So, is the jurisdiction of the CFNIS really set in stone?
One has to wonder why the CFNIS weren’t involved in this matter.
The matter of former Canadian Forces officer SLt. Jeffery Delisle is an interesting study in the jurisdiction of the Canadian Forces military police and the CFNIS.
On January 13, 2012, SLt. Jeffery Paul Delisle was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for violating the Security of Information Act. His offence was that he had been selling “5 -Eyes” intelligence to the Russians.
5-Eyes is the name of the intelligence alliance comprising of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The information that Delisle had given to the Russians was most damaging to the United States, hence why the American Federal Bureau of Investigations was the first agency to become involved in this matter.
The FBI made contact with the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service and informed CSIS of the activities of Mr. Delisle.
From documents released under Access to Information Requests, it became very apparent that the CFNIS was kept out of the loop literally until the last minute.
So the timeline want like such: December 9th, 2011 CFPM informs the CO CFNIS that an investigation is underway into a member of the Canadian Forces. January 13th, 2012 Canadian Forces officer Sub-Lt. Jeffery Paul Delisle is arrested by the RCMP. December 13th, 2012 the RCMP fully brief the Commanding Officer of the CFNIS on the particulars of the investigation.
In a report issued in October 2012 which discussed the matter of Sub-Lt. Delisle,
Was this interesting section:
Basically, this is the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence pouting that their “police” weren’t involved in the investigation of their own officer Mr. Delisle. One can only wonder why the FBI, CSIS, and the RCMP wanted to steer clear of involving the Canadian Forces Military Police Group and the CFNIS .
SLt. Delisle had been sharing “5-Eyes” intelligence that he collected from DND computers, located on DND property, while he was a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline. If anyone was deserving of being investigated by the CFNIS, it was SLt. Delisle.
The National Defence Act even has sections that specifically deal with persons such as Mr. Delisle.
Sections 75(b), 75(c),75(j) would possibly have applied.
Section 78 may be a stretch, but it could still be argued that if Russia is not an ally, then it is automatically considered an enemy.
The Security of Information Act is what Mr. Delisle violated.
4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) seem to be the sections that Mr. Delisle ran afoul of.
The Security of Information Act applies to all persons who were subject to the Code of Service Discipline when they became aware of the information.
A prohibited place means a military base, or even a building that is used by the military for military business.
Is the incompetence of the CFNIS really that legendary?
In March of 2015, then Defence Minister Jason Kenney said that an MPCC report issued had clearly indicated that the military police were guilty of “wrongdoing and incompetence”.
If the Slt Delisle case does prove one thing, it’s that the “sole jurisdiction” claim of the CFNIS is laughable at best.
Trying to define the jurisdiction of the CFNIS and the military police is about as easy as trying to nail jello to the wall. Sadly, this is more to do with the failure of Parliament to close the holes in the National Defence Act than anything else.
In 1987, the Crown of Canada took a man by the name of John Patrick Nolan to the Supreme Court to try to have his lower court appeal overturned.
The Crown argued that military police are “Peace Officers” and therefore can arrest anyone at anytime. The Supreme Court squashed that.
In the Supreme Court of Canada case Regina v. Nolan, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the Canadian Forces military police are not a secondary civilian police force and have no jurisdiction over civilians except for when enforcing regulations that specifically apply to civilians located on Defence Establishments. I have attached a copy of Regina v. Nolan below.
Some key points of Regina v. Nolan are this. ” The military policeman had no authority under s. 2(f)(i) of the Code to demand that the accused provide a breathalyzer sample. That section, which prescribes that “peace officer” includes “officers and men of the Canadian Forces who are appointed for the purposes of section 134 of the National Defence Act “, does not extend the authority of military police to act as “peace officers” throughout a province and in relation to all residents of a province, duplicating the role and function of the civil police. Section 2 of the Code serves only to grant additional powers to enforce the criminal law to persons who must otherwise operate within the limits of their statutory or common law sources of authority. In the case of military policemen, the purposes of s. 134 are clear: the section provides that they may exercise authority over persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline. That is the full extent of the grant of power. Section 2 (f)(i) must be construed, therefore, as extending to persons appointed for the purposes of s. 134 of the National Defence Act the additional authority to enforce the Criminal Code , but only in relation to persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline. “ -and- ” The authority to demand that the accused provide a breathalyzer sample can be derived in this case, however, from the definition of “peace officer” in s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code. Section 2 (f)(ii) establishes that “officers and men” of the Canadian Forces are peace officers when “employed on duties that the Governor in Council, in regulations made under the National Defence Act for the purposes of this paragraph, has prescribed to be of such a kind as to necessitate that the officers and men performing them have the powers of peace officers”. Under s. 22.01(2) of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, made under the National Defence Act for the purposes of s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code, military policemen have the powers of peace officers when they perform any lawful duties “as a result of a specific order or established military custom or practice” when those duties are related to certain matters including the maintenance and protection of law and order and the protection of property or persons. Here, the officer had authority under the Government Property Traffic Regulations to enforce the applicable speed limits against a civilian driving on the base and, having stopped him for the purposes of enforcing the speed limit, the officer derived further authority from s. 28(1) of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations. This section, which applies to persons not subject to the Code of Service Discipline, prescribes that a military policeman is “authorized to arrest without warrant any person found committing any criminal offence … on or with respect to any defence establishment or whom on reasonable and probable ground he believes to have committed such offence . . . .” A military police officer who has clear statutory authority to enforce the law and who is sent out on a patrol on a base is abiding by “established military practice” in fulfilling his role by attempting to enforce the law and he meets the conditions imposed by s. 22.01(2). Therefore, when s. 22.01(2) of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces is read with s. 28(1) of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations, the arresting officer was a peace officer within the meaning of s. 2(f)(ii) of the Code and he was entitled to invoke the statutory authorization of s. 235(1) of the Code. The fact that the accused was arrested outside the military base did not deprive the military policeman of his authority. Given the instantaneous police warning to the accused to stop his vehicle and the detention immediately outside the gates of the base, there was such a clear nexus between the offence committed on the base and the detention off the base that the military police retained their status and authority as peace officers. “
Long story short, the military police only have jurisdiction over civilians when they are enforcing very specific regulations. Those two regulations are the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulation and the Government Property Traffic Regulation.
The following document is one of many that would seem to throw a monkey wrench into the workings of the military justice system so far as it having jurisdiction over civilians.
Here, the Canadian Forces are admitting that they don’t have jurisdiction over all civilian offences committed by civilians on Defence Establishments. For the CFNIS to claim jurisdiction over a civilian for having committed a criminal code offence on a Defence Establishment, the CFNIS would have to have arrested the civilian within a certain period of time after the offence occured, and within a certain distance from the base. Mr. P.S. molested me from 1978 until 1980 on CFB Namao which is just north of Edmonton. Mr. P.S. currently resides in Fort Erie, Ontario. The distance between Edmonton Garrison, AB and Fort Erie, ON is 2786 km. I think that 30 years and 3k km is stretching CFNIS jursidiction to the extreme.
Another interesting document that casts doubts on the arrest jurisdiction of the CFNIS is the following from CFPM 2120-4-0. This document originated in 1998, just after the creation of the CFNIS. This document was re-issued to all bases and units in 2006.
Pretty Straightforward, right? Wrong. In December of 2015, when I realized that RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban was not going to be involved in the second phase of the investigation into my complaint against Mr. P.S., and that he was stepping aside to let the CFNIS run their show, I filed a complaint with the “Civilian And Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police”. The CCC-RCMP found in favour of the RCMP. But for a rather interesting reason.
Basically, unless the CFNIS offer an investigation to the outside civilian authorities having jurisdiction, the RCMP cannot insist that the CFNIS hand over the investigation.
On February 9th, 2015, I had a telephone conversation with Lt. Col. David Antonyshyn of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. In this conversation Mr. Antonyshyn stated that “domestic matters that occur within the PMQs” are always pushed to the outside civilian authorities. Mr. Antonyshyn also stated that the CFNIS do not have sole jurisdiction on the bases for Criminal Code matters, they have at most concurrent jurisdiction.
In 2014, Madame Marie Deschamps was tasked with reviewing the military police, including the CFNIS, to see how they were dealing with sexual assaults amongst service members. Her report was very damning of the defective military justice system. More importantly, her report was accepted by the Chief of Defence staff as being valid and true.
The full report of the External Review Authority is available here:
Even though Lt. Gen. Christine Whitecross insists that matters involving children and cadets (12 to 18 year olds) are handed off to the outside civilian authorities, and even though CFAO 2120-4-0 says that offences in which the offender is a civilian will be “offered” to the outside civilian authorities, and even though Madame Marie Deschamps stated in her review that offences involving civilians are referred to the outside civilian justice system, and even though Lt. Col. David Antonyshyn states that domestic matters are always handed off to the outside civilian authorities, the CFNIS in my case held on to jurisdiction in a matter of a civilian teenager sexually abusing a civilian child.
This problem arises due to the loosey-goosey language in the National Defence Act. The National Defence Act says who the military police have jurisdiction over. However, the National Defence Act does not state who the military police do not have jurisdiction over.
And that’s a very dangerous precedent.
Basically, the CFNIS chain of command can choose on a case by case basis who they have jurisdiction over and who they don’t have jurisdiction over.
And that leads to the possibility of all sorts of political interference.
I’ll be willing to bet you dollars to donuts that had Mr. P.S. not been anointed the sole victim of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae in July of 1980, and had Mr. P.S. not gone on to sue the Office of the Minister of National Defence in March of 2001, and had the Office of the Minister of National Defence in November of 2008 not accepted General Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of a Canadian Forces officer, I firmly believe that the CFNIS would have handed my matter off to the RCMP in Morinville.
However, as the Office of the Minister of National Defence accepted General Legal Liability and admitted that the sexual abuse that Mr. P.S. endured caused him personal injuries, it could be argued that those personal injuries suffered by Mr. P.S. caused Mr. P.S. to act out his abuse on younger children living on Canadian Forces Base Namao. Therefore, a matter like this would have possibly exposed the Office of the Minister of National Defence to further civil legal action brought forth by the numerous other victims of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.
So, it should be of no surprise to anyone, that the CFNIS would have kept this investigation away from the civilian authorities. After all, the civilian authorities have no fealty to the Office of the Minister of National Defence.
Remember, there has to be a reason why the CFNIS edited a statement that was given to them by Mr. P.S. in 2011.
Now, compare what Mr. P.S. stated to Sgt. Hancock with what Sgt. Hancock in turn submitted to the Alberta Crown.
I wonder why CFNIS investigator Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock felt the need for the Alberta Crown to not know that Mr. P.S. considers that the military has handled things for him.
And I don’t know about you, but I’m really curious to know just what exactly the military handled for Mr. P.S., who is a multi-time convicted child molester. And more importantly, why is the military handling things for child molesters?