A little bit of good news.

Back in November of 2020, the Military Police Complaints Commission released their final report of their review of the 2015 through 2018 portion of CFNIS investigation GO 2011-5754.

Although it was just a review, and although the review had to be conducted as per rules that the Canadian Armed Forces shaped, the MPCC did find that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal did err when it relied upon the decision of the Alberta Crown as meaning that no crime had been committed. The Crown had opined that there was insufficient evidence to lay charges. The Crown made no determination on the guilt or innocence or P.S..

The MPCC was of the opinion that there was ample evidence to indicate that a crime had been committed.

Generally, the Crown has a very high bar for determining whether or not to pursue charges in court. This is because the accused stands to lose their personal freedom and suffer penalties and sanctions administered by the courts.

However, just because this bar is set high doesn’t mean that the accused is innocent.

And that was one of the findings of the Military Police Complaints Commission.

There had been crimes committed.

But, for some reason when dealing with the outside civilian agency the CFNIS had chosen to use the opinion of the Alberta Crown and not its own opinion in determining if a crime had been committed.

I think this refusal to go on record and state that crimes had occurred comes down to not wanting to expose the Minister of National Defence to civil actions and the resultant public humiliation that the Canadian Forces knew that over 25 children had been sexually abused on a secure defence establishment by an officer of the Regular Forces and instead in 1980 set about to sweep everything under the rug and hide it from the public eye by a very questionable publication ban.

The MPCC recommended that the Provost Marshal supply more documentation from the investigation to the outside civilian agency that was reviewing this matter on my behalf.

Upon receipt of these documents, the outside civilian review agency concluded that I had in fact been the victim of multiple sexual assaults by multiple perpetrators and that these assaults had in fact caused psychological issues as indicated by my Alberta social service Foster Care records. These were the records that were submitted to the CFNIS in August of 2011, but which the CFNIS completely ignored for the most part as they directly conflicted with the statement that my father had given (coerced, coached, or otherwise) to the CFNIS in June of 2011.

Relying on the opinion of the Provincial Crown is apparently nothing new for the Canadian Forces military police.

A former crown prosecutor from New Brunswick who had declined to recommend charges against 5 soldiers from CFB Gagetown who had raped a mentally challenged spouse of a service member remarked that the military police did this as a way of shifting the blame to the Crown for the failure to prosecute.

Why did the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal rely so heavily upon the Alberta Crown report? Was this due to a desire for a “softball” investigation that wouldn’t break any agreement between P.S. and the Minister of National Defence?

That’s beyond the scope of the MPCC. The MPCC cannot, by its enabling legislation, review interference complaints unless the complaints are made by CFNIS investigators directly involved with a particular investigation. As the MPCC indicated in its own submission to the “2nd Independent Review of Amendments Made to the National Defence Act” which was published in 2011, the CFNIS investigators may not even be aware that interference has occurred in their investigation if that interference happens high enough up the chain of command.

And is a superior really interfering with an investigation if they are issuing “lawful commands” that their subordinates are legally bound by the National Defence Act to obey?

CFNIS investigators do not “own” their investigation. They cannot make their own decisions and their own determinations. Everything they do must be approved by the Chain of Command.

In the 2015 to 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation into my complaint against P.S., even though the Crime Stoppers appeal had generated numerous other tips which resulted in other victims coming forward, the CFNIS chain of command made the decision that each complaint had to stand on its own and that none of the complaints would be used to strengthen the other complaints.

Someone involved with the CFNIS decided that there was far too much risk in presenting a strong case to the Alberta Crown.

In 2020, the CFNIS undertook the investigation into my complaint that P.S. had supplied me for sexual purposes to a man at the base swimming pool in the period of time between having been caught in the bedroom of P.S. and the subsequent house fire at the residence of P.S.. I had made mention of this man previously during the 2011-5754 investigation. Because of paperwork related to the 1980 investigation of Captain McRae released to me under the Access to Information legislation in 2019, I became aware of a very likely possibility of who this man was so I decided to make a formal complaint.

In January I was contacted by the CFNIS investigator handling my case. He said that he was making arrangements with the Vancouver Police Department for me to view police line-up photographs to see if I could identify the man that P.S. had supplied me to. Then suddenly a week ago this investigator contacted me and said that his superiors had decided to scrub the photographs and that they were working on other possible ways for me to identify this man.

I know for sure that the CFNIS are not simply going to pay Mr.P.S. a visit and ask him the name of the man. So I can only wonder how they intend for me to identify this man.

So again, it’s not the CFNIS investigator the runs the investigation, it’s the CFNIS chain of command and the Provost Marshal chain of command that run the investigations.

Under the National Defence Act, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff has the right to issue guidelines and instructions for any investigation undertaken by the CFNIS and that although these instructions are to be made public, these instructions do not have to be made public of the Provost Marshal decides against releasing them.

The Vice Chief of Defence Staff must obey the lawful commands of the Chief of Defence Staff.

The Chief of Defence Staff must obey the Minister of National Defence.

The office of the Minister of National Defence is civilly liable for the actions of any person subject to the Code of Service Discipline while that person is on a Defence Establishment.

This isn’t the first rodeo for the Canadian Armed Forces.

They have a massive legal department.

They also have the benefit of the Department of Justice.

The Canadian Forces have legislation on their side that says that they have very little if any responsibility for civilians injured on Defence Establishment.

About the only thing that would circumvent that implied immunity to civil action would be criminal charges connected directly to a person who was subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

In the case of P.S., that person was Captain Father Angus McRae. Under Canadian law at the time, McRae would have been fully responsible for the delinquency of P.S.

In the case of the man at the base swimming pool, I’m pretty sure that this man was a major in the Canadian Forces at the time. He went on to have his own legal problems involving sexual relations with underage persons.

If the Canadian Forces are unable to find a criminal connection between myself and P.S. or myself and the man at the base swimming pool, the odds on me ever being able to launch a successful civil action against the Minister of National Defence are slim to none.

Minister of National Defence -> Chief of Defence Staff -> Vice Chief of Defence Staff -> Provost Marshal -> Commander of the CFNIS -> Divisional Commander CFNIS -> CFNIS investigator.

My two-cents on MPCC 2018-030

In this post I will critique the Military Police Complaints Commission Final Report MPCC 2018-030.

This will be a somewhat long read, but it will be worth it.

I’m not going to critique each and every item in MPCC 2018-030. I’m just going to critique the items that I feel need to be critiqued or expanded upon.

Opening section of MPCC 2018-030

On June 23rd, 2011 the Military Police Complaints Commission made the following submission to the Independant Review Authority that was charged with reviewing the 1998 Amendmentd to the National Defence Act:

One of the issues noted by the Military Police Complaints Commission itself is that civilians, such as myself, do not have access to internal Canadian Forces grievances mechanisms. This means that when a civilian such as myself wishes to make a complaint against a member of the Canadian Forces military police, unlike members of the Canadian Armed Forces, we receive absolutely no assistance from the Canadian Forces nor do we receive assistance from the Military Police Complaints Commission.

Civilians are on their own.

A brief step back to 2011

Because the Military Police Complaints Commission raises the spectre of the previous MPCC review (MPCC 2011-045) I will briefly speak to it.

During my initial complaint in 2011 I had absolutely no access to any of the investigation paperwork.

All I knew is that on November 4th, 2011 Petty Office Steve Morris contacted me via telephone and told me that the CFNIS could find absolutely no evidence that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I accused him of.

P.S. was the same person that retired Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham told me about on November 27th, 2011 as having been investigated by the base military police for having inappropriate interactions with children on the base.

P.S., as I would later discover, had an extensive record for sexual crimes involving children. His attraction to children was in no doubt nurtured by the grooming P.S. received at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

At no time during the initial MPCC investigation (MPCC 2011-045) was any of the CFNIS paperwork shared with me. As such this was literal blind attempt to try to figure out what went so off the rails with the original 2011 CFNIS investigation.

And even if I had tried to obtain the investigation paperwork, the paperwork would have been very heavily redacted. And that’s if the paperwork even shows up within the established time frame for making a complaint. In August of 2018 I filed and ATI request for the paperwork from the 2015 to 2018 portion of CFNIS 2011-5754. It took 20 months for DND to respond to my request and provide the paperwork. The paperwork that I received was redacted to the point of being useless.

It wasn’t until I received the Certified Tribunal Records from the MPCC when I made my application for Judicial Review that I learnt exactly what had transpired during the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

Basically it was my father’s statement to the CFNIS that allowed the CFNIS to write my complaint off as meaningless. My father’s statement fit the narrative that the CFNIS needed. This narrative was that my brother and I never had a babysitter. And that I was obviously only doing this because I wanted easy money.

The only problem with my father’s statement is that even though I had no idea that the CFNIS had contacted my father in June of 2011, I had supplied the CFNIS with a copy of my foster care records from the Alberta Government. The CFNIS ignored the contents of these records. The MPCC wasn’t able to consider these records as they had not been before the CFNIS. And because both agencies ignored these records and didn’t consider these records in their respective reviews, these records were not allowed to be introduced in Federal Court during my application for Judicial Review. My foster care records and other documents such as my father’s statement acknowledging that there was in fact a babysitter in our house were struck as being “new evidence”.

What did these records have to say?
My father took no responsibility for his family.
My father blamed the problems that my brother and I were having on his mother.
My father had invited his mother into the house on base to raise my brother and after our mother had “abandoned us” at CFB Summerside.
My father was frequently absent due to military requirements.
That my father was so resistant to family counselling that I was to have been removed from the house and placed into foster care or residential care as a means to induce my father into the counselling that he so desperately required.

So why did my father spin such a fanciful and tall tale?
Well, he’s been dead since January 2017 so we’ll never find out.
But, my foster care records did observe that he often told people he perceived to be in positions of authority what he thought they wanted to hear. My foster care records also indicated that my father often changed his stories from one meeting to the next.

Basically, my father was a pathological liar who would say anything if he thought that it would make him look like the good guy.

How could a man like Richard ever publicly admit that he willingly put his children in a position to be sexually abused because he placed his military career above all else.

For my father to tell the CFNIS in 2011 that he had never heard about a babysitter when he spent every year from 1980 until 1987 when I moved out of the house, blaming me for allowing and encouraging the babysitter to touch my younger brother, was beyond belief.

And yes, when I examined my father for Federal Court in 2013, he admitted that he hadn’t been truthful with the CFNIS in 2011. He admitted that there had in fact been a babysitter in the house. But as usual he blamed his mother for hiring the babysitter. He also basically admitted that he kidnapped my brother and I in 1977 and that our mother hadn’t really abandoned the family.

So, why didn’t I raise these issues with the MPCC in 2012 when I was interviewed?

I had absolutely no idea of what was in the CFNIS investigation paperwork that the Provost Marshal had submitted to the Military Police Complaints Commission. This is by far the biggest flaw with the whole MPCC complaints process. A complainant such as myself is literally playing “pin the tail on the donkey” in a tilt-a-whirl with absolutely no assistance from anyone. No assistance from the MPCC. No assistance from the Provost Marshal. No assistance from the Canadian Forces ombudsman.

The evidence that I collected, it was all considered new evidence, even though most of it had been in the possession of the CFNIS during the original CFNIS investigation.

I can only wonder how the previous 2011 CFNIS investigation has poisoned the Alberta Crown to ever prosecuting P.S.. I can’t see the Alberta Crown coming out and admitting that they got hoodwinked by the CFNIS in 2011.

I know from the Certified Tribunal Records that I received as part of my application for Judicial Review in 2013 that the CFNIS fed the Alberta Crown a rather horrid plate of B.S..

During my interview with the CFNIS on March 31st, 2011 I told CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock that I had twice tried reporting P.S. to the military police. Once in 1984, and once in 1990. For what ever reason, the CFNIS in 2011 made the decision to not pass this information on to the Alberta Crown. This resulted in Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki making the follwoing observation which no doubt figured heavily in his decicision to not prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester.

My younger brother at the time would have been between four and six years of age when the babysitter, P.S. was abusing him. P.S. would have been between the ages of thirteen and fifteen when he was absuing my younger brother. That’s not “childhood curiosity and experimentation”. And is very obvious that Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki is placing very heavy emphasis on “the fact that no complaint was made to any party or a person in authority after P.S. moved away is very significant.”

P.S. was born in June of 1965. He would have been 14 in June of 1979. He would have been just weeks shy of his 15th birthday when he was found buggering me in his bedroom. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act P.S. would have been fully culpable for his crimes. Yes, it’s true that P.S. would have to be charged under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, but he’s already had a lifetime of prosecution for sexual offences involving children. It’s not like he’s going to do any jail time or face any serious consequences other than officially being found guilty.

I know that Chief Alberta Crown Prosecutor Orest Yeriniuk is extremely upset that I was allowed to see this document. I can only wonder if the Crown’s continued reluctance to prosecute P.S. is a function of retaliation.

I know from my complaint to the Alberta Criminal Injuries Review Board that the CFNIS heavily edited the documents that it submitted to the Alberta Crown in 2011. For example on Tuesday August 9th, 2011 P.S. called CFNIS investigator Mcpl Robert Jon Hancock and stated the following:

However, this is what was submitted to the Alberta Crown:

Notice something missing? As we shall see later on, P.S. did have extensive involvement with the military police for what had transpired on CFB Namao from August of 1978 until May of 1980. Why didn’t the CFNIS want the Alberta Crown to know this? It’s not like the Alberta Crown would have any access to military police records. Surely, if the CFNIS wanted to present a strong case, they would have submitted the military’s records relating to the activities of P.S. from August of 1978 until May of 1980.

And in a way, I can fully understand Orest Yeriniuk’s continued refusal to prosecute. Going against the original decision made by Werbicki in November of 2011 to not prosecute P.S. would be considered improper and a rebuke of Werbicki’s independence as a Crown Prosecutor. This is not something the Crown undertakes lightly.

Also, the Alberta Crown would essentially be admitting that it didn’t perform due diligence in this matter and had the wool pulled over their eyes by a police force with a very questionable record.

Pretty bad when the Minister of National Defence says this.

When I made my first complaint in March of 2011, the case was only 31 years old. Not 40.

I was a pre-pubescent child. My brother a was pre-pubescent child. P.S. was a young adult who had passed through puberty. Not the same category. None of the children that P.S. was abusing was sexually developed. P.S. was fully sexually matured.

Earl Ray Stevens – a 32 year old complaint.

In March of 2017 I made a complaint against Earl Ray Stevens. He was a commissionaire at the Denison Armouries when I was in cadets. He had also been a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces. He started sexually abusing me just after the summer of 1985. He took advantage of the fact that he knew my father was in the Canadian Forces and that the Commissionaires had special authority under the National Defence Act that placed them almost at the same level as military police. Basically the threats were that if I ever told anyone about what he was doing, that he’d tell my father. I’d be kicked out of cadets. But even worse than that, my father would find out that I had sex with men. This is not something that any male child living on a Canadian Forces Base at the time wanted anyone to know.

The CFNIS took the investigation as the abuses occured on Canadian Forces military property.

The case was initially investigated by the CFNIS in Borden, ON. CFNIS Borden then handed the case over to the Toronto Police Services. The Toronto Police Service laid six charges against Earl within weeks of taking the case on.

I had provided even less evidence to the CFNIS in the matter of Earl Ray Steven.

And the Ontario Crown was worried that as I was 14 when the abuse started that Earl’s defence lawyer would be able to argue that I had consented to willfully have sexual intercourse with a 42 year old man.

In 2018 I took part in the preliminary hearing. The hearing lasted two days. At the end of the hearing the justice overseeing the matter determined that there was more than sufficient evidence and the case was moved up to Superior Court for trial.

Unfortunately Earl died of bladder cancer before the trial.

But at least he was charged. And at least we were heading to trial.

Why the difference?

Liability.

Earl worked for the Canadian Corp of Commissionaires. The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence cannot be sued for the actions of an employee of a subcontractor.

P.S. was abused by an employee of the Department of National Defence. P.S. was a juvenile at the time of his offences. The Juvenile Delinquents Act said that the adult who contributed to the delinquency of a minor could be held responsible. This means that just as P.S. sued the Minister of National Defence in 2001, anyone abused by P.S. would be eligible to sue the minister as well…. so long as their was a direct link established by the victim of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae. Without charges against P.S., there can be no link.

Limited disclosure to outside agencies

I can only wonder who it was that determined which information it was that was released to the Alberta Victim of Crimes board. You have to remember that in a CFNIS investigation, the CFNIS investigators can’t do anything without the expressed permission or instruction of the Chain of Command.

RCAF Station Namao ceased to exist in 1968 with the unification of the Forces. It was CFB Namao when we lived there. CFB Namao and CFB Griesbach formed CFB Edmonton.

I was 7 when the abuse started in the fall of 1978 and 8 when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

My younger brother would have been 4 when the abuse started and 6 when the abuse ended.

P.S. would have been 13 when the abuse started and weeks shy of his 15th birthday when the abuse ended in the spring of 1980.

Again, having not seen any of the paperwork from the 2011 CFNIS investigation I was not able to flag any of the obvious flaws with the 2011 CFNIS investigation.

As I stated previously, it was only after I had received the certified tribunal records from the Military Police Complaints Commission that I was able to finally see just how horrific and putrid the 2011 CFNIS investigation actually was.

Any evidence that I submitted in my records to the Federal Court to show that the CFNIS had really bungled the investigation was struck from the hearings as “New Evidence”. New evidence included documents that I had exchanged with the CFNIS in 2011, but which were never submitted to the MPCC during the MPCC 2011-045/054. New evidence was copies of emails between myself and the investigators which were not passed on to the MPCC during the review.

It was after RCMP Akrum Ghadban reviewed the 2011 CFNIS investigation as well as the new information that I had as a result of my telephone calls with both P.S. and his father J.S. that the decision was made to re-open the investigation.

There were four items that Insp Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to concentrate on.
1) Locating the younger brother of P.S.
2) Talking to a potential witness who had possibly seen the beating I took from the older kids when I left P.S.’s house after he was discovered buggering me in his bedroom.
3) Talking to Fred Cunningham
4) Locating records of my 1984 and 1990 complaints. Unlike what the CFNIS had claimed, Insp Ghadban said that he noted that I did in fact mention this to the CFNIS in 2011. And yes, I do have a copy of my video statement to the CFNIS and yes, I do mention these two events.

Locating the younger brother of P.S. was tricky. At first the S. family was claiming that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast and never contacted the family. One family member even suggested that the younger brother was deceased. As it turned out, the younger brother at the time was living in Welland Ontario, just a short distance away from where P.S. and his father J.S. were living in Fort Erie, Ontario. It turns out that the younger brother was actually in frequent contact with the rest of the S. family.

Locating the witness was easy, but sadly the witness was only around 11 at the time and can’t remember anything. He does remember P.S. though.

Fred Cunningham was easy enough for the CFNIS to locate. Even more stunning was the location of the CFSIU paperwork which contrary to what Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre told me in January of 2011 indicated that Fred Cunningham was a very key player in the investigation of P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae.

Fred Cunningham was such a key player that he was the primary witness for the prosecution during the court martial of Captain Father Angus McRae.

During the 2015 through 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation, Sgt. Tenaschuk would often tell me that he was trying to locate any copies of the records from when I attended the military police shack on CFB Namao in 1984 and 1990 to make my complaints against P.S. but that the record keeping system from then left a lot to be desired. Sgt. Tenaschuk wouldn’t be the first person to find issue with the military’s historical record system. This was brought up in the ’90s during the Somalia hearings.

McRae is officially labeled as a pedophile.

As it turns out, in 1980 they knew that alcohol was being given to the children “hanging around” at his living quarters (the rectory at the chapel).

Examination of Fred Cunningham during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

And yes, they knew what McRae was doing in the Rectory at the chapel:

Examination of Sgt. Ryan during the court martial of Canadian Armed Forces officer
Captain Father Angus McRae

It’s nice to finally see Captain McRae called out for what he was. It’s also nice to see that my recollection of P.S. taking me to the chapel is in the official records. I told the CFNIS about these five visits on May 3rd, 2011 when Mcpl Christian Cyr called me to ask me if I remembered anything about the base chaplain, Captain McRae, having been charged with molesting children. I sent Cyr some information that evening. I told Mcpl Cyr that I remembered 5 different visits to the rectory at the chapel. That these visits always ended with P.S. giving me a tumbler with a “sickly sweet grape juice”. I told Cyr that I didn’t remember anything after the grape juice, not even how I got home. I even sent Mcpl Cyr maps and descriptions of the rectory.

This however is not what was recorded in Mcpl Cyr’s occurrence report.

This was:

From MPCC 2011-045 Certified Tribunal Records.

During the 2011 portion of the CFNIS investigation the CFNIS scrubbed any and all mention of Captain McRae from the investigation.

As this information does not show up in the records the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal submitted to the MPCC in 2012, the MPCC was completely unaware of this. The MPCC did not share any information with me during the MPCC review of 2011-5754 as they’re not required to. As such I wasn’t able to raise any concerns about the creative editing and the narrative provided by this creative editing. Because I couldn’t raise these issues during the MPCC review I was unable to enter these into Federal Court as they were now considered “new evidence”.

The more I think about it now, the more I realize that the CFNIS in 2011 knew about the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. They knew about P.S.’s extensive criminal record for child molestation. And the CFNIS or the relevant chain of command must have concluded that I was just looking for a quick buck, that somehow I must have heard about the settlement between P.S. and the Minister and therefore I decided that I wanted some easy money.

Might explain why my father’s statement was so custom tailored to the wishes of the CFNIS even though his statement was easily proved wrong by the various social service records my family accumulated across Canada.

A brief trip to the Federal Court for Judicial Review.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

In the written examination of my father he admits that there was a babysitter in the house and he can’t offer an explanation as to why he willingly told the CFNIS in 2011 that there wasn’t.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

The lawyer representing the Attorney General of Canada went through the roof when I introduced the emails between myself and Master Corporal Christain Cyr as well as the written examinations of both my father and my brother.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement

It’s funny, but the justice that reviewed my matter was basically okay with striking my “new evidence” because it didn’t appear in the CFNIS investigation even though my documents showed that it had been presented to and made known to the CFNIS.

Sure, I know, I know…… “but Bobbie why didn’t you challenge the absurdity of this in the Supreme Court of Canada”.

Supreme court ain’t cheap. And I don’t have $100k plus kicking around to go tilting at windmills.

Sometimes you gotta take the bad judgments and just walk away.

From T_317_13 Final Judgement
From T_317_13 Final Judgement

This is one of the massive flaws with the courts in this country. The courts do not assist in the location of information that the courts themselves have access to.

It wasn’t until after this hearing that I was able to contact the Edmonton lawyer who represented P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence. The lawyer in a way confirmed the identity of P.S.. Or more succinctly I should state that this lawyer was unwilling to go on record and state that the P.S. in P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was NOT my babysitter P.S.

This lawyer also gave me a bit of advice. He said that I should think long and hard about going after DND. He said that given the chance, he’d never do this again. I think the point this lawyer was making is that DND and the Department of Justice have extremely deep pockets and can tie anyone up in court long enough that you’ll be happy to take any scrap of a settlement they’re willing to throw your way.

And I know there is some truth to this.

P.S. started his action in March of 2001. The Canadian Forces Director of Civil Liabilities and Claims made the offer to settle in November of 2008. That’s almost 7-1/2 years of court for a matter in which a member of the Canadian Armed Forces admitted to and plead guilty to molesting a military dependent on a military establishment. The liability couldn’t be more clear cut. Yet DND and the absurdly named “Department of Justice” spent 7-1/2 years trying to weasel out of compensating a victim.

In my July 2015 telephone call with P.S., he confirmed that P.S. v. Minister of National Defence was his civil action but that an NDA agreement prevents him from discussing the matter.

To date DND has stonewalled me for any information related to P.S. v Minister of National Defence.

It wasn’t until I got creative and submitted an Access to Information request to the Department of Justice for their records related to their defence of the Minister of National Defence in the matter of P.S. v. Minister of National Defence that I discovered that the Minister settled with P.S. in November of 2008.

But this is all information that is easily available to the courts. These are court records.

It really makes me sick to realize that the courts have all of this power, but willingly play stupid.

So far as liability goes. The Juvenile Delinquents Act is very clear in that the adult responsible for the delinquency is responsible for the consequences.

Yes, I could have appealed this to the Supreme Court, but with court costs and expenses estimated to be over $100,000.00 sometimes it better to just walk away.

P.S. v. Minister of National Defence confirmed.

Here the MPCC is stating something that the Federal Court of Canada was unwilling to state even though the Federal Court had easy access to these records:

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

Again, Mr. X is P.S.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

McRae died three months after the start of the investigation into my complaint against P.S. McRae died 17 days after Mcpl Cyr asked me if I remembered anything about McRae.

You need to bear in mind that when the investigation plan was put into action that Angus McRae was still alive. This posed a very serious dilemma for the CFNIS. Depending on the outcome of their investigation into P.S. they might be able to charge P.S., but due to the fact that Angus McRae was subject to the Code of Service Discipline in 1980 no matter what crimes P.S. implicated McRae in the 3-year time bar would prevent the CFNIS from even charging Angus McRae.

The email that started it all.

MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

The Edmonton Police Service didn’t refer me to anyone. The EPS contacted the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team. ASIRT in turn contacted the CFNIS. The CFNIS assumed jurisdiction.

My original message to the Edmonton Police Service:

Edmonton Police Service internal message:

Another internal Edmonton Police Service email:

ASIRT contacting the CFNIS:

Warrant Officer Blair Hart contacting Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger:

Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger stating CFNIS will take jurisdiction and even mentioning that in 1980 jurisdiction would have belinged to the RCMP.

So no, at no time did I contact the CFNIS on my own. If I had known in 2011 that this was going to investigated by the Canadian Forces I would have just walked away.

MPCC 2018-030

Remember, the CFNIS submitted such horrific evidence to the Alberta Crown that the Alberta Crown wondered if anything had happened at all outside of “childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

Also, the first communication I had from the CFNIS indicating that the investigation was over was on November 4th, 2011.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Petty Officer Morris’ words were that “the CFNIS could find no evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I had accused him of” and that the investigation was going to be closed.

MPCC 2018-030

Again, bear in mind that during the 2012 MPCC investigation I was not shown any of the documentation that was supplied to the MPCC by the CFNIS and I was therefore unable to question some of the questionable decisions by the CFNIS in 2011. As a result of this, any evidence that I entered into court was struck as being “new evidence” as I didn’t raise this evidence during the MPCC review. Neat how that works, eh?

MPCC 2018-030

I can only wonder if the Alberta Crown’s continued refusal to prosecute a multi-time convicted child molester is an act of retribution against me by the Alberta Crown for the fuss I’ve raised over Alberta Crown Prosecutor Jon Werbicki’s Crown opinion. I was never supposed to have seen that Crown opinion. They’re considered privileged documents.

Request for a Public Interest Hearing.

MPCC 2018-030

The funny thing about the MPCC declining to convene a public interest hearing is that it was the MPCC itself in 2011 that had stated in the “Military Police Complaints Commission Submissions to the Independent Review Authority” that having the Provost Marshal respond to the commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff “runs counter to Canadian law and practice regarding the independence of police investigations generally”.

Basically, what is being stated here is that when the police are investigating a criminal matter, the police answer to no one but the law itself. However, this is not possible in the Canadian Armed Forces as members of the CFNIS as well as the chain of command of the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal are members of the Canadian Forces and are bound by the National Defence Act as well as the Queen’s Regulations and Orders and must obey their superiors at all times.

This chain of command means that the investigator investigating my matter is subordinate to the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence is the very same entity that I would have to sue for civil damages.

This excerpt is from a Supreme Court of Canada matter which the Military Police Complaints Commisison raised within its submissions to the Independent Review Authority on June 23rd, 2011.

The Military Police Complaints Commission was taking issue with ammendments made to the National Defence Act which would allow for the Vice Chief of Defence Staff to direct the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal in any Professional Standards review and and military police investigation. The Surpeme Court of Canada has long recognized that it is improper for a police agency to receive instuction or guideance from any agency that may stand to be subject to civil actions depending on the outcome of the police agency.

The Military Police Complaints Commission itself pointed out that the Vice Chief of Defence Staff is not a Peace Officer unlike the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal must obey the lawful commands of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff must obey the lawful commands of the Chief of Defence Staff. And the Chief of Defence Staff must obey the wishes of the Minister of National Defence.

And as illustrated in the matter of P.S. v. Mininster of National Defence, it is the Minister with direct authority over the military police that I would have to initiate a civil action against and that the success of this civil action is solely dependent on the findings of the military police investigation that the minister may issue instructions for.

National Defence Act
Revised statutes of Canada 1985, Chapter N-5
Current as of 2019-08-01

Section 18.4 defines the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal.

Section 18.5 gives the Vice Chief of Defence Staff certain responsibilities over the Provost Marshal.

Section 83 and 85 state that EVERY member of the Canadian Forces will without hesitation obey the lawful commands of their superior. There are no exceptions for the military police or the CFNIS or the Provost Marshal, or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, or the Chief of Defence staff. Each and every one of them must obey the commands of their superior. The ultimate superior in this chain is the Minister of National Defence.

This type of obedience does not exist in any civilian police department to the best of my knowledge.

Interference Complaint

So, why didn’t I file an inference complaint?

Becuase only members of the military police conducting or supervising an investigation may make an interference complaint.

Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The last sentence of the excerpt above should be very concerning to anyone who understands what it means. Due to the Chain of Command Influence within the Canadian Armed Forces, if interference in an investigation occurs high enough up the Chain of Command, the military police investigator may be completely unaware of the interference. It’s sad that the MPCC wrote this observation in 2011 but pretends that interference couldn’t have possibly been an issue in my matter which stood to expose the Minister of National Defence to Civil Actions.

Pre-1998 Brick Wall.

MPCC 2018-030

The Canadian Forces Military Police and the MPCC often hide behind this “brick wall” that was errected in December of 1999 with the creation of the Military Police Complaints Commission. The CFNIS and the MPCC both claim that they cannot take anything from the 1980 CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae into account as this happened prior to 1999.

Refusal to hand over documents to the MPCC for review.

MPCC 2018-030

Unlike in 2012, this time around the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal declined to provide the Military Police Complaints Commission a copy of the Crown Brief or the response from the Crown. The decision to not supply the MPCC with these documents more than likely stems from how embarrassing it was for both the Alberta Crown and the CFNIS for me to have obtained the prior Crown Brief and the decision by the Crown.

However, as I have the tribunal records from the Alberta Victims of Crime, I can state for a fact that the CFNIS basically just regurgitated the original 2011 investigation Crown Brief.

MPCC 2018-030

The MPCC did ask me to sign a consent form allowing them to retrieve the a copy of the Crown Brief from the Alberta Victims of Crime seeing as how the Provost Marshal was declining to hand over a copy. As I’ve seen the Crown Brief I know that the CFNIS added sweet bugger all to the original 2011 Crown Brief and basically just resubmitted the original 2011 mess. And then they act surprised when the Crown refuses to prosecute.

Mention of RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban

MPCC 2018-030
MPCC 2018-030
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Okay, so the CPIC check is interesting. But it misses out on some of the details that are in the newspaper article below.

Deep River, Ontario is just north of Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. CFB Petawawa is where P.S.’s family had been transfered to in June of 1980.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Deep+River,+ON/@46.0342639,-77.4257889,11z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x4cd6def70c3cdefd:0x1ca01a3335c67a5f!8m2!3d46.0976628!4d-77.4933397

The 1984 charge from Manitoba is missing. This one involved an 8 year old boy in Manitoba.

There were TWO charges in 1985. One for molesting a 9 year old boy on Canadian Forces Base Namao after his family had been transferred back there in 1985. And one for molesting a 13 year old newspaper boy in Edmonton after the Canadian Forces ordered him out of the military housing and off the base. His father, J.S., rented him an apartment in the west end of Edmonton.

So, that’s a total of four charges involving children prior to 1985. And they’re only listing the crimes he was convicted of. What’s not listed, but what is available in his CPIC file, is the numerous charges that were stayed or dismissed.

So, I hope you understand why I get annoyed when I think back to the phone call I received on November 4th, 2011 from Petty Office Steve Morris stating that the CFNIS couldn’t find anything to indicate that P.S. was capable of the crimes that I had accused him of.

Warrant Officer Fred R. Cunningham

MPCC 2018-030

This is correct, the CFSIU which after the separation of the intelligence section, went on to become the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service. The CFSIU primarily concerned itself with “serious and sensitive” offences committed by service members, much the same as the modern day CFNIS. The base military police then, much as they do today, looked after the smaller menial occurrences.

CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434
CFSIU DS 120-10-80 ATIP A-2016-02434

At the time of the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae in 1980, Fred Cunningham was Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham of the CFSIU. Fred was a Military Police officer with the base military police but was then transfered over to the CFSIU and became the Acting Section Commander.

When I spoke with Fred on November 27th, 2011, he wouldn’t elaborate what function he did with the military police. He said that he was very familiar with the P.S. and Captain McRae affair.

He said that the base MPs had received numerous complaints about P.S. and that this led to the investigation of P.S. by the base military police. According to Fred, when P.S. was questioned in his father’s house P.S. named Captain Father Angus McRae. Fred stated that the CFSIU had the charges related to three boys ready to go to court martial, but that the brass cut the charges down to only those charges involving P.S.

Fred stated that one of the other boys who had his charges against McRae dismissed by the brass thought that P.S. had stabbed him in the back. Fred Cunningham said that this other boy was named either Fred or Frank and that he was a prolific pyromaniac on the base and had set numerous fires.

As a side note, I was able to determine who this other kids was. His initials are F.A.. His family’s PMQ was involved with fires that F.A. was found to have set. According to one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports F.A. like to play the “hero” by “discovering” the fire after it had been set. F.A. had a tendency to try to blame his sisters for setting the fires. F.A. had also been to a psychiatric hospital to help him deal with his urges.

And, one of the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports indicate that F.A. and P.S. were good friends going so far as playing with fire together.

Just on a side note, on September 11th, 1978 the Canadian Forces Military Police on CFB Namao knew that P.S. was 13.

CF Fire Marshal report 7667-2-E16
ATIP A-2016-00793
MQ #26 – 12 St is where P.S. lived, MQ #21 – 12 Street is where F.A. lived.

I have the Edmonton Telephone Directories from 1978, 1979, and 1980 which confirm the family names of the persons living in these Married Quarters.

When I asked Fred Cunningham is he was insinuating that this Fred boy had anything to to with the fire at the P.S. residence on June 23rd, 1980 which resulted in the death of a civilian contractor, Fred Cunningham responded ” I am not going to speak to that”.

Fred also said that the brass wouldn’t allow the base military police to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.

Fred pleaded with me to understand that the military police tried everything to get Captain McRae transferred into the civilian system but that the brass wouldn’t allow for that to happen.

Fred Cunningham was of the opinion that P.S. should never have been allowed to babysit children and that P.S. was having “mental problems” at the time and that he was a very “unsavory character”.

In 2011, after having talked to Fred Cunningham about this, I sent a letter to the Provost Marshal at the time hoping that this would show the Provost Marshal that something bad happened on CFB Namao in 1978 through 1980 and that he should have the CFNIS take a deeper look. In early January of 2012, I received a telephone call from Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre telling me to not put much faith in what Cunningham had told me, that Cunningham wasn’t involved in the original investigation and was probably telling me second or third hand information.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The person “x” above is P.S.

P.S. was not the subject of a formal military police investigation because the military police at the time could not investigate P.S..

According to the National Defence Act at the time, the military police could only arrest military dependants who were outside of Canada accompanying their serving parent on Canadian Forces business. That’s actually still the case today.

The military police at the time would have had to call in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S.. And according to Fred Cunningham the base military police and the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit were being prevented by the chain of command from calling in the R.C.M.P. to deal with P.S..

If the Canadian Forces had called in RCMP to deal with P.S., the Canadian Forces would have lost the ability to throw a gag-order over the Juvenile Delinquent Court. Yes, the Juvenile Court could easily prevent the naming of P.S., but they wouldn’t be able to prevent the naming of Captain Father Angus McRae and the delinquencies that Captain McRae was being charged with enabling a minor to commit.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

No one believed that P.S. was 12 years old at the time. P.S. was born in June of 1965. Captain McRae arrived at CFB Namao in August of 1978 from Canadian Forces Station Holberg on Vancouver Island. P.S. didn’t start abusing children until after Captain McRae started grooming P.S.. So this would have been in the fall of 1978. P.S. would have been about 13-1/2. P.S. would have turned 14 in June of 1979.

As indicated above, Canadian Forces records indicate that they knew in September of 1978 that P.S. was 13 years old.

In fact, the Canadian Forces NEEDED P.S. to be over the age of 14. According to a Court Martial Appeal Court matter titled Regina v. Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan from 1986 the Canadian Forces only retained the right to conduct a court martial for the crimes of Gross Indecency, and Indecent Assault so long as there was the possibility of consent. No consent meant the case had to be tried in a civilian court. No child under the age of consent can consent to have sexual relations with an adult. The age of consent in Canada at the time was 14.

C.M.A.C. 246 March 4, 1986
Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan v. Her Majesty the Queen (Regina)

As can been seen by the above excerpt, the military had the right to conduct a court martial against Captain McRae in the matter of Gross Indecency so long as there was the possibility that P.S. consented.

I wonder if any of this information from Fred Cunningham was passed on to the Alberta Crown.

If it wasn’t I wonder why?

Fred Cunningham was originally contacted by the CFNIS in early 2016.

For some reason he was very reluctant to sit down for a recorded interview with the CFNIS.

I wonder if Lt. Col. Gilles Sansterre had truly put the fear of god into Fred Cunningham back in December 2011 when I told the Provost Marshal what Fred had told me. After all for some reason Sansterre seemed to really want me to forget and not pay much attention to what Cunningham had told me. I’m still convinced that Sansterre or one of his underlings at the Canadian Forces Military Police group threatened Cunningham with violating the Official Secrets Act / the Security of Information Act for having discussed the matter of Captain McRae’s court martial with me in violation of the in-camera order that was applied to the court martial in July of 1980 by the Western Commander of the Canadian Forces for the sole goal of “protecting the morals” of Canadians.

Protecting the Public Morals of Canadians.
ATI A-2019-00017 McRae Court Martial Transcript
RSC 1970, Chapter N-4, National Defence Act

Court Martial hearings are supposed to be open to the public, just as court proceedings are.

Basically the Canadian Forces didn’t want the Canadian public to discover that not only had an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relations on a military base. The Canadian Armed Forces didn’t want the Canadian public learning that an OFFICER of the Canadian Armed Forces had homosexual relationships with children ranging in age from 15 to as young as possibly 4. As long as the Canadian Forces could hide this court martial, the Canadian Forces could portray it as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces having homosexual relations with a person who consented to the sexual activity.

ATI A-2018-00780
ATI A-2018-00780
MPCC 2018-030 Final Report

For someone who the CFNIS in 2011 couldn’t find any evidence against, P.S. sure keeps being mentioned as someone who liked to touch younger children.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

A lot of things back then seemed to have been dealt with “unofficially” back then if you know what I mean.

The funny thing about this is the MPCC and the CFNIS seem to have both neglected to mention my recording of the telephone call I had with retired Sgt. J.S., the father of P.S.. J.S. directly implicates his son.

Sgt. Tenaschuk called me in September of 2016 to inform me that the CFNIS was about ready to wrap up the investigation. Sgt. Tenaschuk asked me if there was anything else he thought that the CFNIS could do to satisfy me that they had tried everything this time. I suggested that the CFNIS run a Crime Stoppers appeal. Tenaschuk said that he would have to consult with his superiors to see if they would agree to this.

ATIP A-2018-00780
CFNIS Investigation GO 2011-5754

Note that the investigator can’t simply request a Crime Stoppers appeal. The investigator has to appeal to their chain of command. I also find it interesting that for a 40 year old case that lacks evidence that one Crime Stoppers appeal that ran for about two days in the media was garnering tips.

This appeal ran for two days. Better than nothing.

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7 tips for a two day appeal? Not too shabby.

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Victim D was James Paluck. James is the one who told me that the sickly sweet grape juice was actually Manischewitz wine. James also told me about P.S.’s convictions in 1985 and both James and P.S.’s younger brother had been riding the bus to M.E. LaZert high school in Edmonton when the other school kids started teasing P.S.’s younger brother about his older brother being a child molester. Unfortunately James passed away. However, before James passed away he did give me the name of one other victim to go looking for.

Victim C is the youngest of three boys. He currently lives on the East Coast. When I spoke to him he was fearful of coming forward as he didn’t want to jeopardize his career. The middle brother was having issues that the younger brother believed was directly attributable to the abuse on CFB Namao at the hands of McRae and P.S.. The eldest brother committed suicide years ago. The younger brother blames the way the military handled the abuse investigation back in the 1980s as being a contributing factor.

On a side note, I recently learnt of another former military dependent from Canadian Forces Base Namao that had been abused by Captain McRae who would later go on to commit suicide. This dependent’s brother recently contacted me.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I can only wonder what these “painful memories” were. The CFNIS seemed to have scrubbed them from the investigation paperwork.

It should be noted that the interview with Victim C occurred on January 12, 2017.

It was in early February 2017 that Sgt Tenaschuk contacted me and told me about finding the Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit case file for the investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae. One of the things that Tenaschuk said has stuck with me. He said that it was very odd that this file still existed. He said that usually the military disposes of paperwork after a certain period. And seeing as how Captain McRae was convicted and subsequently booted out of the military in the early 1980s, this file shouldn’t exist anymore, but here it was.

This got me wondering. Maybe this file only continued to exist because it had been accessed frequently between 1980 and the current day because other victims of Captain McRae and P.S. kept coming forward over the years.

Maybe this is what drove P.S. to attempt suicide in 2000. He knew that he was never going to be free of what happened on CFB Namao.

Sgt. Tenaschuk read to me excerpts from the file. Unlike what J.S. had told me in July of 2015, it wasn’t J.S. that obtained the name of Captain McRae from his son P.S.. It was two base military police officers whom had interrogated P.S. in the kitchen of his family PMQ. Sgt. Tenaschuk said that just about everything else that Fred Cunningham had told me in 2011 was backed up by this paperwork. I asked Sgt. Tenaschuk for the name of this paperwork. He replied that it’s “CFSIU DS 120-10-80”. I filed an ATIP for CFSIU DS- 120-10-80 as soon as I got off the phone with Sgt. Tenaschuk.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I forget how I was first put in contact with victim A, but if I remember correctly he contacted me via Facebook after having seen one of my postings in one of the Base Brat groups on Facebook. He’s a good guy. I’ve only met him twice face to face. His employment allows his to come out to the West Coast periodically. He has been willing in the past to go on camera so long as he is allowed to sit behind a screen. Being a sexually abused male carries such a bad stigma, especially in the line of work that he’s in that he doesn’t want anyone knowing who he actually is. And this I can totally understand.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Again Mstr [X] refers to P.S..

Bear in mind that no one involved with my investigation had tried to locate this paperwork. It was only when the CFNIS commenced an investigation into the complaint made by Victim A that the CFNIS Western Region tracked down the paperwork.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Remember, Corporal White was investigating the complaint of “Victim A”. No one from my investigation had tried obtaining the court martial records. P.S. was the main prosecution witness against Captain McRae.

In July of 2015 when I spoke with J.S. he told me how when his family was living on CFB Petawawa, the Canadian Forces wanted his son P.S. to fly back to Edmonton by himself to testify against Captain McRae. J.S. said that after much back-and-forth the Canadian Forces agreed to allow J.S. to fly to Edmonton with his son. However, J.S. was barred from entering the court martial. This would have been illegal at the time. Children have a right to have a parent or guardian present during any manner of court proceeding. The fact that the court martial panel didn’t want J.S. to hear his son’s testimony shows how far the Canadian Forces were willing to go to keep the actions of Captain McRae under wraps.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

And here it is ladies and gentlemen, the moment we’ve all been waiting for:

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

There it is in black and white Ladies and Gentlemen, the words that the CFNIS and the Canadian Forces chain of command have been very fucking reluctant to say or even acknowledge. P.S. was sexually abusing younger children on the base and the military police in 1980 WERE aware of the abuse.

Having been investigated by the base military police in 1980 for sexually abusing younger children should have proved that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes that I accused him of. At least the should have allowed me to face P.S. in a court of law out of the hands of the military.

The Alberta Victims of Crime – 2018 Crown Brief.

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Final Report MPCC 2018-030
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It should be understood that the 2011 ‘remarks’ are from the Crown Brief that was submitted to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki.

The reason that I had applied for benefits from the Victims of Crime Financial benefits program is that the victim services officer with the Canadian Forces suggested that I approach the Alberta Victims of Crime program for financial assistance to get counselling services.

As I’ve explained elsewhere as I’m not a member of the Canadian Forces I don’t qualify for counselling services from the Canadian Forces.

Alberta and British Columbia have both declined to assist me with counselling. British Columbia stating that the crimes didn’t occur in British Columbia, so it’s not their responsibility to pay.

Alberta first said that as I’m not a resident of Alberta, they’re not going to pay for counselling in another province. Then Alberta further declined stating that the crimes happened on a military reserve, therefore the Canadian Forces should pay.

Basically everyone just passes the buck.

And from what I’ve heard from other former base brats, this is common. Base brats quite often fall through social safety nets as the provinces look for any excuse to not deal with us.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030
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Section 156 of the 1980 Criminal Code was Indecent Assault on Male. This was an indictable offence. The sentence was for up to ten years and to be whipped. As a juvenile, P.S. would have received at most a stint in reform school, if that.

Also, what I find odd about this is Petty Office Steve Morris called me on November 4th, 2011 and told me that the CFNIS couldn’t find any evidence to indicate that P.S. was capable of committing the crimes I had accused him of.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I think Mr. Ghadban is being a little over generous here. After all, the CFNIS ‘forgot’ to mention to Alberta Crown prosecutor Jon Werbicki that I had tried twice previously to report P.S. to the military police. The CFNIS outright ignored the connection between P.S. and Captain McRae. The CFNIS in 2011 could have just as easily obtained the court martial transcripts for Captain McRae as Corporal White did in the 2018 CFNIS investigation into the complaint against P.S. by the other victim.

In 2011 there would have been nothing preventing the CFNIS from changing the scope of the investigation while McRae was alive and changed the status of P.S. from accused to witness and then proceeded after McRae. But again, connecting my sexual abuse to the actions of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae has always been the last thing the Canadian Forces chain of command have wanted.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

I urge you to search for a Macleans Magazine article from the early 2000s called “The CFB Gagetown Rape Controversy”. I won’t get too much into that other that it was a story about a flawed military police investigation related to the rape of a developmentally challenged woman by four male soldiers at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in New Brunswick. One of the things that was noted is that the military police would often submit laughable cases to the local Crown Prosecutors knowing full well that the Crown would recommend against charges. This way the military could tell the victim that it was the Crown’s fault that charges were being pursued.

This rape and the subsequent investigation occurred prior to the Somalia Inquiry. The Somalia Inquiry found that the Canadian Forces justice system was prone to abuse and manipulation from the Chain of Command, commanding officers could easily interfere with investigations, people with no legal training and no legal back ground could summarily dismiss criminal code charges.

This is why with the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, the requirement for commanding officers to conduct summary investigations AFTER the military police laid charges was removed. This is also why the 3-year time bar that applied to ALL indictable offences in the Criminal Code of Canada was removed from the National Defence Act.

Still, it looks as if some things never change.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As long as Orest Yeriniuk views me as a “trouble maker” instead of a victim, there will be no funding for counselling.

Submission of Case to Crown Prosecutor and conclusion

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Final Report MPCC 2018-030

If I had to hazard a guess, the Alberta Crown is still smarting over the release of the Crown Brief and the subsequent Crown Opinion to me by the Military Police Complaints Commission in 2013. I would have like to have been a fly on the wall when the Alberta Crown, and possibly even the Alberta Solicitor General reamed the CFNIS and possibly the MPCC a new one.

Decisions by the Crown are supposed to not be questioned. That’s one of the major flaws with the justice system in this country. The Crowns operate like their own private little fiefdoms that will dispense justice as they see fit. The Crowns believe that they are above reproach and should never have to justify their decisions to anyone, not even lowly peasants such as myself.

Questionable Crown decisions are how Karla Holmolka is allowed to walk the streets even though as it turned out, she was at least as involved with the murders as Paul Bernardo was.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

This must be a new “standard practice” as the Crown Prosecutor’s opinion was released to the MPCC the last time. I wonder what’s different this time around? This secrecy doesn’t really do anyone too well. In fact, even the MPCC has complained about this in the past.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The case was 31 year old in 2011 when this started.

I was 7 to 8 when the abuse was occuring

P.S. was between 13-1/2 and 15 when the abuse was occuring.

P.S. had already been investigated by the base military police and had received counselling for his involvement with young children on the base.

It was the involvement of P.S. with the younger children that eventually led to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

P.S. has a substantial criminal record for child sexual abuse.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

The Alberta Crown in 2011 had determined, based on the original 2011 CFNIS investigation, that it was very significant that I never told anyone of the abuse. Looks like the CFNIS forgot to tell the Alberta Crown about my attempts to report P.S. to the military police in 1984 and in 1990. Also, the case presented to the Alberta Crown made it sound as if I could barely remember the assaults. I clearly remembered the two times that P.S. tried to have anal intercourse with me and the third time he succeeded. I clearly remember the times that P.S. forced me to perform oral sex on him. I clearly remember the threats that P.S. made to me that he would kill me if I ever told the military police about what he had done to me. I also remember quite clearly the threats P.S. made that his father would have my father thrown out of the military if I ever told anyone. However, I don’t think the CFNIS was too interested in passing all of this information on to the Alberta Crown. Otherwise I don’t think the Alberta Crown would have remarked that this was nothing more than “Childhood curiosity and experimentation”.

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The MPCC said itself that Chain of Command interference would be almost impossible to detect.

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is image-44.png
Military Police Complaints Commission Submission to the Independent Review Authority

The MPCC cannot investigate an interference complaint from me. And as the MPCC state above in its own report, any interference from the chain of command may be undetectable. After all, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of any investigation and any Military Police investigation.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Basically, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, who is not a peace officer, and generally is not required to have any manner of legal training and who is not sworn to uphold the Criminal Code of Canada can supervise the Provost Marshal in criminal code investigations and in professional standard reviews.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5
Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Here’s the really scary part. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff can issue instructions to the Provost Marshal in respect of a particular investigation. Basically the National Defence Act is stating that it’s okay for someone with no peace officer qualifications to direct a law enforcement agency.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

Sound great in theory.

Part II National Defence Act , RSC 1985, Chapter N-5

So, if the Vice Chief of Defence Staff issued instructions to the Provost Marshal to not forward certain information to the Alberta Crown, what do you think the odds are on that I would ever be able to see those instructions?

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McRae’s court martial was anything but public knowledge. The Canadian Forces threw a “veil of secrecy” around it. The public never knew the true extent of what Captain McRae had done.

Edmonton Journal, July 31, 1980
Edmonton Journal July 30 1980
Globe and Mail August 1st, 1980

The tone presented in these news articles makes it very clear that the Canadian Forces wasn’t been too transparent with the Captain McRae affair.

If the Canadian public knew that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae had molested well over 25 children ranging in ages from 5 to 15 on a secure defence establishment, the Canadian public would have demanded that heads roll. To be very clear, the court martial wasn’t moved in-camera to protect the identity of P.S..

The court martial was moved in-camera to protect the public image of the Canadian Armed Forces.

25 children, on a secure defence establishment, sexually abused by an officer of the Canadian Armed Forces? This would have been a fucking scandal. There is no way that Minister of National Defence Gilles Lamontagne or Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau would have survived this.

Here is the order requesting that McRae’s court martial be moved in-camera in the “interests of public morals”:

From Court Martial transcripts CM62 July 18, 1980 ATIP A-2019-00017

It wasn’t the identity of P.S. that the Canadian Armed Forces were protecting. It was their own necks and their own careers.

25 children.

1 secure military base

1 military officer.

This was not going to be public at all.

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The Federal Government is compelled to settle this lawsuit. DND is legally liable and responsible for its employees. DND and the Canadian Government aren’t settling out of the kindness of their heart. They’re settling because of legal actions. Legal actions that military dependants or other civilians cannot take against the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence.

The class action lawsuit was specifically open to only members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence. Persons such as myself, who had been given “conversion therapy” through the military social workers are ineligible to join these class action lawsuits as we were never members of the Canadian Forces or civilian employees of the Department of National Defence.

It took almost 40 years for the Canadian Armed Forces to own up to its responsibilities for the cadets who had been killed and injured by a grenade blast in 1974 when a real live grenade was introduced into a classroom full of 12 to 18 year old children. From 1974 until 2011 the Canadian Forces refused to accept liability and to cover the expenses for the dead and injured cadets because cadets are not the legal responsibility of DND or the Canadian Forces.

It took the Minister of National Defence requesting that the Canadian Forces ombudsman review the matter before the Canadian Forces finally responded to the pleas of the former cadets for assistance.

The cadets were not able to receive compensation or assistance at the time of the grenade explosion because they were not members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/en/ombudsman-reports-stats-investigations-valcartier/valcartier-report.page#compensation

As per the above section of the Canadian Forces Ombudsman report on the CFB Valcartier cadet grenade incident the Canadian Armed Forces are only legally liable for its members of the Reserves and Regular Forces as well as its civilian employees and contractors. Cadets, military dependents (spouses and children), and civilians not employed by DND who are on military bases are their at their own risk.

The problem with DND and sexually abused military dependents is that no one knows just how many children were sexually abused on the various bases by members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Actually, the three year time bar flaw was never remedied. It was only removed. Meaning that after December 1998, the 3-year time bar could not be used to prevent the laying of charges under the criminal code against a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

However, what wasn’t fixed was the fact that any crime that occurred prior to 1998 cannot be charged for. What this means is that in my matter, if P.S. had been charged and had in turn implicated Angus McRae. Angus McRae could never be charged due to the 3-year time bar that existed prior to 1998.

I don’t think the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence want this one little flaw known.

I think this flaw is what allows the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence to claim that child sexual abuse on the bases in Canada was non-existent in the old days.

Dan M. was the Base Commander of Canadian Forces Base Namao, and he was also the commanding officer of Captain Father Angus McRae. Col Dan M. would have been the one who conducted the summary investigation against Captain McRae after the military police laid charges. It would have been Col Dan M. that would have determined which charges proceeded and which charges were dismissed. Col Dan M. would have also had the authority to prohibit the CFSIU and the base military police from calling in the RCMP to deal with P.S.

So, it is very clear that the 3-year time bar, even though it was removed by the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998, still affects criminal investigations to this date.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

This is laughable.

The Minister of National Defence settled with P.S.. Of this there is no doubt.

P.S., in his telephone conversation with CFNIS investigator Robert Jon Hancock in August of 2011 has said that the “military has already handled things that he was involved in as a youth”.

When I spoke with P.S. in July of 2015 he claimed that he is bound to silence by an NDA.

The Minister of National Defence by way of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff can give instructions on any military police investigation.

The CFNIS conducted an investigation that could have potentially subjected the Minister of national Defence to further civil action.

The CFNIS also submitted to the Alberta Crown a very poorly executed investigation.

The Canadian Forces chain of command knew that by submitting an inferior investigation to the Crown that the Crown would be very highly unlikely to recommend charges.

The Canadian Forces chain of command are also well aware that without a criminal conviction, the chances on any victim of P.S. being successful in a civil action against the Minister would be severely diminished.

And as P.S. was a juvenile at the time, initiating a civil action against a minor would be impossible. However, the Juvenile Delinquents Act held that the adult who had contributed to the delinquency could be held responsible.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

Captain McRae was investigated in 1973 for committing “acts of homosexuality” at the Royal Military College at Canadian Forces Base Kingston in Ontario. “Acts of homosexuality” is also what Captain McRae was charged with committing on Canadian Forces Base Namao. Captain Father Angus McRae was involved with a teenage boy on Canadian Forces Station Holberg just prior to his transfer to Canadian Forces Base Namao.

Brigadier General Roger Bazin was arrested in 2010 for having sexually abused a boy on Canadian Forces Base Borden when he was a catholic chaplain at the military chapel on the base.

The Bazin matter occurred just prior to me bringing my complaint against P.S.

Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan molested numerous children in the 1970s before he joined the Canadian Armed Forces. Once in the Canadian Forces he was court martialed for molesting numerous boys on Canadian Forces Base Gagetown in 1984.

The Canadian Armed Forces removed the rectories from the catholic chapels in the late ’80s.

In 2006, the Canadian Armed Forces changed the way that baptismal records are issued specifically stating that this was due to the amount of civil actions being brought against Catholic Archdiocese in Canada.

Email from June 2011 when I tried to obtain my baptismal records from the Canadian Forces.
Operation “cover our asses” has commenced as of November 22nd, 2006.

Due to the way that children were moved from base to base to follow their serving parent’s military career, and due to the way that Canadian Forces service members including military chaplains were also moved from base to base, it is conceivable that there are thousands of children who were touched once or twice on the various bases, but who never said anything.

It’s also conceivable that these children never said anything until years later, possibly outside of the 3-year time bar, that made pressing charges impossible.

This is a problem that the Canadian Armed Forces are more than willing to let fade into history.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As the MPCC itself has said, the investigators within the CFNIS and the military police may not even be aware of “chain of command” influence.

Why did the CFNIS chain of command determine that the Crown shouldn’t be informed of the entirety of the telephone conversation between P.S. and Robert Jon Hancock.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination that my father was not to be re-interviewed even though my foster care records and his answer to my written examination exposed his statement to the CFNIS as lie upon lie easily disproved by my foster care records.

Richard didn’t die until January of 2017. The CFNIS had over a year and a half to get the silly fucker to “clarify” his original statement to the CFNIS. And even though the CFNIS knew of the errors in Richard’s statement, they did nothing what so ever to make sure that the Alberta Crown understood the issues with Richard’s statement.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that shortly after the events on CFB Namao that I was made a ward of the province due to the instability in my household.

Who within the CFNIS made the determination to not inform the Alberta Crown that P.S. had been interviewed by the base military police in 1980 and had also been sent for treatment for committing sexual assaults against young children on the base?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030
Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As I’ve seen the documents submitted to the Alberta Victims of Crime, I know that it was basically the 2011 Crown Brief with a bit of the 2018 investigation thrown in.

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

It’s generally good police practice to not tip off the family of the suspect that you’re looking for another family member to give a statement against another family member.

The family of P.S. told the CFNIS investigators in the 2015 to 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation that the younger brother lived out on the West Coast, that the younger brother never spoke to the family, that the younger brother hated and despised P.S., and that the younger brother was probably deceased.

After tracking the younger brother down via CPIC, it turns out that the younger brother and P.S. lived about 25 km apart.

P.S. lived at home with his father, J.S. in Fort Erie.

Southern Ontario

J.S. told me in the telephone call that I had with him that he had just had one of his legs amputated and that he needed P.S. at home to look after him.

How much do you wanna bet that when Sgt. Tenaschuk called up J.S. looking for his youngest son that J.S. asked him not to say anything against P.S.?

When I spoke with J.S. in 2015, he blamed himself for what had happened to both P.S. and his younger brother. Apparently they had both been abused by Captain McRae.

Another former base brat, whom I met via the base brat groups, knew D.S, the older sister of P.S.. D.S. said that her father J.S. blamed himself. P.S. was apparently a shy boy and didn’t have many friends, so J.S. forced P.S. to go over to the chapel to be McRae’s altar boy and to assist McRae with duties around the chapel.

D.S. herself is interesting in the sense that she also covers for her brother, P.S..

It’s almost as if that entire family doesn’t hold P.S. responsible for all of the children that he assaulted and molested over he years because they all blame Captain McRae.

And I think they further justify this victimhood by saying that the Canadian Armed Forces never would have settled with P.S. if P.S. wasn’t a victim.

It’s just too bad that the rest of us can’t be victims.

I still can’t believe that my father thought that at 7 years of age that I could force 14 year old P.S. to molest my younger brother. I guess it must be true, after all I wasn’t a victim of anyone, right?

Final Report MPCC 2018-030

As the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is under no obligation to supply the MPCC with documentation, and as the MPCC does not have the legal authority to subpoena any document from the Provost Marshal, I’m just going to have to say that I would never simply take the verbal word of anyone attached to the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

Having seen the games DND played during the Mark Norman affair I just can’t trust DND at their word.

In February of 2016 the Minister of National Defence called my intentions into question by suggesting that I had impure motives.

He wanted to know “what my game was” and “what angle was I trying to play”

In August of 2011 the CFNIS tried to get my brother to state that I was a societal malcontent with an axe to grind against the military.

This has never been about justice.

This has always been about the Canadian Armed Forces ensuring that the dirty secrets of the past stay in the past.

I never wanted a single nickel from the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

All I wanted was for my father to own up to the truth and for him to stop blaming me for having “fucked with his military career” and for having forced P.S. to molest my younger brother.

That was it.

Richard wasn’t the type of man to ever apologize unless he knew that he couldn’t weasel his way out of this with lies and bullshit.

Yeah, I do realize that any apology I would have received from him probably would have been worthless bullshit that he spewed just to try to make himself look good.

But the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service took that possibility away from me.

Keeping the military’s secrets was more paramount than my apology.

The lawyer in P.S.’ claim against the Crown summed it up the best:

As P.S. was a juvenile at the time, these are the entities that anyone abused by P.S. would have to make a claim against:

Court of Queens Bench procedure card Q0103 08346
P.S. v. Minister of National Defence et. al.

The Canadian Armed Forces would be represented by the Department of Justice. The DoJ has unlimited tax payer dollars and an unlimited amount of lawyers. Basically the DoJ can turn night into day if it so wishes. That’s how much power it has.

An interesting ATI request

Back in 2019, I was trolling around the government website that lists all ATI requests that have been filed with the various departments and what the outcome of those reports was.

One ATI request caught my eye. Someone had requested a copy of all of the General Occurence Reports from DND related to “Sexual Assault” that occured on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980.

I filed a request with DND for a copy of this information on October 10 2019.

I just received a copy of this report on Friday July 3rd 2020.

You can download a copy of the ATI here:

There were three “sexual assaults” on CFB Namao in the years of 1978 until 1980.

The first was related to a male exposing himself to young females at the base rec centre. The fact that the military police administered a polygraph to this person indicates that this person would have been subject to the Code of Service Discipline. This event occured in November of 1978.

The next incident occured in the vicinity of Northtown Mall in May of 1979. A member of the Canadian Forces exposed himself from his waist to his ankles to a girl. The City of Edmonton police and the CFB Edmonton police worked on this matter. The fact that the incident report indicate that the male was “dress in civilian clothing” and the fact that the CFB Edmonton military police we called in by the Edmonton Police Service also indicates that this was a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

Then of course there’s the matter of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

Curiously, there is one incident that is missing.

In June of 1980, Corporal Larry King, who was 39 years old at the time, had been sentenced to 3 yers in prison for choking and raping a 16-year-old Edmonton girl.

Corporal Larry King, 39, was sentenced in civilian court to three years in prison for choking and raping a 16-year-old Edmonton Girl

There were three sexual assaults in two years in addition to all of the sexual assaults that P.S. and Captain McRae committed on CFB Namao. You can’t tell me that the Canadian Forces was a safe environment for children to grow up in.

I Missed it……

The Military Police Complaints Commission has recently been in contact with me regarding documents and other forms of information that I have in my possession from the 2015 through 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation into the acts of P.S. on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980.

In preparation for sending the pertinent information to the MPCC, I’ve been reviewing the documents. And I realized something. The second investigation was designed to fail from the word go.

In the summer of 2015, after I had spoken to J.S. and then subsequently his son P.S., I wrote a letter to the Chief of Defence Staff and I sent a courtesy copy to Bob Paulson who at the time was the commissioner of the RCMP. Within a few weeks I was contacted by RCMP Major Crimes Investigator Akrum Ghadban. Mr. Ghadban was on secondment to the CFNIS and was responsible for reviewing major cases. Mr. Ghadban said that he had reviewed the 2011 CFNIS investigation and that he had concerns about the investigation and that he was going to instruct the CFNIS on areas that he thought they could improve.

This led to a new interview being conducted between myself, RCMP Inspector Ghadban, and Sgt. Tenaschuk of the CFNIS. This interview took place on September 22nd, 2015 at the RCMP detachment at the University of British Columbia.

Just prior to the interview, Inspector Ghadban met with me. He said that he had concerns about aspects of the 2011 CFNIS investigation. He said that the 2011 investigation was not up to “contemporary policing standards”.

During the interview, Inspector Ghadban said that he was going to instruct the CFNIS to concentrate on four specific areas of the investigation.

First is that Inspector Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to track down and locate P.S.’s younger brother who also has the initials of P.S.. For clarity I will call P.S.’s younger brother P.S.2.

Second is that Inspector Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to track down Doug Schwirtz who in 1980 would have been around 9 years old and lived at PMQ 13 on 12th street and had potentially seen the kids on the front lawn of the S. PMQ attack me when I came out of P.S.’s PMQ after P.S. had been discovered buggering me in his bedroom.

Third is that Inspector Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to talk to retired Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham to find out what Cunningham knew about the 1980 investigation into Captain McRae. After all, both J.S. and Fred Cunningham indicated that the investigation into Captain McRae was commenced due to the complaints of numerous parents on CFB Namao about the interaction of P.S. with their young children.

Fourth is that Inspector Ghadban wanted the CFNIS to ascertain that I did in fact mention during my initial interview with the CFNIS in March of 2011 that I had tried reporting P.S. to the military police in 1984 and in 1990. This was specifially to counter Alberta Crown Prosecutor Jon Werbicki’s concern that I hadn’t tried reporting these crimes to anyone before.

True to CFNIS form, when Sgt. Tenaschuk tried locating P.S.2 he contacted the family again. The same very protective family that closed ranks around P.S. during the 2011 CFNIS investigation. When Tenaschuk contacted these family members, they all claimed that P.S.2. lived out on the West Coast and that they had lost contact with him years ago and they didn’t know how to get hold of him. As it turns out P.S.2. lives in London, Ontario which is just a hop, skip, and a jump away from Fort Erie, Ontario where his father J.S. and his older brother P.S. both live.

Tenaschuk tracked down Doug Schwirtz. I have no idea what questions Doug was asked. According to Sgt. Tenaschuk, Doug remembers absolutely nothing from back then.

I have no idea of what Sgt. Tenaschuk did so far as trying to locate records of me having tried to report P.S. to the military police in 1984 and 1990.

Sgt. Tenaschuk then contacted Fred Cunningham. According to Sgt. Tenaschuk he asked Fred Cunningham what he remembered about our telephone call on November 27th, 2011. Fred said that he couldn’t remember anything.

So, here’s what caught my eye. Tenaschuk wasn’t asked to talk to Fred Cunningham about our telephone call on March 27th, 2011. Sgt. Tenaschuk was instructed to talk to Fred Cunningham about the 1980 investigation into Captain McRae.

Sgt. Tenaschuk avoided asking Cunningham about the 1980 investigation, such as why did the base military police interrogate P.S. in his family’s PMQ in May of 1980? Why had Fred Cunningham been tasked with investigating Captain Father Angus McRae?

What did Fred Cunningham remember on November 27th, 2011? Quite a lot. What Fred Cunningham told me that day has been verified by Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit file DS 120-10-80 and by two separate Canadian Forces Fire Marshal reports.

During our brief phone call on November 27th, 2011 Fred identified another boy, younger than P.S. named F.A., as a “prolific pyromaniac”.

And what a pyromaniac he was. The Canadian Forces Fire Marshal identified F.A. as having been responsible for two separate house fires on CFB Namao. One of the Fire Marshal reports even goes on to identify this boy named F.A. as having been friends with P.S. and that P.S. had been at F.A.’s house earlier in the day prior to one of the fires and that both F.A. and P.S. had been playing with fire on the stove in the F.A. household.

The Fire Marshal’s report also indicated that this boy named F.A. wasn’t attending school as he had just recently been released from psychiatric care.

It was also noted in the most recent Fire Marshal report that F.A. seemed to like to play the role of the “hero” by “discovering” the fire and alerting people to the fire.

According to Fred Cunningham, when the charges stemming from F.A.’s complaint against Captain McRae were dropped by the “brass”, the boy named F.A. thought that P.S. had stabbed him in the back. Fred Cunningham said that the boy named F.A. had no idea that it was the “brass” that dropped all of the charges against McRae except for the charges related to P.S..

Fred Cunningham said that there had been a massive falling out between F.A. and P.S.

I asked Fred if this pyromaniac named F.A. had anything to do with the June 23rd, 1980 house fire at P.S.’s family’s PMQ.

Fred Cunningham said is that he wasn’t going to speak to that.

As I have the CF Fire Marshal’s report for the June 23rd, 1980 fire at the S. PQM, I know that Colonel Dan Munro’s signature was the final signature on the Fire Marshal’s investigation report for June 23rd, 1980 fire. In the Fire Marshal’s report, Colonel Dan Munro declines the need for further review of the cause of the fire.

I also learnt that someone did actually die in that fire. An Edmonton area civilian gas fitter employed on base by the Canadian Forces named Sam Stelter died as a result of trying to shut off the gas to prevent a major fire. Sam died of a heart attack in the basement of the S. family PMQ.

The Alberta Fire Marshal ruled that the house fire was due to a defective brass gas line behind the stove. I’ve often wondered since November 27th, 2011 just how hard it would have been for someone to have given that already defective gas line a simple tug. Someone with a grudge against a resident of the house. Another opportunity for someone to play the hero maybe?

Pure speculation I know.

Colonel Dan Munro was also Captain Father Angus McRae’s commanding officer.

Was Colonel Dan Munro the “brass” that dropped all of the charges against Captain McRae except for those relating to P.S.? Or was it someone higher up the chain of command?

In 2018, Sgt. Tenaschuk said that he wouldn’t be able to talk to Colonel Munro due to the 3-year time bar that existed in the National Defence Act prior to 1998.

It should be noted that the term “brass”never referes to a non-commissioned officer. If you were in the military, you would never call a Master Warrant Officer “the brass”. And you would almost certainly not call a junior rank officer “the brass”. It’s generally not until you get into the senior officer ranks that you start referring to officers as “the brass”. Colonel is the highest rank senior officer.

Above Colonel are the General / Flag officers. These you can call “the brass” as well.

Tenaschuk spooks the S. clan by contacting them and asking them for contact information for P.S.2 becuase he wants to talk to P.S.2 about what P.S. did in 1980. That family is extremely protective of P.S.. They view P.S. as the sole victim of Captain McRae. They obviously view the children that P.S. was abusing as being of no consequence. I wouldn’t be surprised at all if the S. clan blame all the children that P.S. abused on CFB Namao as being the driving force behind P.S. attempting suicide in January of 2000. See, we’re not victims, we’re ruthless cold hearted killers who won’t leave poor misunderstood P.S. alone.

During the 2015 through 2018 CFNIS investigation, I provided the CFNIS with the names of other victims of P.S.. The CFNIS took their statements, and kept them separate from my investigation. According to Tenaschuk, this was a decision by his superiors.

The Crime Stoppers appeal that was run in November of 2016 provided “numerous” tips with others coming forward with complaints about P.S.. None of this information was forwarded to the Alberta Crown in 2018.

Sure, my father died in January of 2017, but the CFNIS had a whole year and a bit to interview him again. The statement that he gave to the CFNIS in 2011 does not reflect the reality of my family as it was back in the late ’70s and early ’80s. More specifically my father’s statement to the CFNIS is 100% at odds with the answers he gave me when I examined him for Federal Court in 2013. I provided Sgt. Tenaschuk with the pertinent sections of my foster care / Alberta Social Service records as well as a copy of my father’s answers to my written examination. From what I’ve seen that was provided to the Alberta Crown in 2018, Sgt. Tenaschuk made no mention at all that he had any concerns about the validity of my father’s statement to the CFNIS in 2011. My father’s statement would have had a very negative effect on the Crown’s decision.

In 2018, in the same letter that Sgt. Tenaschuk informs me that he can’t talk to Colonel Dan Munro due to the 3-year time bar, Tenaschuk informs me that the P.S. “investigation is still with the Crown Prosecutor” and that he viwed this as a “positive note”.

Weeks later the 2015 through 2018 investigation goes down in flames.

Sgt. Tenaschuk informed me in 2018 that the Alberta Crown was declining to recommend charges as it wasn’t in the public interest.

In late 2018 an agency of the Alberta government reviews the 2015 through 2018 portion of the CFNIS investigation and can’t find any evidence that any type of criminal code offence occured.

From the documents that I’ve seen from another agency of the Alberta government, Sgt. Tenaschuk basically resubmitted Sgt. Hancock’s 2011 Crown Briefing.

I don’t think that it was Sgt. Tenaschuk’s decision. Someone within the chain of command within the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal ensured that the 2015 through 2018 portion of CFNIS GO 2011-5754 stayed concerned only with the four exact concerns that RCMP Inspector Akrum Ghadban had raised. This meant that the CFNIS excluded just about anything else that had been brought to their attention. Other victims, potential witnesses, details about the 1980 investigation, these were all excluded from the 2015 – 2018 investigation.

This explains why the Sgt. Tenaschuk bascially re-submitted Sgt. Hancock’s investigation to the Alberta Crown. Excluding all of the new evidence ensured that the Alberta Crown was just going to give the same answer they gave to the flawed 2011 investigation.

This means that the 2015 through 2018 portion of CFNIS investigation GO 2011-5754 was just yet another dog and pony show that was never meant to wake up long dead ghosts.

It will be very interesting to see where the current MPCC review goes. It’s abundantly clear that the Canadian Forces do not want to revisit anything from 1980. And considering how narrow and restricted the review process is, I have no doubt that the MPCC will have absolutely no choice but to find in favour of the CFNIS just like the last time.

And unless the powers of the MPCC have been improved since my last go round, the Provost Marshal holds all of the cards.

Two dog and pony shows for the price of one.

How could the Canadian Forces court martial for child sexual abuse.

I’m going to talk a little bit about the flaws in the National Defence Act that existed prior to 1985.
Specifically how the National Defence Act played with the average Canadian’s lack of understanding about the criminal code.


I’ve frequently been told that I’m wrong. I’ve been told that the Canadian Armed Forces could never court martial a service member for sexual assaults committed against a child. I’ve been told that the military couldn’t conduct a service tribunal for the crimes of “Murder, Manslaughter, and Rape” prior to 1985.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, Chapter N-4
National Defence Act
Section 60

Well, there’s a problem with that. The problem is that rape was never a crime that could apply to males. Rape was a crime that could only apply to females:

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 143 – Rape.

There you have it.
Rape is when a male has “sexual intercourse” with a female person who is not his wife. That automatically rules out males having sex with other males. It is also worth mentioning that when underage females were involved, the preferred charges were often Section 149 “Indecent Assault on a female”, or Section 146 “Sexual Intercourse with female under 14”.

What this means is that so long as the charge was not “Rape”, the military could conduct a service tribunal. This means that the Canadian Armed Forces could conduct a service tribunal for the offences indicated in sections 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, and 157 of the 1970 Criminal Code of Canada. And this criminal code was in place up to 1985. That means that the Canadian Forces had from 1950 until 1985 to conduct service tribunals for sexual crimes against children.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, Chapter N-4
National Defence Act
Section 120 gave the military the right to conduct service tribunals for Criminal Code matters

How many of these service tribunals did the Canadian Forces conduct?
Your guess is as good as mine.
It would appear that the record keeping system for criminal convictions prior to 1998 leaves a lot to be desired.

How many of these charges actually made it to a service tribunal?
Again, your guess is as good as mine as prior to November 1997, the commanding officer of the accused could dismiss any charge that had been brought against their subordinate.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, Chapter N-4
National Defence Act
Sections 139 and 140
Commanding officers could dismiss service offence charges brought against their subordinate.
Service offence charges also include all Criminal Code matters.

How many of these offences couldn’t be prosecuted due to the arbitrary 3-year time bar that the National Defence Act placed upon service offences?
Remember, section 120 of the National Defence Act made Criminal Code matters into Service Offences, so the 3 -year time bar did place a “statute of limitations” on Criminal Code matters that did not have a “statute of limitations”.
Again, we’ll probably never know. The Minister of National Defence could call an inquiry if he so chose to. But I really don’t think the Minister of National Defence really wants to open that Pandora’s box.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, Chapter N-4
National Defence Act
3-year “statute of limitations” on all service offences which include all criminal code matters.

What’s also not clear to me is when someone comes forward with a complaint of child sexual abuse from back in the ’70s for example and claims that they were molested on base by a member of the Canadian Armed Forces. Section 55(1) of the 1970 National Defence Act defines persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline. Section 55(2) states that a person who committed a crime while they were subject to the Code of Service Discipline continues to be liable for having committed a service offence even after they’ve left the military. Does this mean that the rules of the National Defence Act that were in place at the time also apply. Does that mean that Section 59 of the National Defence Act prevents the prosecution of historical child sexual assault matters?

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, Chapter N-4
National Defence Act
Continuing Liability for service offences which include all Criminal Code matters.

Charges other than rape.

Sex with an underage female:

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 146 – Underage

Section 146 is clearly not “Rape”. I believe that this would be called the “jail bait law”. I can only wonder how many times the Canadian Forces conducted a service tribunal for this crime. Notice that this is the charge for having “Sexual Intercourse” with a female child under the age of 14. This covers any age under the age of 14.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 146 (2).
“Of previously Chaste character” – code speak for “slut shaming”

Section 146(2) is what we’d call “slut shaming” in the modern day. Basically what Criminal Code s. 146(2) is stating is that if a man has sex with a virgin between the ages of 14 and 16, he has committed an indictable offence and can be sent to prison for up to 5 years. This also seems to imply that if the girl isn’t a virgin, then he hasn’t committed a crime at all.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 146 (3)
WTF?

Section 146(3) further states that the prosecutor has to show that the accused is MORE to blame than the girl otherwise the court can find the accused not guilty. I can see a lot of commanding officers using Section 146(3) in determining to not allow charges to proceed against their subordinate.

Criminal Code of Canada
Here’s an interesting charge that also is not rape.
As this is not rape, the Canadian Forces could conduct a service tribunal for this offence.

Section 148 of the 1970 Criminal Code is interesting. What exactly defines an idiot, imbecile, or for that matter “feeble-minded”?

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Criminal Code of Canada
Section 149
Indecent Assault on Female
Banging your daughter gets you up to 14 years and a whipping.
Banging your step-daughter / foster-daughter or a female ward gets you at most two years with no whipping.

From my experience, there were a lot of stepfamilies on base. How many times acts contrary to section 153 were committed on base is again anyone’s guess.

Buggery could also apply to hetrosexuals as well.
Buggery is the old-timey word for anal intercourse.
Section 158 allowed for a husband and wife to engage in buggery.
Section 158 also allowed any 2 persons whom were both over the age of 21 to engage in buggery.
The off thing with buggery is that there really wasn’t a victim, both parties were guilty.

Regina vs. Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan.

or how the CMAC straight up said that the Canadian Forces could conduct service tribunals for some forms of gross indecency.

Donald Joseph Sullivan was recently just convicted for crimes against numerous children that he committed during the 1970s when he was a boy scout leader in Ottawa area of Ontario. For some reason, the police never busted his ass in the ’70s. Donald disappeared from the Ottawa area and fell off the radar of the police for some reason.

The reason that Donald Joseph Sullivan fell of the radar of the Ottawa police in the ’70s is that he joined the Canadian Armed Forces. Donald went on to have some involvement with the Catholic church on CFB Gagetown, and that’s where he met most of his teenaged victims.

1986 Court Martial Appeal Court ruling
Regina vs. Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan.

The above section is from the Court Martial Appeal Court ruling when Corporal Donald Joseph Sullivan appealed his courts martial sentence for molesting four boys all over the age of consent on Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, in New Brunswick. One of Mr. Sullivan’s arguements was whether or not the Canadian Forces had the right to conduct a service tribunal for the crimes of “Gross Indecency”.

The finding of the CMAC explains how the Canadian Forces could conduct a service tribunal for sexual crimes involving children

Gross Indecency is an interesting charge. There is no clear definition of what Gross Indecency is other than it typically referred to any type of sexual relations between two males that did not involve Buggery. Rarely was the charge of Gross Indecency ever used in any type of heterosexual encounter.
Gross Indecency included:
Masturbation of the other person;
Oral Sex;
Kissing;
Fondling.

The Age of Consent.

As the CMAC ruling in the Regina vs. Donald Joseph Sullivan matter shows, the appearance of consent determined whether or not the Canadian Armed Forces could conduct a service tribunal for sexual assaults against children.

1970 Revised Statutes of Canada
Chapter C-34 Criminal Code
Section 140 Consent to Sexual Acts.

Consent.

As section 140 of the Criminal Code of Canada stated, a person under the age of 14 cannot consent to sexual relations.
Section 146 is “Sexual intercourse with female under fourteen”;
Section 149 is “Indecent Assault on Female”;
Section 156 is “Indecent Assault on Male”

What is “Indecent Assault”? Believe it or not, but just like Gross Indecency, Indecent Assault isn’t clearly defined in the Criminal Code. Best examples I can think of would be touching someone’s genitals without their consent, rubbing against someone for sexual gratification, groping someone for sexual gratification, of just plain touching anyone anywhere on their body in a sexual manner.

One thing that I’ve learnt from the Captain Father Angus McRae matter is that the “brass” reduced the number of charges brought against Captain McRae to only the charges involving P.S. who was apparently the only victim at the time who was over the age of 14 at the time of the CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae. The other victims of Captain McRae, F.A., and S.O., were 13 years of age when McRae was investigated by Warrant Officer Fred Cunningham of the CFSIU.

The CMAC ruling in the Donald Joseph Sullivan matter makes it very clear as to why the Canadian Forces would have dropped all of the charges against Captain McRae except for the charges related to P.S..

If the Canadian Forces had insisted on charging Captain McRae with crimes that he had committed against children under the age of 14, the Canadian Forces would have lost the right to have conducted a service tribunal. And by losing the right to have conducted a service tribunal, Captain McRae’s exploits would have been dealt with in the public courts where the Canadian Forces wouldn’t have been able to”throw a wall of secrecy” around the proceedings.

What, oh what were they hiding?
Oh yeah, 25 children molested on a military base by an officer of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Even in the matter of Regina vs. Donald Joseph Sullivan, all of the boys he was charged with molesting are all 14 years of age and older. You’re telling me that there were no boys under the age of 14 on CFB Gagetown? Was Mr. Sullivan checking birth certificates to ensure that he wasn’t messing around with a 12 year old or even an older looking 11 year old?

I don’t know about you, but I’m really kinda curious to know how many times the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence limited charges to those involving only children above the age of consent to ensure that these matters were dealt with in a service tribunal as opposed to in the civilian justice system.