having talked to Fred Cunningham about this, I sent a letter to the Provost Marshal at the time hoping that this would show the Provost Marshal that something bad happened on CFB Namao in 1978 through 1980 and that he should have the CFNIS take a deeper look. In early January of 2012, I received a telephone call from Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre telling me to not put much faith in what Cunningham had told me, that Cunningham wasn’t involved in the original investigation and was probably telling me second or third hand information.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The person “x” above is P.S.

P.S. was not the subject of a formal military police investigation because the military police at the time could not investigate P.S..

According to the National Defence Act at the time, the military police could only arrest military dependants who were outside of Canada accompanying their serving parent on Canadian Forces business. That’s actually still the case today.

The military police at the time would have had to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.. And according to Fred Cunningham the base military police and the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit were being prevented by the chain of command from calling in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S..

If the Canadian Forces had called in RCMP to deal with P.S., the Canadian Forces would have lost the ability to throw a gag-order over the Juvenile Delinquent Court. Yes, the Juvenile Court could easily prevent the naming of P.S., but they wouldn’t be able to prevent the naming of Captain Father Angus McRae and the delinquencies that Captain McRae was being charged with enabling a minor to commit.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

No one believed that P.S. was 12 years old at the time. P.S. was born in June of 1965. Captain McRae arrived at CFB Namao in August of 1978 from Canadian Forces Station Holberg on Vancouver Island. P.S. didn’t start abusing children until after Captain McRae started grooming P.S.. So this would have been in the fall of 1978. P.S. would have been about 13-1/2. P.S. would have turned 14 in June of 1979.

As indicated above, Canadian Forces records indicate that they knew in September of 1978 that P.S. was 13 years old.

In fact, the Canadian Forces NEEDED P.S. to be over the age of 14. According to a Court Martial Appeal Court matter titled Regina v. Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan from 1986 the Canadian Forces only retained the right to conduct a court martial for the crimes of Gross Indecency, and Indecent Assault so long as there was the possibility of consent. No consent meant the case had to be tried in a civilian court. No child under the age of consent can consent to have sexual relations with an adult. The age of consent in Canada at the time was 14.

C.M.A.C. 246 March 4, 1986
Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan v. Her Majesty the Queen (Regina)

As can been seen by the above excerpt, the military had the right to conduct a court martial against Captain McRae in the matter of Gross Indecency so long as there was the possibility that P.S. consented.

I wonder if any of this information from Fred Cunningham was passed on to the Alberta Crown.

If it wasn’t I wonder why?

Fred Cunningham was originally contacted by the CFNIS in early 2016.

For some reason he was very reluctant to sit down for a recorded interview with the CFNIS.

I wonder if Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre had truly put the fear of god into Fred Cunningham back in December 2011 when I told the Provost Marshal what Fred had told me. After all for some reason Sansterre seemed to really want me to forget and not pay much attention to what Cunningham had told me. I’m still convinced that Sansterre or one of his underlings at the Canadian Forces Military Police group threatened Cunningham with violating the Official Secrets Act / the Security of Information Act for having discussed the matter of Captain McRae’s court martial with me in violation of the in-camera order that was applied to the court martial in July of 1980 by the Western Commander of the Canadian Forces for the sole goal of “protecting the morals” of Canadians.

Protecting the Public Morals of Canadians.
ATI A-2019-00017 McRae Court Martial Transcript
RSC 1970, Chapter N-4, National Defence Act

Court Martial hearings are supposed to be open to the public, just as court proceedings are.

Basically the Canadian Forces didn’t want the Canadian public to discover that not only had an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relations on a military base. The Canadian Armed Forces didn’t want the Canadian public learning that an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relationships with children ranging in age from 15 to as young as possibly 4. As long as the Canadian Forces could hide this court martial, the Canadian Forces could portray it as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces having homosexual relations with a person who consented to the sexual activity.

ATI A-2018-00780
ATI A-2018-00780
MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

For someone who the CFNIS in 2011 couldn’t find any evidence against, P.S. sure keeps being mentioned as someone who liked to touch younger children.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

A lot of things back then seemed to have been dealt with “unofficially” back then if you know what I mean.

The funny thing about this is the MPCC and the CFNIS seem to have both neglected to mention my recording of the telephone call I had with retired Sgt. J.S., the father of P.S.. J.S. directly implicates his son.

Sgt. Tenaschuk called me in September of 2016 to inform me that the CFNIS was about ready to wrap up the investigation. Sgt. Tenaschuk asked me if there was anything else he thought that the CFNIS could do to satisfy me that they had tried everything this time. I suggested that the CFNIS run a Crime Stoppers appeal. Tenaschuk said that he would have to consult with his superiors to see if they would agree to this.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Note that the investigator can’t simply request a Crime Stoppers appeal. The investigator has to appeal to their chain of command. I also find it interesting that for a 40 year old case that lacks evidence that one Crime Stoppers appeal that ran for about two days in the media was garnering tips.

This appeal ran for two days. Better than nothing.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

7 tips for a two day appeal? Not too shabby.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Victim D was James Paluck. James is the one who told me that the sickly sweet grape juice was actually Manischewitz wine. James also told me about P.S.’s convictions in 1985 and both James and P.S.’s younger brother had been riding the bus to M.E. LaZert high school in Edmonton when the other school kids started teasing P.S.’s younger brother about his older brother being a child molester. Unfortunately James passed away. However, before James passed away he did give me the name of one other victim to go looking for.

Victim C is the youngest of three boys. He currently lives on the East Coast. When I spoke to him he was fearful of coming forward as he didn’t want to jeopardize his career. The middle brother was having issues that the younger brother believed was directly attributable to the abuse on CFB Namao at the hands of McRae and P.S.. The eldest brother committed suicide years ago. The younger brother blames the way the military handled the abuse investigation back in the 1980s as being a contributing factor.

On a side note, I recently learnt of another former military dependent from Canadian Forces Base Namao that had been abused by Captain McRae who would later go on to commit suicide. This dependent’s brother recently contacted me.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I can only wonder what these “painful memories” were. The CFNIS seemed to have scrubbed them from the investigation paperwork.

It should be noted that the interview with Victim C occurred on January 12, 2017.

It was in early February 2017 that Sgt Tenaschuk contacted me and told me about finding the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit case file for the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae. One of the things that Tenaschuk said has stuck with me. He said that it was very odd that this file still existed. He said that usually the military disposes of paperwork after a certain period. And seeing as how Captain McRae was convicted and subsequently booted out of the military in the early 1980s, this file shouldn’t exist anymore, but here it was.

This got me wondering. Maybe this file only continued to exist because it had been accessed frequently between 1980 and the current day because other victims of Captain McRae and P.S. kept coming forward over the years.

Maybe this is what drove P.S. to attempt suicide in 2000. He knew that he was never going to be free of what happened on CFB Namao.

Sgt. Tenaschuk read to me excerpts from the file. Unlike what J.S. had told me in July of 2015, it wasn’t J.S. that obtained the name of Captain McRae from his son P.S.. It was two base military police officers whom had interrogated P.S. in the kitchen of his family PMQ. Sgt. Tenaschuk said that just about everything else that Fred Cunningham had told me in 2011 was backed up by this paperwork. I asked Sgt. Tenaschuk for the name of this paperwork. He replied that it’s “CFSIU DS 120-10-80”. I filed an ATIP for CFSIU DS- 120-10-80 as soon as I got off the phone with Sgt. Tenaschuk.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I forget how I was first put in contact with victim A, but if I remember correctly he contacted me via Facebook after having seen one of my postings in one of the Base Brat groups on Facebook. He’s a good guy. I’ve only met him twice face to face. His employment allows his to come out to the West Coast periodically. He has been willing in the past to go on camera so long as he is allowed to sit behind a screen. Being a sexually abused male carries such a bad stigma, especially in the line of work that he’s in that he doesn’t want anyone knowing who he actually is. And this I can totally understand.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Again Mstr [X] refers to P.S..

Bear in mind that no one involved with my investigation had tried to locate this paperwork. It was only when the CFNIS commenced an investigation into the complaint made by Victim A that the CFNIS Western Region tracked down the paperwork.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Remember, Corporal White was investigating the complaint of “Victim A”. No one from my investigation had tried obtaining the court martial records. P.S. was the main prosecution witness against Captain McRae.

In July of 2015 when I spoke with J.S. he told me how when his family was living on CFB Petawawa, the Canadian Forces wanted his son P.S. to fly back to Edmonton by himself to testify against Captain McRae. J.S. said that after much back-and-forth the Canadian Forces agreed to allow J.S. to fly to Edmonton with his son. However, J.S. was barred from entering the court martial. This would have been illegal at the time. Children have a right to have a parent or guardian present during any manner of court proceeding. The fact that the court martial panel didn’t want J.S. to hear his son’s testimony shows how far the Canadian Forces were willing to go to keep the actions of Captain McRae under wraps.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

And here it is ladies and gentlemen, the moment we’ve all been waiting for:

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

There it is in black and white Ladies and Gentlemen, the words that the CFNIS and the Canadian Forces chain of command have been very fucking reluctant to say or even acknowledge. P.S. was sexually abusing younger children on the base and the military police in 1980 WERE aware of the abuse.

Having been investigated by the base military police in 1980 for sexually abusing younger children should have proved that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I accused him of. At least the should have allowed me to face P.S. in a court of law out of the hands of the military.

The Alberta Victims of Crime – 2018 Crown Brief.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

It should be understood that the 2011 ‘remarks’ are from the Crown Brief that was submitted to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki.

The reason that I had applied for benefits from the Victims of Crime Financial benefits program is that the victim services officer with the Canadian Forces suggested that I approach the Alberta Victims of Crime program for financial assistance to get counselling services.

As I’ve explained elsewhere as I’m not a member of the Canadian Forces I don’t qualify for counselling services from the Canadian Forces.

Alberta and British Columbia have both declined to assist me with counselling. British Columbia stating that the crimes didn’t occur in British Columbia, so it’s not their responsibility to pay.

Alberta first said that as I’m not a resident of Alberta, they’re not going to pay for counselling in another province. Then Alberta further declined stating that the crimes happened on a military reserve, therefore the Canadian Forces should pay.

Basically everyone just passes the buck.

And from what I’ve heard from other former base brats, this is common. Base brats quite often fall through social safety nets as the provinces look for any excuse to not deal with us.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Section 156 of the 1980 Criminal Code was Indecent Assault on Male. This was an indictable offence. The sentence was for up to ten years and to be whipped. As a juvenile, P.S. would have received at most a stint in reform school, if that.

Also, what I find odd about this is Petty Office Steve Morris called me on November 4th, 2011 and told me that the CFNIS couldn’t find any evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I had accused him of.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I think Mr. Ghadban is being a little over generous here. After all, the CFNIS ‘forgot’ to mention to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki that I had tried twice previously to report P.S. to the military police. The CFNIS outright ignored the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. The CFNIS in 2011 could have just as easily obtained the court martial transcripts for Captain McRae as Corporal White did in the 2018 CFNIS investigation into the complaint against P.S. by the other victim.

In 2011 there would have been nothing preventing the CFNIS from changing the scope of the investigation while McRae was alive and changed the status of P.S. from accused to witness and then proceeded after McRae. But again, connecting my sexual abuse to the actions of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae has always been the last thing the Canadian Forces chain of command have wanted.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I urge you to search for a Macleans Magazine article from the early 2000s called “The CFB Gagetown Rape Controversy”. I won’t get too much into that other that it was a story about a flawed military police investigation related to the rape of a developmentally challenged woman by four male soldiers at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in New Brunswick. One of the things that was noted is that the military police would often submit laughable cases to the local Crown Prosecutors knowing full well that the Crown would recommend against charges. This way the military could tell the victim that it was the Crown’s fault that charges were being pursued.

This rape and the subsequent investigation occurred prior to the Somalia Inquiry. The Somalia Inquiry found that the Canadian Forces justice system was prone to abuse and manipulation from the Chain of Command, commanding officers could easily interfere with investigations, people with no legal training and no legal back ground could summarily dismiss criminal code charges.

This is why with the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, the requirement for commanding officers to conduct summary investigations AFTER the military police laid charges was removed. This is also why the 3-year time bar that applied to ALL indictable offences in the Criminal Code of Canada was removed from the National Defence Act.

Still, it looks as if some things never change.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As long as Orest Yeriniuk views me as a “trouble maker” instead of a victim, there will be no funding for counselling.

Submission of Case to Crown Prosecutor and conclusion

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

If I had to hazard a guess, the Alberta Crown is still smarting over the release of the Crown Brief and the subsequent Crown Opinion to me by the Military Police Complaints Commission in 2013. I would have like to have been a fly on the wall when the Alberta Crown, and possibly even the Alberta Solicitor General reamed the CFNIS and possibly the MPCC a new one.

Decisions by the Crown are supposed to not be questioned. That’s one of the major flaws with the justice system in this country. The Crowns operate like their own private little fiefdoms that will dispense justice as they see fit. The Crowns believe that they are above reproach and should never have to justify their decisions to anyone, not even lowly peasants such as myself.

Questionable Crown decisions are how Karla Holmolka is allowed to walk the streets even though as it turned out, she was at least as involved with the murders as Paul Bernardo was.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

This must be a new “standard practice” as the Crown Prosecutor’s opinion was released to the MPCC the last time. I wonder what’s different this time around? This secrecy doesn’t really do anyone too well. In fact, even the MPCC has complained about this in the past.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The case was 31 year old in 2011 when this started.

I was 7 to 8 when the abuse was occuring

P.S. was between 13-1/2 and 15 when the abuse was occuring.

P.S. had already been investigated by the base military police and had received counselling for his involvement with young children on the base.

It was the involvement of P.S. with the younger children that eventually led to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

P.S. has a substantial criminal record for child sexual abuse.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The Alberta Crown in 2011 had determined, based on the original 2011 CFNIS investigation, that it was very significant that I never told anyone of the abuse. Looks like the CFNIS forgot to tell the Alberta Crown about my attempts to report P.S. to the military police in 1984 and in 1990. Also, the case presented to the Alberta Crown made it sound as if I could barely remember the assaults. I clearly remembered the two times that P.S. tried to have anal intercourse with me and the third time he succeeded. I clearly remember the times that P.S. forced me to perform oral sex on him. I clearly remember the threats that P.S. made to me that he would kill me if I ever told the military police about what he had done to me. I also remember quite clearly the threats P.S. made that his father would have my father thrown out of the military if I ever told anyone. However, I don’t think the CFNIS was too interested in passing all of this information on to the Alberta Crown. Otherwise I don’t think the Alberta Crown would have remarked that this was nothing more than “Childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The MPCC said itself that Chain of Command interference would be almost impossible to detect.

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is image-44.png
Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The MPCC cannot investigate an interference complaint from me. And as the MPCC state above in its own report, any interference from the chain of command may be undetectable. After all, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of any investigation and any Military Police investigation.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Basically, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, who is not a peace officer, and generally is not required to have any manner of legal training and who is not sworn to uphold the Criminal Code of Canada can supervise the Provost Marshal in criminal code investigations and in professional standard reviews.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Here’s the really scary part. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff can issue instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of a particular investigation. Basically the National Defence Act is stating that it’s okay for someone with no peace officer qualifications to direct a law enforcement agency.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Sound great in theory.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

So, if the Vice Chief of Defence Staff issued instructions to the Provost Marshal to not forward certain information to the Alberta Crown, what do you think the odds are on that I would ever be able to see those instructions?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

McRae’s court martial was anything but public knowledge. The Canadian Forces threw a “veil of secrecy” around it. The public never knew the true extent of what Captain McRae had done.

Edmonton Journal, July 31, 1980
Edmonton Journal July 30 1980
Globe and Mail August 1st, 1980

The tone presented in these news articles makes it very clear that the Canadian Forces wasn’t been too transparent with the Captain McRae affair.

If the Canadian public knew that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae had molested well over 25 children ranging in ages from 5 to 15 on a secure defence establishment, the Canadian public would have demanded that heads roll. To be very clear, the court martial wasn’t moved in-camera to protect the identity of P.S..

The court martial was moved in-camera to protect the public image of the Canadian Armed Forces.

25 children, on a secure defence establishment, sexually abused by an officer of the Canadian Armed Forces? This would have been a fucking scandal. There is no way that Minister of National Defence Gilles Lamontagne or Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau would have survived this.

Here is the order requesting that McRae’s court martial be moved in-camera in the “interests of public morals”:

From Court Martial transcripts CM62 July 18, 1980 ATIP A-2019-00017

It wasn’t the identity of P.S. that the Canadian Armed Forces were protecting. It was their own necks and their own careers.

25 children.

1 secure military base

1 military officer.

This was not going to be public at all.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The Federal Government is compelled to settle this lawsuit. DND is legally liable and responsible for its employees. DND and the Canadian Government aren’t settling out of the kindness of their heart. They’re settling because of legal actions. Legal actions that military dependants or other civilians cannot take against the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence.

The class action lawsuit was specifically open to only members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence. Persons such as myself, who had been given “conversion therapy” through the military social workers are ineligible to join these class action lawsuits as we were never members of the Canadian Forces or civilian employees of the Department of National Defence.

It took almost 40 years for the Canadian Armed Forces to own up to its responsibilities for the cadets who had been killed and injured by a grenade blast in 1974 when a real live grenade was introduced into a classroom full of 12 to 18 year old children. From 1974 until 2011 the Canadian Forces refused to accept liability and to cover the expenses for the dead and injured cadets because cadets are not the legal responsibility of DND or the Canadian Forces.

It took the Minister of National Defence requesting that the Canadian Forces ombudsman review the matter before the Canadian Forces finally responded to the pleas of the former cadets for assistance.

The cadets were not able to receive compensation or assistance at the time of the grenade explosion because they were not members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/en/ombudsman-reports-stats-investigations-valcartier/valcartier-report.page#compensation

As per the above section of the Canadian Forces Ombudsman report on the CFB Valcartier cadet grenade incident the Canadian Armed Forces are only legally liable for its members of the Reserves and Regular Forces as well as its civilian employees and contractors. Cadets, military dependents (spouses and children), and civilians not employed by DND who are on military bases are their at their own risk.

The problem with DND and sexually abused military dependents is that no one knows just how many children were sexually abused on the various bases by members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Actually, the three year time bar flaw was never remedied. It was only removed. Meaning that after December 1998, the 3-year time bar could not be used to prevent the laying of charges under the criminal code against a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

However, what wasn’t fixed was the fact that any crime that occurred prior to 1998 cannot be charged for. What this means is that in my matter, if P.S. had been charged and had in turn implicated Angus McRae. Angus McRae could never be charged due to the 3-year time bar that existed prior to 1998.

I don’t think the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence want this one little flaw known.

I think this flaw is what allows the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence to claim that child sexual abuse on the bases in Canada was non-existent in the old days.

Dan M. was the Base Commander of Canadian Forces Base Namao, and he was also the commanding officer of Captain Father Angus McRae. Col Dan M. would have been the one who conducted the summary investigation against Captain McRae after the military police laid charges. It would have been Col Dan M. that would have determined which charges proceeded and which charges were dismissed. Col Dan M. would have also had the authority to prohibit the CFSIU and the base military police from calling in the RCMP to deal with P.S.

So, it is very clear that the 3-year time bar, even though it was removed by the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, still affects criminal investigations to this date.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

This is laughable.

The Minister of National Defence settled with P.S.. Of this there is no doubt.

P.S., in his telephone conversation with CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock in August of 2011 has said that the “military has already handled things that he was involved in as a youth”.

When I spoke with P.S. in July of 2015 he claimed that he is bound to silence by an NDA.

The Minister of National Defence by way of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions on any military police investigation.

The CFNIS conducted an investigation that could have potentially subjected the Minister of national Defence to further civil action.

The CFNIS also submitted to the Alberta Crown a very poorly executed investigation.

The Canadian Forces chain of command knew that by submitting an inferior investigation to the Crown that the Crown would be very highly unlikely to recommend charges.

The Canadian Forces chain of command are also well aware that without a criminal conviction, the chances on any victim of P.S. being successful in a civil action against the Minister would be severely diminished.

And as P.S. was a juvenile at the time, initiating a civil action against a minor would be impossible. However, the Juvenile Delinquents Act held that the adult who had contributed to the delinquency could be held responsible.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Captain McRae was investigated in 1973 for committing “acts of homosexuality” at the Royal Military College at Canadian Forces Base Kingston in Ontario. “Acts of homosexuality” is also what Captain McRae was charged with committing on Canadian Forces Base Namao. Captain Father Angus McRae was involved with a teenage boy on Canadian Forces Station Holberg just prior to his transfer to Canadian Forces Base Namao.

Brigadier General Roger Bazin was arrested in 2010 for having sexually abused a boy on Canadian Forces Base Borden when he was a catholic chaplain at the military chapel on the base.

The Bazin matter occurred just prior to me bringing my complaint against P.S.

Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan molested numerous children in the 1970s before he joined the Canadian Armed Forces. Once in the Canadian Forces he was court martialed for molesting numerous boys on Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in 1984.

The Canadian Armed Forces removed the rectories from the catholic chapels in the late ’80s.

In 2006, the Canadian Armed Forces changed the way that baptismal records are issued specifically stating that this was due to the amount of civil actions being brought against Catholic Archdiocese in Canada.

Email from June 2011 when I tried to obtain my baptismal records from the Canadian Forces.
Operation “cover our asses” has commenced as of November 22nd, 2006.

Due to the way that children were moved from base to base to follow their serving parent’s military career, and due to the way that Canadian Forces service members including military chaplains were also moved from base to base, it is conceivable that there are thousands of children who were touched once or twice on the various bases, but who never said anything.

It’s also conceivable that these children never said anything until years later, possibly outside of the 3-year time bar, that made pressing charges impossible.

This is a problem that the Canadian Armed Forces are more than willing to let fade into history.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As the MPCC itself has said, the investigators within the CFNIS and the military police may not even be aware of “chain of command” influence.

Why did the CFNIS chain of command determine that the Crown shouldn’t be informed of the entirety of the telephone conversation between P.S. and Robert Jon Hancock.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination that my father was not to be re-interviewed even though my foster care records and his answer to my written examination exposed his statement to the CFNIS as lie upon lie easily disproved by my foster care records.

Richard didn’t die until January of 2017. The CFNIS had over a year and a half to get the silly fucker to “clarify” his original statement to the CFNIS. And even though the CFNIS knew of the errors in Richard’s statement, they did nothing what so ever to make sure that the Alberta Crown understood the issues with Richard’s statement.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that shortly after the events on CFB Namao that I was made a ward of the province due to the instability in my household.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that P.S. had been interviewed by the base military police in 1980 and had also been sent for treatment for committing sexual assaults against young children on the base?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As I’ve seen the documents submitted to the Alberta Victims of Crime, I know that it was basically the 2011 Crown Brief with a bit of the 2018 investigation thrown in.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

It’s generally good police practice to not tip off the family of the suspect that you’re looking for another family member to give a statement against another family member.

The family of P.S. told the CFNIS investigators in the 2015 to 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast, that the younger brother never spoke to the family, that the younger brother hated and despised P.S., and that the younger brother was probably deceased.

After tracking the younger brother down via CPIC, it turns out that the younger brother and P.S. lived about 25 km apart.

P.S. lived at home with his father, J.S. in Fort Erie.

Southern Ontario

J.S. told me in the telephone call that I had with him that he had just had one of his legs amputated and that he needed P.S. at home to look after him.

How much do you wanna bet that when Sgt. Tenaschuk called up J.S. looking for his youngest son that J.S. asked him not to say anything against P.S.?

When I spoke with J.S. in 2015, he blamed himself for what had happened to both P.S. and his younger brother. Apparently they had both been abused by Captain McRae.

Another former base brat, whom I met via the base brat groups, knew D.S, the older sister of P.S.. D.S. said that her father J.S. blamed himself. P.S. was apparently a shy boy and didn’t have many friends, so J.S. forced P.S. to go over to the chapel to be McRae’s altar boy and to assist McRae with duties around the chapel.

D.S. herself is interesting in the sense that she also covers for her brother, P.S..

It’s almost as if that entire family doesn’t hold P.S. responsible for all of the children that he assaulted and molested over he years because they all blame Captain McRae.

And I think they further justify this victimhood by saying that the Canadian Armed Forces never would have settled with P.S. if P.S. wasn’t a victim.

It’s just too bad that the rest of us can’t be victims.

I still can’t believe that my father thought that at 7 years of age that I could force 14 year old P.S. to molest my younger brother. I guess it must be true, after all I wasn’t a victim of anyone, right?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is under no obligation to supply the MPCC with documentation, and as the MPCC does not have the legal authority to subpoena any document from the Provost Marshal, I’m just going to have to say that I would never simply take the verbal word of anyone attached to the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

Having seen the games DND played during the Mark Norman affair I just can’t trust DND at their word.

In February of 2016 the Minister of National Defence called my intentions into question by suggesting that I had impure motives.

He wanted to know “what my game was” and “what angle was I trying to play”

In August of 2011 the CFNIS tried to get my brother to state that I was a societal malcontent with an axe to grind against the military.

This has never been about justice.

This has always been about the Canadian Armed Forces ensuring that the dirty secrets of the past stay in the past.

I never wanted a single nickel from the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

All I wanted was for my father to own up to the truth and for him to stop blaming me for having “fucked with his military career” and for having forced P.S. to molest my younger brother.

That was it.

Richard wasn’t the type of man to ever apologize unless he knew that he couldn’t weasel his way out of this with lies and bullshit.

Yeah, I do realize that any apology I would have received from him probably would have been worthless bullshit that he spewed just to try to make himself look good.

But the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service took that possibility away from me.

Keeping the military’s secrets was more paramount than my apology.

The lawyer in P.S.’ claim against the Crown summed it up the best:

As P.S. was a juvenile at the time, these are the entities that anyone abused by P.S. would have to make a claim against:

Court of Queens Bench procedure card Q0103 08346
P.S. v. Minister of National Defence et. al.

The Canadian Armed Forces would be represented by the Department of Justice. The DoJ has unlimited tax payer dollars and an unlimited amount of lawyers. Basically the DoJ can turn night into day if it so wishes. That’s how much power it has.

DND and the art of hiding stuff

I might have the ear of a news reporter that is willing to look at my matter.

This reporter is more interested in some of the results I have recevied from the Department of National Defence in response to my various Access to Information requests.

The most recent results I recevied were from an Access to Information Request that I filed with the Department of National Defence in 2019.

In April of 2019, I had been contacted by the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada. I was told by the OIC that DND had released documents to another party that were the same documents that I had been requesting since 2012 and therefore I should submit a new request for the exact documents that DND had just released.

The records that I had requested were for the July 18th, 1980 court martial of Captain Father Angus McRae.

I made an application for these documents on April 3rd 2019. DND acknowledged this request a few days later.

In July of 2020 I finally received the documents that I had requested.

This is the cover page of the documents.

The cover letter

The second page is a photocopy of the file folder from the office of the Judge Advocate General.

The coverpage of the Judge Advocate General file folder

The third page states that pages 2 to 266 are being exempted under the privacy act section 19(1).

Everything has been exempted to protect Captain McRae’s privacy, who has been dead since May of 2011.

So, basically, I recevied three worthless but very humorous pages from DND.

The interesting thing about this information is that a Toronto Star reporter had access to this information back in 1990 for a news story he was writing about Captain McRae having been busted for molesting more children at a Scarborough Ontario church.

Kevin Donovan, Toronto Star
Feb 11, 1990
Page A 14

Also, an instructor with the Canadian Forces College had access to these documents.

Dr. Chris Madsen
Canadian Forces College

So, why am I not being given access to McRae’s court martial records?

In plain and simple terms. There’s a coverup under foot.

The DND Access to Information Office, the Judge Advocate General, the Provost Marshal, the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, they all work under the same minister.

This is the same minister that must be sued in any civil action brought against a current or former member of the Canadian Forces.

This is the very same Minister that asked me “What my angle was”, and “What game was I playing” when I went to speak with him in 2016 at his constituency office in Vancouver.

There is nothing in the language of the National Defence Act whch exempts the Judge Advocate General, the Provost Marshal, or anyone in the Canadian Forces Military Police Group from Section 83 of the National Defence Act.

Chapter N-5, Section 83
National Defence Act

What does this have to do with the refusal of DND to release the requested documents to me?

During the 2nd portion of CFNIS investigation GO2011-5754, the investigators with the CFNIS noted that although my name wasn’t mentioned in CFSIU investigation DS-120-10-80 they would ask me a series of questions to see if my answers matched details within CFSIU DS 120-10-80.

Excerpt from GO 2011-5754
The first report would be CFSIU DS-120-10-80 which commenced on May 12th, 1980
The second report would be the base military police investigation of P.S. for what he had been doing with younger children on the base.

I was never asked any questions.

The goal was never to connect me to P.S. or Captain McRae.

The goal was a “Dog and Pony Show” investigation that wouldn’t lead to any charges against P.S., but would give me the feeling that something had been done.

Yes, P.S. would never face a court martial. But you have to remember that at the start of this investigation back in March of 2011, Angus McRae was alive and well.

The CFNIS had to structure the investigation around the fact that even if P.S. were to implicate Captain Angus McRae, the Canadian Forces would never be able to bring charges against Captain McRae due to the 3-year time bar that existed pre-1998.

The Minister of National Defence, the Judge Advocate General, and the Provost Marshal do not want to establish that I or any other child from CFB Namao were involved with the P.S./ Captain McRae child sexual abuse scandal on CFB Namao.

The decision was made in 1980 to only charge Captain McRae with committing “Acts of Homosexuality” against P.S. as P.S. was the only boy above the age of 14.

14 was the age of consent in 1980.

And as was explained in the Court Martial Appeal Court ruling in the matter of Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan vs. Regina, the Canadian Armed Forces have the right to conduct a court martial for “Gross Indecency”, “Indecent Assault”, and “Buggery” so long as consent could have been a consideration.

Regina vs. Sullivan
Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada

This implies that if consent wasn’t given, then the Canadian Forces couldn’t conduct a service tribunal. The matter would have to go before a civilian court. And in a civilian court, the Department of National Defence would have a much harder time throwing a “wall of secrecy” around the matter.

It must be remembered that at the time in 1980, 14 was the legal age that a child could consent to sexual activities.

1970 R.S.C. Chapter C-34
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 140 – Consent
Children under 14 cannot consent.

This is why the Chain of Command, according to Fred Cunningham, dropped all of the charges against McRae except for the charges related to P.S.. P.S. was the only boy over the age of 14. Instead of this being a matter of child sexual abuse, now this was a matter of “homosexuality”.

CFSIU Investigation DS 120-10-80

P.S., being the only boy over the age of 14 would have been the only one who could have possibly “consented”.

If the Canadian Armed Forces had tried to charge Captain McRae with molesting the children that were between the ages of 4 and 14 that both he and P.S. molested both individually and together, the Canadian Armed Forces would have lost the ability to conduct a court martial against Captain McRae.

The problem this posed for the Canadian Armed Forces is that Captain McRae was the first officer in the Canadian Armed Forces investigated for molesting children.

In a court martial, the Minister of Defence may allow the proceedings to be moved “in-camera” and thereby keep an embarrassing situation out of the media.

If the Canadian Forces had charged Captain McRae with molesting the children under the age of 14, McRae would have had to be prosecuted in civilian court.

To move a court martial “in-camera” is far easier than it is to try to move a civilian court case “in-camera”.

This also explains why the base military police and the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit were not allowed to call in the RCMP to deal with P.S..

If P.S. had been investigated and charged with molesting the children he had been babysitting, he would have been dealt with under the Juvenile Delinquents Act.

There was an odd section of the Juvie Act which allowed for the adult that contributed to the delinquency of a minor to be found guilty on summary conviction.

Section 33 Juvenile Delinquents Act

Had the Chain of Command in 1980 allowed either the base military police or the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit to call in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to deal woth P.S., the Canadian Forces would have lost all ability to control the narrative of the eventual investigation into Captain McRae.

By keeping things “in house”, the Chain of Command knew they could keep a very embarrassing situation out of the local media.

The problem that created is that any of the children being molested by P.S. and Captain McRae would be forever denied acknowedlegment or justice.

MPCC Second Complaint

I finally finished with my submissions to the Military Police Complaints Commission. This time around I hope that things work out a little different.

My first tango with the MPCC back in 2012 was the first time ever that I had dealt with an agency such as the MPCC. I had no lawyer, and no legal advice. I went I completely naive expecting the MPCC to agree that an investigation that couldn’t bring charges against a person with already numerous charges for child sexual abuse had to have been flawed.

Flawed it was, but I had absolutely no access to any of the paperwork from the CFNIS investigation. I had no idea that the Provost Marshal could determine which documents were sent to the MPCC and which documents were withheld from the MPCC.

I also had no idea that CFNIS investigator participation in a MPCC review is strictly voluntary, and that the MPCC investigations can take flights of fancy with their statements to the MPCC as their statements are not taken under oath.

The Military Police Complaints Commission was created by an act of Parliament with extensive input from agencies such as the Department of Justice, and the Department of National Defence. You just know the rules are stacked against you from the word go.

What I find the most disappointing about agencies such as the MPCC is that they aren’t structured at all to assist the complaintant.

To make a successful complaint against the military police, one would need to have access to the investigation paperwork.

However, the MPCC is not set up to be able to assist a person with obtaining the paperwork for the police investigation that they would like to complain against.

In 2018, as soon as I heard that the Alberta Crown was again declining to reccomend charges against P.S., I filed an Access to Information Request with the Department of National Defence to get the paperwork from the CFNIS investigation.

This request was filed on July 27th, 2018. DND acknowledged the receipt of this request on July 30th, 2018. On September 5th, 2018 I filed a complaint with the Military Police Complaints Commission in regard to the second portion of CFNIS GO# 2011-5754.

I made it specifically clear in my complaint that I was awaiting the paperwork from the investigation before I would be able to clearly state my concerns. I explained that as the CFNIS investigator who had been working on the second portion of my case would not give me a firm date as to when the investigation had ended, that I was filing my second MPCC complaint as a way to ensure that the deadline for my filing a complaint didn’t expire.

You only have one year from the date of the end of the investigation to make a complaint.

I recevied the investigation paperwork on Februaty 5th, 2020. This is over 7 months past the one year deadline for filing.

And I only received the documents after the involvement of the Office of the Information Commmisioner of Canada. The OIC stated that my complaint against DND for “deemed refusal” was “Well Founded” and will be officially recorded as such.

Deemed refusal is a term of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada. It means that while the agency responsible for releasing the information being requested has agreed to the request, they are intentionally dragging their heels in an attempt to deny a person access to the information that they have requested.

Needless to say, had I waited until I received the paperwork from the investigation before I made my complaint, I would have been well past the deadline for filing a complaint.

The paperwork that I received was redacted to the nth degree. There is a lot of good information contained in the documents, but a lot is missing as well.

I know for example that two different investigators spoke with Fred Cunningham during the second portion of the CFNIS investigation. I know that Fred was refusing to be interviewed if the interview was recorded. He also didn’t seem to want to attend the CFNIS detachment on base.

I also know that the CFNIS basically regurgitated the 2011 CFNIS investigation and fed that back to the Alberta Crown again. It became very apparent that no matter how many other witnesses came forward with complaints against P.S., the the CFNIS were going to keep all of our complaints separate.

You do have to understand, the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal are not protecting P.S.. The CFNIS and the Provost Marshal are doing everything within their power to ensure that the Canadian Public never discover that the Canadian Armed Forces were having the exact same problem with their Catholic clergy that the various civilian archdiocese were having. Captain McRae wasn’t the only service member charged with sexual acts involving children in the Catholic clergy in the Canadian Forces. Canadian Armed Forces Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan was another, along with Canadian Armed Forces officer Brigadier General Roger Bazin.

And there are probably many more who were never charged due to the 3 year time bar in the pre-1998 National Defence Act, or the summary investigation flaw that also existed in the pre-1998 National Defence Act.

There is one aspect of my current complaint that concerns me is that most of the personnel involved with the investigation of my complaint against P.S. have moved on to other endeavours. Some have been “released” while some have “retired”.

A problem in the Chapel

A problem in the chapel.

The Catholic chapels on many of the bases in Canada had rectories attached for the padre to reside in.

Blueprints for “Our Lady of Loretto Chapel – Canadian Forces Base Namao”
These plans were used on most other bases as well

Most of these rectories were systematically removed in the late 1980s to early 1990s.

Instructions for removing the bathtub from the rectory and for removing the kitchen partition walls
New layout for former living quarters now re-purposed as worship and absolution areas.

It’s anyone’s guess really as to why the Canadian Armed Forces started to remove the rectories, but I have a guess or two that probably aren’t far from what the true answer actually is.

I think the Canadian Armed Forces were beginning to realize in the ’80s that they were having a problem with the chaplins. It’s no secret that it was during the ’80s that the public started to become aware of the problems facing the Catholic Church and their priests that had a fondness for children.
And all of the military chaplains were supplied by the Catholic church.

This was such a known problem that the Catholic Church even had a recycling facility where they would send the Catholic priests to help them with their issues after they had been found to be sexually involved with children.

In 2006 the Canadian Armed Forces changed the procedure for obtaining baptismal records. In their explanation, they specifically cite the number of lawsuits brought against the various civilian diocese across Canada as being the primary reason for the change in procedure.

If you ask me, I think the reason for this change is to make civil actions against the Canadian Forces for the actions of their kiddie diddling clergy that much harder. If you can’t prove that you were baptised, then how could you have been involved with the padre. I know I was baptised as my grandmother had me take my first communion on CFB Namao at Our Lady of Loretto Chapel. Captain McRae would have been the padre.

When Captain Father Angus McRae was being investigated by the CFSIU for having committed “acts of homosexuality” with teenage boys on CFB Namao, Major Roger Bazin had been sent out from Ottawa to assist Captain McRae with his affairs.

Major Roger Bazin was once a padre on Canadian Forces Base Borden in the 1970s. We know for sure that Captain Roger Bazin was on CFB Borden in 1972. Major Roger Bazin would go on to become Brigadier General Roger Bazin and he would become the head of the chaplaincy branch of the Canadian Forces.

Just before the time of the Colonel Russell Williams fiasco on Canadian Forces Base Trenton a man came forward and made a complaint against Roger Bazin. The complaint was that Roger Bazin had sexually abused this man when he was a child living on Canadian Forces Base Borden in 1972.

Bazin was investigated and charged, but the charges were dropped at the last minute. I think the three year time bar played a significant role in the dropping of charges. As Bazin was subject to the Code of Service Discipline at the time of the abuse, and as he had committed the service offences of Buggery, Gross Indecency, and Indecent Assault, these were crimes that could be prosecuted through a court martial (see the court martial of Captain McRae, July 18th, 1980 CM62).

However, as previously discussed, the three year time bar that existed in the pre-1998 National Defence Act meant that the court martial had to occur within 3 years of the date of the offence. As more than 3 years had elapsed, there is no possibility that charges could proceed.

And no, there exists no mechanism to kick these matters over to the civilian courts to get around the 3 year time bar.

Now, this isn’t the first time a complaint had been brought against Roger Bazin.

After Roger Bazin had retired from the Canadian Forces, he became a chaplain in a small parish in Ontario. A boy from that parish came forward with complaints against Bazin. The church convinced the parents of the boy to not bring the police in. Bazin made a cash settlement with the boy, and the matter simply went away.

So, what are the odds that Captain Father Angus McRae and Brigadier General Roger Bazin were the only two padres with a soft-spot for children?

Unlike the Catholic church, the Canadian Armed Forces have their own legal system. The Canadian Armed Forces can choose to deal with the wayward padres however they see fit.

I know that in the matter of Canadian Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae, the Canadian Forces were just as guilty of moving the predator padres around as the Catholic church was guilty of moving the predator priests around.
In 1973, McRae was investigated for “acts of homosexuality” at RMC Kingston @ CFB Kingston.
He was punted off to CFB Portage La Prairie.
He was then punted off to Canadian Forces Station Holberg on Vancouver Island where he became involved with a teenage boy.
He was then punted over to CFB Namao where in less than two years he was investigated for molesting over 25 children.

If the CFNIS were requested by the office of the Minister of National Defence to investigate the military padres during the ’60s, ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, what would they find? Would they have the required skills? What would the point be if charges couldn’t be brought due to the 3-year time bar? How would the Minister of National Defence find all of the former military dependants? What about the ones who committed suicide over the years?

Would the Minister of National Defence ever request this to be done with the knowledge that any evidence of wrongdoing would expose the office of the Minister of National Defence to civil actions much like when Mr. P.S. sued the office of the Minister of National Defence?

Would the Minister of National Defence ever allow this type of investigation to occur knowing full well that it would forever damage the image of the Canadian Armed Forces and probably lead Parliament to overhauling the military justice system.

How many time during the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, did other military dependants come forward with complaints against other military pardes for incidents of sexual assault, only to have charges not proceed due to the 3-year time bar.

How many times in the past did commanding officers dismiss charges that had been brought against the padres?

Remember, as in my case, the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal have a multitude of ways to cover-up the reason why charges didn’t go forward. In my case, Sgt. Christian Cyr intentionally told me that Mr. P.S. was only 13 years old in the spring of 1980 when Mr. P.S. had been discovered buggering me in his bedroom in his family’s PMQ . Sgt Cyr did this for a reason. Under the juvenile delinquents act, a person who had not yet achieved their 14th birthday could not be charged with a criminal offence.

However, Mr. P.S. was born on June 20th, 1965. In May of 1980, Mr. P.S. would have been two months shy of his 15th birthday. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act he would have been fully culpable for all of the criminal code offences that he committed since June 20th, 1979 while at the same time Captain McRae couldn’t be charged for any crime after May of 1983. (3-year time bar).

And in researching the CMAC records I’ve collected for this blog posting, I came across a CMAC finding that says that the Minister of National Defence functions as the Attorney General for the Canadian Armed Forces and maintains a supervisory role over military prosecutions.
This means that the Minister of National Defence has some involvement in the military justice system.
This serves to further my observations that a conflict of interest exists in allowing the CFNIS to investigate historical matters of child sexual abuse on the Defence Establishments when it is the office of the Minister of National Defence that would be subject to civil actions should convictions result.

Jurisdiction of the CFNIS

Trying to define the jurisdiction of the CFNIS and the military police is about as easy as trying to nail jello to the wall. Sadly, this is more to do with the failure of Parliament to close the holes in the National Defence Act than anything else.

In 1987, the Crown of Canada took a man by the name of John Patrick Nolan to the Supreme Court to try to have his lower court appeal overturned.

The Crown argued that military police are “Peace Officers” and therefore can arrest anyone at anytime. The Supreme Court squashed that.


In the Supreme Court of Canada case Regina v. Nolan, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the Canadian Forces military police are not a secondary civilian police force and have no jurisdiction over civilians except for when enforcing regulations that specifically apply to civilians located on Defence Establishments.
I have attached a copy of Regina v. Nolan below.

Some key points of Regina v. Nolan are this.
”  The military policeman had no authority under s. 2(f)(i) of the Code to demand that the accused provide a breathalyzer sample. That section, which prescribes that “peace officer” includes “officers and men of the Canadian Forces who are appointed for the purposes of section 134  of the National Defence Act “, does not extend the authority of military police to act as “peace officers” throughout a province and in relation to all residents of a province, duplicating the role and function of the civil police. Section 2 of the Code serves only to grant additional powers to enforce the criminal law to persons who must otherwise operate within the limits of their statutory or common law sources of authority. In the case of military policemen, the purposes of s. 134  are clear: the section provides that they may exercise authority over persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline. That is the full extent of the grant of power. Section 2 (f)(i) must be construed, therefore, as extending to persons appointed for the purposes of s. 134  of the National Defence Act  the additional authority to enforce the Criminal Code , but only in relation to persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline.
-and-
The authority to demand that the accused provide a breathalyzer sample can be derived in this case, however, from the definition of “peace officer” in s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code. Section 2 (f)(ii) establishes that “officers and men” of the Canadian Forces are peace officers when “employed on duties that the Governor in Council, in regulations made under the National Defence Act  for the purposes of this paragraph, has prescribed to be of such a kind as to necessitate that the officers and men performing them have the powers of peace officers”. Under s. 22.01(2) of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, made under the National Defence Act  for the purposes of s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code, military policemen have the powers of peace officers when they perform any lawful duties “as a result of a specific order or established military custom or practice” when those duties are related to certain matters including the maintenance and protection of law and order and the protection of property or persons. Here, the officer had authority under the Government Property Traffic Regulations to enforce the applicable speed limits against a civilian driving on the base and, having stopped him for the purposes of enforcing the speed limit, the officer derived further authority from s. 28(1) of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations. This section, which applies to persons not subject to the Code of Service Discipline, prescribes that a military policeman is “authorized to arrest without warrant any person found committing any criminal offence … on or with respect to any defence establishment or whom on reasonable and probable ground he believes to have committed such offence . . . .” A military police officer who has clear statutory authority to enforce the law and who is sent out on a patrol on a base is abiding by “established military practice” in fulfilling his role by attempting to enforce the law and he meets the conditions imposed by s. 22.01(2). Therefore, when s. 22.01(2) of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces is read with s. 28(1) of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations, the arresting officer was a peace officer within the meaning of s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code and he was entitled to invoke the statutory authorization of s. 235(1) of the Code. The fact that the accused was arrested outside the military base did not deprive the military policeman of his authority. Given the instantaneous police warning to the accused to stop his vehicle and the detention immediately outside the gates of the base, there was such a clear nexus between the offence committed on the base and the detention off the base that the military police retained their status and authority as peace officers.

Long story short, the military police only have jurisdiction over civilians when they are enforcing very specific regulations. Those two regulations are the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulation and the Government Property Traffic Regulation.

The following document is one of many that would seem to throw a monkey wrench into the workings of the military justice system so far as it having jurisdiction over civilians.

Here, the Canadian Forces are admitting that they don’t have jurisdiction over all civilian offences committed by civilians on Defence Establishments. For the CFNIS to claim jurisdiction over a civilian for having committed a criminal code offence on a Defence Establishment, the CFNIS would have to have arrested the civilian within a certain period of time after the offence occured, and within a certain distance from the base. Mr. P.S. molested me from 1978 until 1980 on CFB Namao which is just north of Edmonton. Mr. P.S. currently resides in Fort Erie, Ontario. The distance between Edmonton Garrison, AB and Fort Erie, ON is 2786 km. I think that 30 years and 3k km is stretching CFNIS jursidiction to the extreme.

Another interesting document that casts doubts on the arrest jurisdiction of the CFNIS is the following from CFPM 2120-4-0. This document originated in 1998, just after the creation of the CFNIS. This document was re-issued to all bases and units in 2006.

NDHQ POLICY DIRECTIVE MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION POLICY
2120-4-0 (CFPM)
Vice Admiral G.L. Garnett, Vice Chief of Defence Staff

Pretty Straightforward, right?
Wrong.
In December of 2015, when I realized that RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban was not going to be involved in the second phase of the investigation into my complaint against Mr. P.S., and that he was stepping aside to let the CFNIS run their show, I filed a complaint with the “Civilian And Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police”.
The CCC-RCMP found in favour of the RCMP.
But for a rather interesting reason.

Basically, unless the CFNIS offer an investigation to the outside civilian authorities having jurisdiction, the RCMP cannot insist that the CFNIS hand over the investigation.

On February 9th, 2015, I had a telephone conversation with Lt. Col. David Antonyshyn of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. In this conversation Mr. Antonyshyn stated that “domestic matters that occur within the PMQs” are always pushed to the outside civilian authorities. Mr. Antonyshyn also stated that the CFNIS do not have sole jurisdiction on the bases for Criminal Code matters, they have at most concurrent jurisdiction.

In 2014, Madame Marie Deschamps was tasked with reviewing the military police, including the CFNIS, to see how they were dealing with sexual assaults amongst service members. Her report was very damning of the defective military justice system. More importantly, her report was accepted by the Chief of Defence staff as being valid and true.

excerpt from
External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces


The full report of the External Review Authority is available here:

Important Excerpts are available here:

Even though Lt. Gen. Christine Whitecross insists that matters involving children and cadets (12 to 18 year olds) are handed off to the outside civilian authorities, and even though CFAO 2120-4-0 says that offences in which the offender is a civilian will be “offered” to the outside civilian authorities, and even though Madame Marie Deschamps stated in her review that offences involving civilians are referred to the outside civilian justice system, and even though Lt. Col. David Antonyshyn states that domestic matters are always handed off to the outside civilian authorities, the CFNIS in my case held on to jurisdiction in a matter of a civilian teenager sexually abusing a civilian child.

This problem arises due to the loosey-goosey language in the National Defence Act. The National Defence Act says who the military police have jurisdiction over. However, the National Defence Act does not state who the military police do not have jurisdiction over.

And that’s a very dangerous precedent.

Basically, the CFNIS chain of command can choose on a case by case basis who they have jurisdiction over and who they don’t have jurisdiction over.

And that leads to the possibility of all sorts of political interference.

I’ll be willing to bet you dollars to donuts that had Mr. P.S. not been anointed the sole victim of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae in July of 1980, and had Mr. P.S. not gone on to sue the Office of the Minister of National Defence in March of 2001, and had the Office of the Minister of National Defence in November of 2008 not accepted General Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of a Canadian Forces officer, I firmly believe that the CFNIS would have handed my matter off to the RCMP in Morinville.

However, as the Office of the Minister of National Defence accepted General Legal Liability and admitted that the sexual abuse that Mr. P.S. endured caused him personal injuries, it could be argued that those personal injuries suffered by Mr. P.S. caused Mr. P.S. to act out his abuse on younger children living on Canadian Forces Base Namao. Therefore, a matter like this would have possibly exposed the Office of the Minister of National Defence to further civil legal action brought forth by the numerous other victims of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

So, it should be of no surprise to anyone, that the CFNIS would have kept this investigation away from the civilian authorities. After all, the civilian authorities have no fealty to the Office of the Minister of National Defence.

Remember, there has to be a reason why the CFNIS edited a statement that was given to them by Mr. P.S. in 2011.

Telephone call between Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock and Mr. P.S.
“Already handled by the military”

Now, compare what Mr. P.S. stated to Sgt. Hancock with what Sgt. Hancock in turn submitted to the Alberta Crown.

Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock’s submission to the Alberta Crown.

I wonder why CFNIS investigator Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock felt the need for the Alberta Crown to not know that Mr. P.S. considers that the military has handled things for him.

And I don’t know about you, but I’m really curious to know just what exactly the military handled for Mr. P.S., who is a multi-time convicted child molester. And more importantly, why is the military handling things for child molesters?

Colonel Dan Munro…..

Who ordered the charges against Captain McRae to be reduced?

I would find out in July of 2012 that Captain Father Angus McRae’s commanding officer was Colonel Dan Munro, the base commander of CFB Edmonton. Munro’s name is spelt without the “e”. Continue reading “Colonel Dan Munro…..”

Conflict of interest

One of the most signifcant examples of “Conflict of Interest” that I have ever seen is having the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service investigating crimes that could cause the Office of the Minister of National Defence to suffer civil actions.

Much as when Mr. P.S. sued Angus McRae in March of 2001, anyone who wants to initiate a civil action against a person who had sexually abused them while the abuser was subject to the Code of Service Discipline would also be required to sue the Office of the Minister of National Defence.

Granted, I can’t recall any sexual abuse at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae. However, that’s more a function of the alcohol that Captain McRae had his altar boy, Mr. P.S. give to me on the five distinct visits to McRae’s living quarters at the base chapel.

We know from the findings of the Fynes Public Interest Hearings that the investigators with the CFNIS do not run their own investigations. The chain of command within the CFNIS determine the scope and breadth of any particular CFNIS investigation.

This is one of the reason why you never hear of investigators within the CFNIS making “interference” complaints to the Military Police Complaints Commission. There can be no interference with a CFNIS investigation. CFNIS investigation do not belong to the investigator. Investigations that fall within the CFNIS mandate are always designed by the chain of command within the CFNIS.

Around 2016, Sgt Damon Tenaschuk told me he was about to submit a brief to the Alberta Crown. Sgt. Tenaschuk asked me if I thought he had done enough. I asked him if he had found other victims or witnesses. He said that he had not. So I asked him about running a Crime Stoppers appeal. He said to me that he would have to speak with his commanding officer to see if his C/O thought that this would be okay to do.

This was the Crime Stoppers Appeal.
Even though the connection between Captain McRae and Mr. P.S. had been well established, you’d be hard pressed to know that McRae had molested over 25 children on CFB Namao in this time period.

When Mr. P.G. made himself known to me as another victim of Mr. P.S., I passed his name on to Sgt, Damon Tenaschuk. Sgt. Tenaschuk informed me that CFNIS chain of command had decided that Mr. P.G.’s statement would be a separate complaint from mine and that my investigation would not contain any statement from Mr. P.G..

So, as you can see, it is the chain of command that runs the CFNIS investigations and not the CFNIS investigators. The CFNIS investigators are nothing more than “meat puppets” that dance as per their master’s wishes.

The anatomy of a CFNIS investigation.

Much is made about the apparent “independence” of the CFNIS from local chain of command interference. However, the investigators within the CFNIS as well as the officers within the CFNIS hierarchy are all still subject to section 83 of the National Defence Act.

Section 83 of the National Defence Act sounds like a perfect reason as to why someone should just go along with the game plan and not make waves. And no, there are no exemptions from section 83. Section 83 applies to every person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline all the way from the Chief of Defence Staff all the way down to a fresh new baby faced recruit.

One thing that I am almost certain of now, is that due to the sheer number of children that Captain Father Angus McRae and his altar boy Mr. P.S.. molested on Canadian Forces Base Namao, I don’t think I’m anywhere near the first person to have ever brought a complaint against Mr. P.S..

Mr. P.S. had criminal convictions going back to 1985.

Mr. P.S. convictions in 1985

In the summer of 2012, I had made acquaintances with an RCMP constable from the Morinville Detachment in Edmonton. This Constable was the one who told me Mr. P.S.’s date of birth was June 20th, 1965. This was the first hint I had that the CFNIS were being far less than truthful with me when Sgt. Cyr tried to tell me that Mr. P.S. was only 13 years old in 1980. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, a person under the age of 14 could not be tried for Criminal Code offences.

The RCMP constable that I had dealt with also ran a CPIC check on Mr. P.S.. The constable wouldn’t tell me any exact details from the CPIC check other than that in addition to the charges and convictions mentioned in the newspaper article, that Mr P.S. had numerous more convictions between 1985 and 2000. Some but not all the convictions were for child sexual assault. Now, what if these charges and convictions in the ’90s weren’t for “current” sexual assaults? What if this was other kids from CFB Namao coming forward with complaints against Mr. P.S. for what he had done on CFB Namao.

On January 14, 2000, Mr. P.S. tried to commit suicide. What if Mr. P.S.’s suicide attempt was due to the fact that he knew he was never going to be able to escape what he had done on CFB Namao? Both the 3-year time bar flaw and the summary investigation flaw meant that Captain Father Angus McRae could never be held responsible for what had occurred on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980. However, as Mr. P.S. was not subject to the Code of Service Discipline, he could be held responsible for what had happened on CFB Namao, regardless of the fact that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae may have forced or induced Mr. P.S. to act the way he did on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980.

That I think would drive anyone to the point of suicide.

It is apparent now that the CFNIS knew right from the word go of the connection between Mr. P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae.

When I was interviewed by Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock in March of 2011, he asked me some peculiar questions during the video interview that didn’t make sense at the time. When Sgt. Christian Cyr contacted me on May 3rd, 2011 and told me that Mr. P.S. was only 13 years old in the spring of 1980 he was trying to set me up to believe that Mr. P.S. was too young at the time of the sexual offences to have charges brought against him. And if Sgt. Cyr had just shut his damn mouth at the time, I might have believed him. But Sgt. Cyr had to be a dumbass and he had to mention Captain Father Angus McRae being arrested for molesting children on the base. It was at that point that I knew something was going wrong with the investigation.

Then on July 18th, 2011 during a telephone conversation between myself and Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger, MWO Eisenmenger told me that his investigators couldn’t find any evidence that Mr. P.S. had committed the crimes that I had accused him of and that this case was going no where due to a complete lack of evidence. It was interesting when I made my application for Judicial Review in 2013 and I received the certified tribunal records, I discovered that when I spoke to MWO Eisenmenger, the CFNIS hadn’t yet talked to any other victims or even tried to contact Mr. P.S. at that point in time.

All of this tells me that the CFNIS are well aware of who Mr. P.S. is. And I have no doubt in my mind that the CFNIS are well aware of the $4.3 million dollar civil action that Mr. P.S. brought against the Minister of National Defence in March of 2001.

I also have no doubt that the CFNIS are well aware that the Office of the Minister of National Defence accepted Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of Captain McRae.

I have the Department of Justice paperwork from when the DOJ represented the Minister of National Defence in this matter. Most of it is blanked out. But it is safe to say that in convincing Mr. P.S. to settle out of court, the Office of the Minister of National Defence agreed to certain terms favourable to Mr. P.S.. I can only wonder if one of these terms is that the Office of the Minister of National Defence agreed to ensure that Mr. P.S. would no longer face any “harassment” related to his actions on CFB Namao in the years of 1978 until 1980. I know this sounds crazy, but there’s the conversation that Mr. P.S. had with CFNIS investigator Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk in August of 2011.

What exactly was Mr. P.S. talking about when he said that anything he had been involved in as a youth “had already been handled by the military”. Is Mr. P.S. referring to the terms of his out of court settlement with the Minister of National Defence? If the CFNIS were to have brought charges against Mr. P.S., and this broke the terms of the out of court settlement agreement, would this allow Mr. P.S. to take further action against the Minister of National Defence hence the comment “a lawyer would be handling that”?

What’s very interesting is that the CFNIS scrubbed the line “anything he had been involved in as a youth had already been handled by the military” from the Crown Brief that was submitted to the Alberta Crown both in 2011 and in 2018.

This is what Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk submitted to the Alberta Crown in 2018
Notice something missing?
This is what was submitted by Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock in 2011

Besides that fact that Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk basically resubmitted the 2011 CFNIS investigation Crown Brief to the Alberta Crown again in 2018, it’s rather intersting that the CFNIS thought there was a need to remove the comment about the military “handling things” for Mr. P.S.

The sad thing is, it looks as if the Alberta Crown doesn’t know, or doesn’t care that it was fed a load of B.S.

And this brings me right back around to the issue of Conflict of Interest.

The CFNIS were well aware of the history of Mr. P.S., and in doing a CPIC check on Mr. P.S., they would have discovered that they were dealing with a sexual predator that had a thing for young children.

Yes, these past convictions from 1984 onward don’t necessarily prove that Mr. P.S. sexually abused me, my brother, and 4 other children that I knew he abused on a regular basis. However, these past convictions do prove that Mr. P.S. is deserving of a thorough investigation. An investigation that would be more deeper and detailed than someone who had a CPIC record check that came back negative for any criminal interactions.

What this does tell me though is that the CFNIS investigation was influenced by chain of command authority in such a manner as to ensure that Mr. P.S. was never again charged for any crime that he committed on Canadian Forces Base Namao after the date of his 14th birthday on June 2oth, 1979.

The only question is this.

Was this decision made so as not to break any covenant agreed to in the out of court settlement between Mr. P.S. and the Office of the Minister of National Defence, or was this decision not to charge Mr. P.S. made solely to ensure that the chain of liability between the Office of the Minister of National Defence and the victims of both Mr. P.S. and Captain McRae remains severed?

Remember, the Office of the Minister of National Defence did accept General Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae. Now that the Office of the Minister of National Defence has accepted liability for the abuse Mr. P.S. suffered, how hard would it be for the victims of Mr. P.S. to also make claims of liability against the Office of the Minister of National Defence? If there had been criminal convictions brought against Mr. P.S., claims of civil liability would be rather elementary to establish in court. Without criminal convictions brought against Mr. P.S., suing the Office of the Minister of National Defence would be a fruitless endeavour as the Office of the Minister could argue that no crime occurred.

And the Minister just happens to be ultimately in charge of the police force that would possibly subject his own office to civil liability.

And this is why I believe that this whole investigation from the word “Go” has been a classic textbook example of what a conflict of interest looks like.

The Summary Investigation Flaw

If you thought that yesterday’s post relating to the 3-year time bar flaw was interesting, you ain’t seen anything yet.

Legislative Summary LS-311E detailed another interesting flaw that existed in the National Defence Act prior to 1998. The flaw had been temporarily addressed via an administrative order in November of 1997, but nonetheless this flaw was so substantial that it had to be addressed by Bill C-25 “An Act to Make Amendments to the National Defence Act”.

Sections 160 to 162 of the 1985 National Defence Act
Sections 138 through 140 of the 1970 National Defence Act

Section 138 of the 1970 Act, and Section 160 of the 1985 Act defines “commanding officer” as being the commanding officer of the accused. In the case of Captain Father Angus McRae, the Canadian Forces have confirmed that CFB Namao base commander Colonel Dan Munro was Captain McRae’s commanding officer.

Section 139 of the 1970 Act, and Section 161 of the 1985 Act both stipulate that after a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline has been charged with a Service Offence, the commanding officer of the accused will conduct a summary investigation.

Section 140 of the 1970 Act, and Section 162 of the 1985 Act both stipulate that the commanding officer of the accused has the power to dismiss charges brought against their subordinate. Or the commanding officer could cause the charges to proceed against their subordinate.

The Canadian Forces didn’t have an independent “prosecutor” until after the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998. The commanding officer had the primary discretion to either proceed with charges or to dismiss the charges. Once the commanding officer made this decision, they would pass this up the chain of command to the “prosecutor”.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia had some very serious reservations of the Commanding Officer acting as a prosecutorial agent.
The Commission found that commanding officers could operate as investigators, prosecutors, and judiciary. The Commission pointed out that in the Civilian justice system, those three roles were conducted by three completely separate entities. Civilian police have no sway over the prosecutors and prosecutors have no sway over the judiciary. Commanding officers on the other hand could be subjected to “command influence”. Military police officers had to obey the commands of superior officers.

What did Legislative Summary LS-311E have to say about Section 160 to 162 of the 1985 National Defence Act?

Page 18 of Legislative Summary LS-311E

The decision to prosecute or not to prosecute was in the hands of commanding officers prior to November of 1997. As the Somalia Inquiry discovered, these commanding officers had no legal training, no legal background, swore no peace officer’s oath. Their decisions could easily be influenced by the chain of command as well as the commanding officer’s own parochial interests.

What charges could a commanding officer dismiss prior to November of 1997?
Gross Indecency;
Indecent Assault;
Buggery;
Sexual Interference;
Invitation to Sexual Touching;
and Sexual Exploitation.
These were crimes that the Canadian Forces were not precluded from conducting a service tribunal for.

regardless of whether or not the commanding officer would have the authority to try the accused on the charge”

What I am not certain of, but seems to be indicated nonetheless by the language in the italics on page 18 of Legislative Summary LS-311e, is could commanding officers dismiss charges related to Murder, Manslaughter, and Rape? Commanding officers definitely would not have had the authority to try the accused on the charges of Murder, Manslaughter, and Rape.

What is the fallout of a commanding officer dismissing charges prior to November of 1997?

As LS-311E states “the effect of a decision of a commanding officer to dismiss a charge is that no other authority – military or civil- can thereafter proceed against the accused on the charge or any substantially similar offence arising out of the same facts”.

This means that anyone, who as a child was sexually abused on a military base, and whose abuser had their charges dismissed or reduced by their abuser’s commanding officer, could never bring charges against their abuser today.

According to the babysitter’s father, with whom I spoke to in July of 2015, the military police on CFB Namao in 1980 knew of 25 other children being molested by Captain McRae.

According to former Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit acting section commander Fred R. Cunningham, with whom I spoke in November of 2011, the military police in 1980 had numerous more charges ready to go to court martial against McRae, but that the “brass” reduced the number of charges brought against Captain McRae to only those involving the babysitter / altar boy.

Why did the Canadian Forces try to bury this matter in 1980?

It would have been quite embarrassing for the Canadian public to have found out that an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces had been committing “Acts of Homosexuality” with children as young as five years of age, on a military base none the less.

What were the implications of dropping the “excess” charges against Captain McRae and only charging him with enough offences to get him booted out of the military? If any child between May of 1980 and May of 1983 had tried to bring charges against Captain McRae, and those charges were similar to the charges that had been dropped, Captain McRae could not be charged.

What are the implications of the 3-year time bar? Anyone who had been sexually abused by Captain McRae would never have been able to bring charges against McRae after May of 1983.

It is apparent that the 3-year time bar flaw and the Summary Investigation flaw make it almost virtually impossible for anyone who was sexually abused as a child to bring charges against their abuser.

I wish I could say that these two flaws were the only issues that could stymie a person’s quest for justice.

However, as I will discuss in future blog postings, there are other issues at play that stand as road blocks to justice.

Unbelievable

I recently watched a Netflix series called “Unbelievable”. This is a must watch program if you’re ever interested in just how badly the police themselves can screw up an investigation.

The story starts off in August of 2008 when an 18 year old woman named “Marie” makes a report to the Lynnwood Police Department that she had been raped. The police investigators in this matter screwed up the investigation from the start. They hounded “Marie”, they intimidated “Marie”, they made “Marie” repeat her story over and over all the while picking her story apart due to what they considered to be “inconsistencies”.
The investigating officers placed special emphasis upon the statements of two of “Marie’s” former foster parents who thought that “Marie” wasn’t behaving like someone who had just been raped.
In the end, “Marie” was coerced into admitting that she made the whole story up.
The Lynnwood Police charged “Marie” with making a “False Report”
In March of 2009 she was fined $500 by the courts and sentenced to probation, and ordered to attend counselling.

It wouldn’t be until February of 2011 that “Marie” was proved to have not lied at all. The FBI along with two Colorado police detectives from two different Colorado police departments arrested a man named Marc O’Leary. Upon searching his house for evidence, the police found a hard drive that contained pictures of “Marie” the night she had been raped and photographed by Marc O’Leary.

The two Lynnwood Police sergeants that had originally coerced “Marie” into admitting that she lied faced no repercussions.
The City of Lynnwood did however refund “Marie” her $500 fine.
“Marie” later settled out of court with the city for $150k.

How did this happen?
I wish I knew.
But, from my personal experience, this happens quite frequently.
Police quite frequently start investigations with preconceived biases already floating around inside of their skulls.

In my case, I have no doubt in my mind that the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service was well aware of who my abuser was, I have no doubt in my mind that the CFNIS knew about my abuser’s lengthy criminal record with numerous charges and convictions for sexual crimes involving children, I also have no doubt that the CFNIS knew of the direct connection between Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae, and my abuser, Mr. P.S.

Much like in “Marie’s” matter, my care giver at the time I was being abused gave the CFNIS in 2011 a false statement. Why’d he give the CFNIS a false statement? My Alberta Social Service paperwork from my childhood contained a report from a psychologist that had been hired by the Canadian Forces in October of 1980 to evaluate my family. This psychologist found that my father accepted no responsibility for his family, blamed others for problems with his family, expected others to solve his problems for him. My child case workers noted that my father often told conflicting stories from one session to the next, and that he often told people in positions of authority what they wanted to hear.

I honestly don’t remember much of my father from before we were posted to Canadian Forces Base Downsview in the spring of 1983. Prior to us living on CFB Downsview, my father was usually frequently away on training exercises or missions with the Canadian Forces. I know that on CFB Shearwater, he was frequently away. He was also away frequently when we lived on CFB Summerside. After my mother left in the spring of 1977, my father asked his mother to move in with us and raise my brother and I.
When my grandmother moved back to Edmonton in the spring of 1978, my father received a compassionate posting to CFB Namao to be near his mother. Upon our arrival at CFB Namao, grandma and her husband moved into the house on base to again raise my brother and I. My father was infrequently home.

I think my father told the CFNIS investigators what they wanted to hear because he didn’t want to own up to the fact that it was his own alcoholic mother that he had brought into the house to raise his kids hired the babysitter that would end up molesting his sons for over a year and a half.

I also think that my father still bore some shame for the way that he would stand aside while I was psychologically traumatized in his presence by Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Terry Totzke. My father never once stood up to Captain Totzke. Sadly, my father seemed to absorb Captain Totzke’s ideas, and my father brought those ideas into our house on CFB Greisbach. I’ll talk more about Captain Totzke in a later post.

When I had my first frank talk with my father back in 2006 about Mr. P.S. and what he had done to me and my brother, my father wasn’t shocked. In fact my father had named Mr. P.S.. My father implored me to understand that he had nothing to do with the hiring of Mr. P.S. and that hiring Mr. P.S. had been my grandmother’s fault and that she was to blame.

I think my father’s statement played right into the hands of the chain of command within the CFNIS as when I spoke with Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger on July 18th, 2011, he stated that the CFNIS couldn’t find any evidence to corroborate my complaint against Mr. P.S. and that it looked as if my complaint was groundless and without merit.