CFNIS – Page 3 – Child sexual abuse in the Canadian Forces

Conflict of interest

One of the most signifcant examples of “Conflict of Interest” that I have ever seen is having the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service investigating crimes that could cause the Office of the Minister of National Defence to suffer civil actions.

Much as when Mr. P.S. sued Angus McRae in March of 2001, anyone who wants to initiate a civil action against a person who had sexually abused them while the abuser was subject to the Code of Service Discipline would also be required to sue the Office of the Minister of National Defence.

Granted, I can’t recall any sexual abuse at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae. However, that’s more a function of the alcohol that Captain McRae had his altar boy, Mr. P.S. give to me on the five distinct visits to McRae’s living quarters at the base chapel.

We know from the findings of the Fynes Public Interest Hearings that the investigators with the CFNIS do not run their own investigations. The chain of command within the CFNIS determine the scope and breadth of any particular CFNIS investigation.

This is one of the reason why you never hear of investigators within the CFNIS making “interference” complaints to the Military Police Complaints Commission. There can be no interference with a CFNIS investigation. CFNIS investigation do not belong to the investigator. Investigations that fall within the CFNIS mandate are always designed by the chain of command within the CFNIS.

Around 2016, Sgt Damon Tenaschuk told me he was about to submit a brief to the Alberta Crown. Sgt. Tenaschuk asked me if I thought he had done enough. I asked him if he had found other victims or witnesses. He said that he had not. So I asked him about running a Crime Stoppers appeal. He said to me that he would have to speak with his commanding officer to see if his C/O thought that this would be okay to do.

This was the Crime Stoppers Appeal.
Even though the connection between Captain McRae and Mr. P.S. had been well established, you’d be hard pressed to know that McRae had molested over 25 children on CFB Namao in this time period.

When Mr. P.G. made himself known to me as another victim of Mr. P.S., I passed his name on to Sgt, Damon Tenaschuk. Sgt. Tenaschuk informed me that CFNIS chain of command had decided that Mr. P.G.’s statement would be a separate complaint from mine and that my investigation would not contain any statement from Mr. P.G..

So, as you can see, it is the chain of command that runs the CFNIS investigations and not the CFNIS investigators. The CFNIS investigators are nothing more than “meat puppets” that dance as per their master’s wishes.

Much is made about the apparent “independence” of the CFNIS from local chain of command interference. However, the investigators within the CFNIS as well as the officers within the CFNIS hierarchy are all still subject to section 83 of the National Defence Act.

Section 83 of the National Defence Act sounds like a perfect reason as to why someone should just go along with the game plan and not make waves. And no, there are no exemptions from section 83. Section 83 applies to every person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline all the way from the Chief of Defence Staff all the way down to a fresh new baby faced recruit.

One thing that I am almost certain of now, is that due to the sheer number of children that Captain Father Angus McRae and his altar boy Mr. P.S.. molested on Canadian Forces Base Namao, I don’t think I’m anywhere near the first person to have ever brought a complaint against Mr. P.S..

Mr. P.S. had criminal convictions going back to 1985.

In the summer of 2012, I had made acquaintances with an RCMP constable from the Morinville Detachment in Edmonton. This Constable was the one who told me Mr. P.S.’s date of birth was June 20th, 1965. This was the first hint I had that the CFNIS were being far less than truthful with me when Sgt. Cyr tried to tell me that Mr. P.S. was only 13 years old in 1980. Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, a person under the age of 14 could not be tried for Criminal Code offences.

The RCMP constable that I had dealt with also ran a CPIC check on Mr. P.S.. The constable wouldn’t tell me any exact details from the CPIC check other than that in addition to the charges and convictions mentioned in the newspaper article, that Mr P.S. had numerous more convictions between 1985 and 2000. Some but not all the convictions were for child sexual assault. Now, what if these charges and convictions in the ’90s weren’t for “current” sexual assaults? What if this was other kids from CFB Namao coming forward with complaints against Mr. P.S. for what he had done on CFB Namao.

On January 14, 2000, Mr. P.S. tried to commit suicide. What if Mr. P.S.’s suicide attempt was due to the fact that he knew he was never going to be able to escape what he had done on CFB Namao? Both the 3-year time bar flaw and the summary investigation flaw meant that Captain Father Angus McRae could never be held responsible for what had occurred on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980. However, as Mr. P.S. was not subject to the Code of Service Discipline, he could be held responsible for what had happened on CFB Namao, regardless of the fact that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae may have forced or induced Mr. P.S. to act the way he did on CFB Namao from 1978 until 1980.

That I think would drive anyone to the point of suicide.

It is apparent now that the CFNIS knew right from the word go of the connection between Mr. P.S. and Captain Father Angus McRae.

When I was interviewed by Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock in March of 2011, he asked me some peculiar questions during the video interview that didn’t make sense at the time. When Sgt. Christian Cyr contacted me on May 3rd, 2011 and told me that Mr. P.S. was only 13 years old in the spring of 1980 he was trying to set me up to believe that Mr. P.S. was too young at the time of the sexual offences to have charges brought against him. And if Sgt. Cyr had just shut his damn mouth at the time, I might have believed him. But Sgt. Cyr had to be a dumbass and he had to mention Captain Father Angus McRae being arrested for molesting children on the base. It was at that point that I knew something was going wrong with the investigation.

Then on July 18th, 2011 during a telephone conversation between myself and Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger, MWO Eisenmenger told me that his investigators couldn’t find any evidence that Mr. P.S. had committed the crimes that I had accused him of and that this case was going no where due to a complete lack of evidence. It was interesting when I made my application for Judicial Review in 2013 and I received the certified tribunal records, I discovered that when I spoke to MWO Eisenmenger, the CFNIS hadn’t yet talked to any other victims or even tried to contact Mr. P.S. at that point in time.

All of this tells me that the CFNIS are well aware of who Mr. P.S. is. And I have no doubt in my mind that the CFNIS are well aware of the $4.3 million dollar civil action that Mr. P.S. brought against the Minister of National Defence in March of 2001.

I also have no doubt that the CFNIS are well aware that the Office of the Minister of National Defence accepted Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of Captain McRae.

I have the Department of Justice paperwork from when the DOJ represented the Minister of National Defence in this matter. Most of it is blanked out. But it is safe to say that in convincing Mr. P.S. to settle out of court, the Office of the Minister of National Defence agreed to certain terms favourable to Mr. P.S.. I can only wonder if one of these terms is that the Office of the Minister of National Defence agreed to ensure that Mr. P.S. would no longer face any “harassment” related to his actions on CFB Namao in the years of 1978 until 1980. I know this sounds crazy, but there’s the conversation that Mr. P.S. had with CFNIS investigator Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk in August of 2011.

What exactly was Mr. P.S. talking about when he said that anything he had been involved in as a youth “had already been handled by the military”. Is Mr. P.S. referring to the terms of his out of court settlement with the Minister of National Defence? If the CFNIS were to have brought charges against Mr. P.S., and this broke the terms of the out of court settlement agreement, would this allow Mr. P.S. to take further action against the Minister of National Defence hence the comment “a lawyer would be handling that”?

What’s very interesting is that the CFNIS scrubbed the line “anything he had been involved in as a youth had already been handled by the military” from the Crown Brief that was submitted to the Alberta Crown both in 2011 and in 2018.

This is what Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk submitted to the Alberta Crown in 2018
Notice something missing?

This is what was submitted by Sgt. Robert Jon Hancock in 2011

Besides that fact that Sgt. Damon Tenaschuk basically resubmitted the 2011 CFNIS investigation Crown Brief to the Alberta Crown again in 2018, it’s rather intersting that the CFNIS thought there was a need to remove the comment about the military “handling things” for Mr. P.S.

The sad thing is, it looks as if the Alberta Crown doesn’t know, or doesn’t care that it was fed a load of B.S.

And this brings me right back around to the issue of Conflict of Interest.

The CFNIS were well aware of the history of Mr. P.S., and in doing a CPIC check on Mr. P.S., they would have discovered that they were dealing with a sexual predator that had a thing for young children.

Yes, these past convictions from 1984 onward don’t necessarily prove that Mr. P.S. sexually abused me, my brother, and 4 other children that I knew he abused on a regular basis. However, these past convictions do prove that Mr. P.S. is deserving of a thorough investigation. An investigation that would be more deeper and detailed than someone who had a CPIC record check that came back negative for any criminal interactions.

What this does tell me though is that the CFNIS investigation was influenced by chain of command authority in such a manner as to ensure that Mr. P.S. was never again charged for any crime that he committed on Canadian Forces Base Namao after the date of his 14th birthday on June 2oth, 1979.

The only question is this.

Was this decision made so as not to break any covenant agreed to in the out of court settlement between Mr. P.S. and the Office of the Minister of National Defence, or was this decision not to charge Mr. P.S. made solely to ensure that the chain of liability between the Office of the Minister of National Defence and the victims of both Mr. P.S. and Captain McRae remains severed?

Remember, the Office of the Minister of National Defence did accept General Legal Liability for the personal injuries that Mr. P.S. suffered at the hands of Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae. Now that the Office of the Minister of National Defence has accepted liability for the abuse Mr. P.S. suffered, how hard would it be for the victims of Mr. P.S. to also make claims of liability against the Office of the Minister of National Defence? If there had been criminal convictions brought against Mr. P.S., claims of civil liability would be rather elementary to establish in court. Without criminal convictions brought against Mr. P.S., suing the Office of the Minister of National Defence would be a fruitless endeavour as the Office of the Minister could argue that no crime occurred.

And the Minister just happens to be ultimately in charge of the police force that would possibly subject his own office to civil liability.

And this is why I believe that this whole investigation from the word “Go” has been a classic textbook example of what a conflict of interest looks like.

The Summary Investigation Flaw

If you thought that yesterday’s post relating to the 3-year time bar flaw was interesting, you ain’t seen anything yet.

Legislative Summary LS-311E detailed another interesting flaw that existed in the National Defence Act prior to 1998. The flaw had been temporarily addressed via an administrative order in November of 1997, but nonetheless this flaw was so substantial that it had to be addressed by Bill C-25 “An Act to Make Amendments to the National Defence Act”.

Sections 160 to 162 of the 1985 National Defence Act

Sections 138 through 140 of the 1970 National Defence Act

Section 138 of the 1970 Act, and Section 160 of the 1985 Act defines “commanding officer” as being the commanding officer of the accused. In the case of Captain Father Angus McRae, the Canadian Forces have confirmed that CFB Namao base commander Colonel Dan Munro was Captain McRae’s commanding officer.

Section 139 of the 1970 Act, and Section 161 of the 1985 Act both stipulate that after a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline has been charged with a Service Offence, the commanding officer of the accused will conduct a summary investigation.

Section 140 of the 1970 Act, and Section 162 of the 1985 Act both stipulate that the commanding officer of the accused has the power to dismiss charges brought against their subordinate. Or the commanding officer could cause the charges to proceed against their subordinate.

The Canadian Forces didn’t have an independent “prosecutor” until after the passing of Bill C-25 in 1998. The commanding officer had the primary discretion to either proceed with charges or to dismiss the charges. Once the commanding officer made this decision, they would pass this up the chain of command to the “prosecutor”.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia had some very serious reservations of the Commanding Officer acting as a prosecutorial agent.
The Commission found that commanding officers could operate as investigators, prosecutors, and judiciary. The Commission pointed out that in the Civilian justice system, those three roles were conducted by three completely separate entities. Civilian police have no sway over the prosecutors and prosecutors have no sway over the judiciary. Commanding officers on the other hand could be subjected to “command influence”. Military police officers had to obey the commands of superior officers.

What did Legislative Summary LS-311E have to say about Section 160 to 162 of the 1985 National Defence Act?

The decision to prosecute or not to prosecute was in the hands of commanding officers prior to November of 1997. As the Somalia Inquiry discovered, these commanding officers had no legal training, no legal background, swore no peace officer’s oath. Their decisions could easily be influenced by the chain of command as well as the commanding officer’s own parochial interests.

What charges could a commanding officer dismiss prior to November of 1997?
Gross Indecency;
Indecent Assault;
Buggery;
Sexual Interference;
Invitation to Sexual Touching;
and Sexual Exploitation.
These were crimes that the Canadian Forces were not precluded from conducting a service tribunal for.

“regardless of whether or not the commanding officer would have the authority to try the accused on the charge”

What I am not certain of, but seems to be indicated nonetheless by the language in the italics on page 18 of Legislative Summary LS-311e, is could commanding officers dismiss charges related to Murder, Manslaughter, and Rape? Commanding officers definitely would not have had the authority to try the accused on the charges of Murder, Manslaughter, and Rape.

What is the fallout of a commanding officer dismissing charges prior to November of 1997?

As LS-311E states “the effect of a decision of a commanding officer to dismiss a charge is that no other authority – military or civil- can thereafter proceed against the accused on the charge or any substantially similar offence arising out of the same facts”.

This means that anyone, who as a child was sexually abused on a military base, and whose abuser had their charges dismissed or reduced by their abuser’s commanding officer, could never bring charges against their abuser today.

According to the babysitter’s father, with whom I spoke to in July of 2015, the military police on CFB Namao in 1980 knew of 25 other children being molested by Captain McRae.

According to former Canadian Forces Special Investigations Unit acting section commander Fred R. Cunningham, with whom I spoke in November of 2011, the military police in 1980 had numerous more charges ready to go to court martial against McRae, but that the “brass” reduced the number of charges brought against Captain McRae to only those involving the babysitter / altar boy.

Why did the Canadian Forces try to bury this matter in 1980?

It would have been quite embarrassing for the Canadian public to have found out that an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces had been committing “Acts of Homosexuality” with children as young as five years of age, on a military base none the less.

What were the implications of dropping the “excess” charges against Captain McRae and only charging him with enough offences to get him booted out of the military? If any child between May of 1980 and May of 1983 had tried to bring charges against Captain McRae, and those charges were similar to the charges that had been dropped, Captain McRae could not be charged.

What are the implications of the 3-year time bar? Anyone who had been sexually abused by Captain McRae would never have been able to bring charges against McRae after May of 1983.

It is apparent that the 3-year time bar flaw and the Summary Investigation flaw make it almost virtually impossible for anyone who was sexually abused as a child to bring charges against their abuser.

I wish I could say that these two flaws were the only issues that could stymie a person’s quest for justice.

However, as I will discuss in future blog postings, there are other issues at play that stand as road blocks to justice.

Unbelievable

I recently watched a Netflix series called “Unbelievable”. This is a must watch program if you’re ever interested in just how badly the police themselves can screw up an investigation.

The story starts off in August of 2008 when an 18 year old woman named “Marie” makes a report to the Lynnwood Police Department that she had been raped. The police investigators in this matter screwed up the investigation from the start. They hounded “Marie”, they intimidated “Marie”, they made “Marie” repeat her story over and over all the while picking her story apart due to what they considered to be “inconsistencies”.
The investigating officers placed special emphasis upon the statements of two of “Marie’s” former foster parents who thought that “Marie” wasn’t behaving like someone who had just been raped.
In the end, “Marie” was coerced into admitting that she made the whole story up.
The Lynnwood Police charged “Marie” with making a “False Report”
In March of 2009 she was fined $500 by the courts and sentenced to probation, and ordered to attend counselling.

It wouldn’t be until February of 2011 that “Marie” was proved to have not lied at all. The FBI along with two Colorado police detectives from two different Colorado police departments arrested a man named Marc O’Leary. Upon searching his house for evidence, the police found a hard drive that contained pictures of “Marie” the night she had been raped and photographed by Marc O’Leary.

The two Lynnwood Police sergeants that had originally coerced “Marie” into admitting that she lied faced no repercussions.
The City of Lynnwood did however refund “Marie” her $500 fine.
“Marie” later settled out of court with the city for $150k.

How did this happen?
I wish I knew.
But, from my personal experience, this happens quite frequently.
Police quite frequently start investigations with preconceived biases already floating around inside of their skulls.

In my case, I have no doubt in my mind that the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service was well aware of who my abuser was, I have no doubt in my mind that the CFNIS knew about my abuser’s lengthy criminal record with numerous charges and convictions for sexual crimes involving children, I also have no doubt that the CFNIS knew of the direct connection between Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae, and my abuser, Mr. P.S.

Much like in “Marie’s” matter, my care giver at the time I was being abused gave the CFNIS in 2011 a false statement. Why’d he give the CFNIS a false statement? My Alberta Social Service paperwork from my childhood contained a report from a psychologist that had been hired by the Canadian Forces in October of 1980 to evaluate my family. This psychologist found that my father accepted no responsibility for his family, blamed others for problems with his family, expected others to solve his problems for him. My child case workers noted that my father often told conflicting stories from one session to the next, and that he often told people in positions of authority what they wanted to hear.

I honestly don’t remember much of my father from before we were posted to Canadian Forces Base Downsview in the spring of 1983. Prior to us living on CFB Downsview, my father was usually frequently away on training exercises or missions with the Canadian Forces. I know that on CFB Shearwater, he was frequently away. He was also away frequently when we lived on CFB Summerside. After my mother left in the spring of 1977, my father asked his mother to move in with us and raise my brother and I.
When my grandmother moved back to Edmonton in the spring of 1978, my father received a compassionate posting to CFB Namao to be near his mother. Upon our arrival at CFB Namao, grandma and her husband moved into the house on base to again raise my brother and I. My father was infrequently home.

I think my father told the CFNIS investigators what they wanted to hear because he didn’t want to own up to the fact that it was his own alcoholic mother that he had brought into the house to raise his kids hired the babysitter that would end up molesting his sons for over a year and a half.

I also think that my father still bore some shame for the way that he would stand aside while I was psychologically traumatized in his presence by Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Terry Totzke. My father never once stood up to Captain Totzke. Sadly, my father seemed to absorb Captain Totzke’s ideas, and my father brought those ideas into our house on CFB Greisbach. I’ll talk more about Captain Totzke in a later post.

When I had my first frank talk with my father back in 2006 about Mr. P.S. and what he had done to me and my brother, my father wasn’t shocked. In fact my father had named Mr. P.S.. My father implored me to understand that he had nothing to do with the hiring of Mr. P.S. and that hiring Mr. P.S. had been my grandmother’s fault and that she was to blame.

I think my father’s statement played right into the hands of the chain of command within the CFNIS as when I spoke with Master Warrant Officer Terry Eisenmenger on July 18th, 2011, he stated that the CFNIS couldn’t find any evidence to corroborate my complaint against Mr. P.S. and that it looked as if my complaint was groundless and without merit.