Or How the Minister of National Defence Controls ALL aspects of the military Justice System.
It may seem hard to believe, but the Minister of National Defence is probably one of the most powerful ministers in the Canadian Government. And I don’t mean this because the minister controls the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
I say this because the Minister of National Defence has the ability to directly control investigations undertaken by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service and the Canadian Forces Military Police.
And don’t forget, as the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence are not legally responsible for the damages suffered by civilians on Defence Establishments, a civilian wishing to receive compensation for the damages suffered at the hands of a member of the Canadian Armed Forces on a Defence Establishment would have to initiate a civil action against the Minister of National Defence.
Yes. That Minister. The very same Minister that can issue commands to ANY member of the Canadian Forces. And that member may have the ability in turn to issue further commands to a subordinate.
Section 83 of the National Defence Act deals with ‘INSUBORDINATION”.
Section 83 of the National Defence Act applies equally to ALL members of the Canadian Forces. There are no exceptions for the Provost Marshal, the commanding officer of the CFNIS, or the division commanding officers of the CFNIS.
And the National Defence Act uses the term “lawful” instead of “legal” for a reason. Not every command a commanding officer gives is legal. And in the exception of outrageously illegal orders i.e. firing on unarmed civilians, the solider receiving the order isn’t expected to weigh the legal merits of the order.
The Chain of Command for the Canadian Armed Forces looks like such:
Minister of National Defence –> Chief of Defence Staff –> Vice Chief of Defence Staff –> Provost Marshal –> CFNIS Commanding Officer –> CFNIS detachment commanding officer –> CFNIS investigator.
This more than qualifies as an example of a “conflict of interest scenario”.
Another issue is Section 18.4 and Section 18.5 of the National Defence Act.
Section 18.4 of the National Defence Act give the Provost Marshal command over any investigation undertaken by any subordinate within the Canadian Forces Military Police Group, the Canadian Forces Military Police, and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service.
Section 18.4 also gives the Provost Marshal the responsibility for conducting the initial Professional Standards Review that must be undertaken prior to a person making a complaint to the Military Police Complaints Commission.
This means that the Minister of National Defence knows exactly what a complaint against the CFNIS is all about.
Section 18.5 ensures that the Minister of National Defence pretty well has a direct pipeline into any investigation undertaken by the military police. Including not only the investigation of criminal code matters which could subject the minister to civil actions, but also the subsequent Professional Standards Review conducted after the CFNIS completes its investigation.
If the Vice Chief of Defence Staff issued any instructions or guidelines to the Provost Marshal, these instructions or guidelines are supposed to be made public. However, the Provost Marshal can simply decline to issue these instructions or guidelines. And as the Vice Admiral Mark Norman affair indicated, when you go hunting for information like this within the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence, it may not be easy to obtain if the CF or DND have used code names or code words for the file or documents that you are requesting.
If I were to submit an ATI to DND requesting copies of any directions or instructions issued by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Provost Marshal, unless DND used my name in the document or some other identifying information, I wouldn’t be able to request the document.
In my matter from Canadian Forces Base Namao, this is why the CFNIS were hellbent on establishing that I was not sexually abused by P.S.. P.S. was a juvenile at the time. And at the time the Juvenile Delinquents Act held that an adult that contributed to the delinquency of a minor was culpable for the crimes committed by that juvenile. It was established in CFSIU investigation 120-10-80 and court martial CM62 July 18th, 1980, that Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae was abusing numerous children on Canadian Forces Base Namao from August of 1978 until May of 1980.
P.S., who had been my baby-sitter on CFB Namao from late 1978 until spring of 1980 had been sexually abusing numerous children on the base, and had been taking some of us to be abused at the base chapel.
If the CFNIS were to have established that P.S. did in fact molest numerous children on the base as a result of the abuse he endured at the hands of Captain McRae as well as instructions given by Captain McRae, the Office of the Minister of National Defence would surely be subject to numerous civil actions.
However, if the CFNIS were unable to substantiate that a person with multiple convictions for child sexual abuse had in fact molested numerous other children on Canadian Forces Base Namao from late 1978 until the spring of 1980, that would pretty well ensure that the Office of the Minister of National Defence would not face the risk of civil actions. After all, you can’t sue for something that didn’t occur.
And isn’t in convenient that the police agency responsible for finding this criminal connection is also under the direct command of the agency that would face litigation in a civil action.
It is readily apparent in the current matter involving both Vance and Sajjan that there is corruption within the Canadian Armed Forces.
And this corruption is nothing new.
This corruption has been allowed to exist because the Canadian Forces have been able to keep control of their own in-house “justice system”. A system that really isn’t concerned about justice but seems to be more concerned about keeping secrets.